

項目	1990年	1991年	1992年	1993年	1994年	1995年	1996年	1997年	1998年	1999年	2000年	2001年	2002年	2003年	2004年	2005年	2006年	2007年	2008年	2009年	2010年	2011年	2012年	2013年	2014年	2015年	2016年	2017年	2018年	2019年	2020年	2021年	2022年	2023年	2024年	2025年	2026年	2027年	2028年	2029年	2030年	2031年	2032年	2033年	2034年	2035年	2036年	2037年	2038年	2039年	2040年	2041年	2042年	2043年	2044年	2045年	2046年	2047年	2048年	2049年	2050年	2051年	2052年	2053年	2054年	2055年	2056年	2057年	2058年	2059年	2060年	2061年	2062年	2063年	2064年	2065年	2066年	2067年	2068年	2069年	2070年	2071年	2072年	2073年	2074年	2075年	2076年	2077年	2078年	2079年	2080年	2081年	2082年	2083年	2084年	2085年	2086年	2087年	2088年	2089年	2090年	2091年	2092年	2093年	2094年	2095年	2096年	2097年	2098年	2099年	2100年																																																								
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Appendix A

The E-Speak Architectural Specification

Developer Release 3.03

Chapter 1 Introduction

This document specifies the e-speak architecture. It defines the abstractions presented by the system and the components that implement those abstractions, and shows how the components interact to create useful services. The following companion documents are also available:

- E-speak *Programmers Guide* defines the interface for e-speak programmers and system developers building e-speak-enabled applications.
- E-speak *Installation Guide* shows how to install e-speak and how to run some simple applications.
- E-speak *Contributed Services* describes several sample applications included with the distributed software.
- E-speak *Tools Documentation* shows how to use tools provided for analyzing the system.

Vision

Computing with e-speak is a paradigm switch, aiming to bring a “just plug in, use the services you need, and pay per usage” model to computation, as opposed to the “install on your machine and pay per installation” model of computation prevalent today. E-speak is the infrastructure that realizes the vision of such a model. Instead of thinking of computing as some hardware you buy and the software you install on it, e-speak encourages you to think of computing as a set of services you access as needed.

The reality of computing today is that it is much more complex than a utility like the electric or water system. An immense variety of computing resources exists, both in type and in power, and a newer, faster, cheaper, or better resource is probably invented by the time you finish reading this sentence. This dynamism is a formidable challenge to interoperability.

At the same time, most of these resources are being connected to each other on a range of scales, from homes to companies to the entire globe. The hardware necessary to support such a computational utility is already available and getting better by the day. On the software front, though the Web has essentially achieved the status of a *data* utility, actual computation remains mainly confined to individual machines and operating systems.

E-speak enables a *computation* utility by interposing on and mediating every resource access in a process called *virtualization*. This broad abstraction yields a model where machines, ranging from a supercomputer to a beeper, can be looked at uniformly and can cooperate to provide and use services.

Goals

E-speak aims at enabling ubiquitous services over the network- making existing resources (e.g., files, printers, Java objects, or legacy applications) available as services, as well as lowering the barriers to providers of new services. The infrastructure's goal is to provide the basic building blocks for service creation, including:

- Secure access to resources and service
- Usage monitoring, billing, and access control
- Advertising and discovery of new services
- Mechanisms for negotiation to find the "best" service
- Independence of operating system, language, and device
- Ability to support large enterprise-wide, intra-enterprise, and global deployments

Architectural Philosophy

This document specifies the e-speak architecture. There are four key concepts:

- **Resource:** Any computational service, such as a file or a banking service, that is virtualized by e-speak.
- **Client:** An active entity that requests access to Resources or responds to such requests.
- **Protection domain:** The part of the e-speak environment visible to a Client.
- **Logical machine:** An active entity that performs the operations needed to implement e-speak.

E-speak is based on the following:

- All Resource access is mediated; e-speak sees all Resource requests.
- All Resource access is virtualized; e-speak maps between virtual and actual references.
- Names for Resources are shared by convention only; e-speak keeps a separate name space for each Client.

This document does not specify anything outside of the e-speak architecture. However, some implementation details are included to show some points. These sections are marked "informational."

Environment

E-speak is designed to work in a hostile, networked environment such as the Internet. It isolates service providers and their clients from an inherently insecure medium while allowing them to negotiate safely, form contracts, and exchange confidential information and services without fear of attack.

Intended Audience

This E-speak *Architecture Specification* describes the lower-level interfaces of e-speak for:

- Implementors of Client libraries to provide a higher level of abstraction for e-speak
- Implementors of utilities and tools to manage and manipulate e-speak
- Implementors of e-speak emulation routines that are used in the run-time environment for legacy applications
- Implementors of extensions to existing services and resources used by Clients
- System administrators who implement policies for security and resource lookup
- Those designing and building their own implementations of e-speak

Structure

This specification consists of the following major sections, in the order listed:

- An overview of the e-speak architecture
- A description of the data structures used by e-speak to describe Resources-Resource metadata
- The interfaces to the e-speak platform that are exposed as "Core-managed Resources"
- A description of Vocabularies, the mechanism for processing Resource descriptions to discover and match Resources to the Client's description of Resources needed
- The e-speak mechanisms used for access control
- The e-speak communication architecture
- The exceptions that can be generated by the e-speak platform

- The e-speak Event Service
- The e-speak management architecture
- The e-speak Respository used for storing Resource metadata (informational)
- A description of how localization is implemented (informational)
- A glossary of terms
- A brief description of probable future extensions to e-speak (informational)

Conventions

There are several document conventions worth noting:

- New terms are introduced in the document flow with italics.
- Programmatically visible architectural abstractions are written with the first letter of each word capitalized, such as Protection Domain.
- Logical names, method names, and other programmatic labels are written in Courier font.
- Even though e-speak is independent of the programming language, the specification uses Java syntax.
- Sections describing material outside of the architecture are shown with the word "Informational" in the chapter or section title.

Developer Release

Chapter 2 Architecture Overview

All system functionality and e-speak abstractions build on top of one single first-class entity in the e-speak architecture- a Resource. A Resource is a uniform description of active entities such as a service or passive entities such as hardware devices. Unlike most platforms, e-speak deals only with data about Resources, *metadata*, and not Resource-specific semantics. Thus, a file Resource within the e-speak environment is simply a description of the attributes of the file and how it can be accessed. The e-speak platform does not access the file directly. A Resource-specific handler that is attached to the e-speak platform receives messages from e-speak and directly accesses the Resource.

Access to e-speak is provided by the e-speak Service Interface (ESI). Client applications and Resource Handlers are linked with a library that provides this interface. The library communicates with the e-speak platform using the *Session Layer Security Protocol* (SLS). The e-speak platform mediates all Resource access. Every access to a Resource through e-speak involves two different sets of manipulations:

- 1 The e-speak platform uses its Resource descriptions for dynamic discovery of the most appropriate Resource, transparent access to remote Resources, and sending Events to management tools.
- 2 The Resource-specific handler directly accesses the Resource such as reading the disk blocks for a file.

E-speak treats all Resource accesses in exactly the same manner. This mediated yet uniform access is the design principle that allows the e-speak environment to accommodate any kind of Resource type flexibly, even Resources dynamically defined after the e-speak system has started.

The e-speak platform maintains an environment for each of its Clients, called a *Protection Domain*. A Protection Domain is analogous to a "home directory" in an operating system. It contains bindings to Resources created by the Client and e-speak keeps track of memory usage due to these bindings.

A single instance of the e-speak platform is called a *Logical Machine*. Figure 1 shows a single Logical Machine. There may be multiple Logical Machines on a single physical machine, or the components of a Logical Machine may be distributed across multiple machines. Logical Machines are independent entities that communicate using the Session Layer Security Protocol as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 1 Resource access in e-speak




Figure 2 Communicating e-speak logical machines

Each e-speak Logical Machine has a single instance of the e-speak Core. All Resource access is through the Core that uses the Resource metadata to mediate and control each access. To access a Resource, a Client sends a message to the e-speak Core naming the Resource. The e-speak Core uses the Resource metadata to locate the Resource Handler and forwards the message to the Resource Handler that, in turn, physically accesses the Resource.

Although Figure 1 shows the Resource Handler being outside the Core (i.e., in a separate process), the handler for some Resources is the Core itself; these Resources are inside the Core and are called *Core-managed Resources*. E-speak Clients can manage and interact with the Core by sending messages to these Resources. For example, one kind of Core-managed Resource is a *Resource Factory*. When a Client wants to create a new Resource instance, it sends a message to the Resource Factory to register the Resource metadata with e-speak.

Logically, there are three categories of Resource access:

- A service provider can choose to register the metadata of its service. The e-speak Resource model describes the contents of this metadata.
- A Client or service provider may look up a service and bind to it, prior to accessing it. The search rules and the information model for descriptions are defined by the registered Resource metadata.
- A Client or service provider may invoke an entry point on a service. The previous two are special cases of this last one, because they may be considered as invocations on entry points of Core-managed services.

In all cases, the mediating e-speak Cores perform name resolution and generate monitoring information as part of this access.

Clients who wish to access a service do so through the e-speak Core, which uses the appropriate Resource metadata to route the Client request to the correct handler, after having performed all desired name translation, and other e-speak functionality.

The following sections outline the various components of the e-speak architecture and describe the steps in a service access.

Mediation Architecture

Following are the main components of the mediation architecture:

- A set of Core-managed Resources inside the e-speak Core. The Core-managed services present the system functionality for managing the e-speak platform, including creating Protection Domains and their contents and managing Resource metadata.
- A Repository containing Resource metadata available to Clients of the Logical Machine. These are the metadata that the Core evaluates during any service access.
- A routing engine that routes all service access messages based on the contents of the metadata of Resources referred to in the parameters of the message. The implications of this are discussed below.

Resource Model

The Resource is a representation of an *e-service* within e-speak. Service providers register the metadata of their services (e-speak Resources) with the Core. This includes the information depicted in Table 1.

Table 1 Resource Model

Description	An attribute-based specification of the Resource
Vocabulary	The definition of the attributes and their types used in descriptions and lookups
Resource Handler Mailbox	The process/thread/task that handles the Resource
Contract	Denotes the Application Programming Interface (API) supported by the provider, including version and similar information
Resource mask, owner public key and service ID	Access control information
Private Resource-specific data	Data important to the provider of the Resource, such as the provider's internal name for the Resource. Not interpreted by e-speak.
Public Resource-specific data	Data important to the user of the Resource, such as a stub for invoking methods. Not interpreted by e-speak.

The Resource metadata is maintained in the mediating Core's Repository. All functionality presented through the Core must have metadata within the Core. This is true even for the functionality provided by the Core itself.

Metadata System

The e-speak metadata system is based on the following architectural and semantic entities:

- Vocabularies are created as first-class Core-managed services. Thus, the model includes a metalanguage for creating a whole range of vocabularies with which to describe services, much like that of XML. XML document type definitions (DTDs) can be handled through the e-speak *Vocabulary Builder*.

The representation of vocabularies as Resources ensures that they can be dynamically discovered and protected from illegal access, and that access to them is mediated as required, like any other service in e-speak. In the e-speak architecture, a created Vocabulary decides the validity of an attribute description provided by a registering service provider.

The Core-managed Vocabulary service also includes a matching engine that is used to match Resource descriptions available in the Repository with search requirements of Clients of e-speak.

- Attribute-based service descriptions are used by service providers as part of service registration. These attribute descriptions are sets of name-value pairs in a specific vocabulary. The Vocabulary is either one that the service provider previously created (using the Vocabulary Builder) or discovered through the discovery facilities provided by the e-speak Core services.
- *Search Recipes* are objects that hold a Client's recipe for discovering a Resource. The Core uses this to process the Resource discovery request. A Search Recipe specifies what Resources the Client is looking for, how the lookup should be done, and what should be done if multiple matches occur. The Search Recipe contains the predicates and a Repository view mechanism with which to constrain the search. A search predicate is constructed with a Vocabulary and a constraint string expressed in that Vocabulary. The predicate is expressed in a form based on the Object Management Group trader services constraint grammar.
- The operational realization of the metadata system includes support for including arbitrary advertising services as part of extended searches, arbiters to optimize matches found through the Core Repositories, and integration of

Vocabulary translation services with the lookup/discovery process. Advertising services provide scalability to service lookup in e-speak by supplying a means to find Resources not registered in the local Repository. Arbiters are used to affect special purpose optimizations such as handling multiple hits in lookups. Translation services can be integrated with Core-managed Vocabulary services or created as external services, thus allowing for translation between Vocabularies.

Naming Model

The e-speak naming system is based on the following principles.

- E-speak Names are Universal Resource Locators (URLs).
- Name spaces are maintained in container Core-managed Resources called *Name Frames*. Name Frames can themselves contain other Name Frames, so each e-speak Core has a hierarchy of Name Frames beginning from its “root” Name Frame. By default, when the Client specifies the name of a service, the e-speak Core, starting with its root Name Frame, finds mapping between the name and a name unique to this Core. In addition, a client can specify a name beginning in the root Name Frame of another e-speak Core, by specifying the host in the e-speak Name.
- The e-speak Core provides the only valid reference to a service as a name in the Client-specific name space. This is like a virtual address of a service. The physical address of a service, the Core's name, is not a valid Client reference for a service.
- There are two ways for a Client to get a name for a service. First, another Client, application, or service provider can pass it the name. Second, a Client may obtain a per-Client name through a bind call that requires a Search Recipe as a parameter. The e-speak system (Core and Client libraries) looks up the name in local Repositories, known remote Repositories, and if necessary a global advertising service to locate the appropriate service and create a binding for the Client in its name space.

- Bindings in e-speak are objects that capture an algorithm. At their simplest, bindings may capture a Search Recipe. These bindings may be resolved and frozen to a specific Core name or names, resolved and cached, or simply resolved on each access. This gives the e-speak system an active naming model. Even when resolved, a Client reference may be bound to multiple Core names, which may be arbitrated prior to service access. This may be done by using a Client-specified arbitration service that picks one particular service from a list of services represented in a binding.

Access Control

E-speak security is based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Specifically it uses the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) developed within the Internet Engineering Task Force.

All entities in e-speak (Resources and Cores) are identified by public keys. To authenticate an entity, we verify that it knows the private key corresponding to the given public key. No entity should ever intentionally share its private key or give anybody access to the private key.

Any entity can create a key-pair. Provided the private key is kept secret, the key-pair is unique to that entity. However, having a key-pair gives you no power in the system. It is necessary also to have certificates stating access rights issued to your public key.

In e-speak, access rights are stated in *attribute certificates*. So as well as the conventional use of certificates to bind a name to a public key (e.g. X.509), we also use certificates to bind access rights to public keys. This helps to have online access control databases or access control lists.

To decide whether to honor an incoming request a Resource Handler must decide if it has a certificate (or certificates) granting access rights for the request. If it finds such a certificate, it must verify that the sender of the request knows the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate to which the access rights have been given (formally this is the subject of the certificate). It does this by a cryptographic protocol that is described in Chapter 6, "Communication".

Finally before honoring the request, the Resource Handler must verify that it trusts whoever issued the certificate. It does this by verifying that the certificate has been signed by an entity that it trusts. Resource Handlers do not trust all certificate issuer's equally. A Resource Handler can choose whether to trust a given certificate issuer and may restrict what access rights a given certificate issuer can issue.

Communication

E-speak uses a mailbox metaphor to describe the interactions between Clients and the Core. This metaphor does not imply that any actual messaging is required, only that the interfaces are defined in terms of mailboxes. Mailboxes consist of two forms: an *Outbox* and a Core-managed Resource called an *Inbox*.

When a Client wants to use a Resource, it constructs a message consisting of a message header and a payload and inserts the message in the Client's Outbox. The Outbox is connected to the Core, which processes the information in the message header. If there is no error, the Core extracts Resource specific metadata and security information from its Repository and inserts this in the message before forwarding the message to the designated Inbox. The Resource Handler reads the message header and the inserted payload to determine how to deal with the request.

The Resource specific metadata and security information inserted by the Core into a message can be used by the Resource Handler to determine how to process the message.

As each message is routed, the e-speak Core may generate events for logging and monitoring.

E-speak uses peer-to-peer communication. The Core has no concept of a reply message. If the Resource Handler needs to return a value to the Client, it must specify a Resource listing an Inbox connected to the Client in the handler field of its metadata. Hence, in replying to a message, the Resource Handler changes roles with the Client.

Session Layer Security Protocol

All messages exchanged between e-speak Cores and between e-speak Cores and Clients use the Session Layer Security protocol. This provides secure message passing between entities as well as unprotected message exchanges. Applications can choose whether to use secure message passing or not.

Session Layer Security protocol is designed to support e-speak mediation. E-speak mediation requires e-speak to modify certain parts of the message so that the message can be routed between endpoints and means there is no TCP connection between the endpoints. These requirements mean that existing protocols such as SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) or TLS (Transport Layer Security) are not suitable for end to end security in e-speak.

Session Layer Security protocol allows multiple secure sessions to be multiplexed over a single TCP connection. This means that two e-speak Cores can be connected via a single TCP connection with many Clients and have many different secure sessions to different e-speak Resources.

Session Layer Security protocol also supports tunnelling. During firewall traversal we might want the firewall to control the client access rights to the internal LAN for every packet. However, we might not want the firewall to see all the traffic in clear (therefore, losing the end-to-end security property). With Session Layer Security protocol we can nest a secure session inside another one, possibly with different end points, allowing us to achieve both goals simultaneously.

Session Layer Security protocol is designed to support SPKI for access control. It performs the negotiation of access rights that need to be proven represented by multiple SPKI certificates.

Session Layer Security supports the following encoding types for messages:

- **CLEAR_DATA:** The message is not encrypted or protected against modification.
- **PROTECTED_DATA:** The message is not encrypted but it is protected against modification.
- **SECURE_DATA:** The message is encrypted and protected against modification.

Session Layer Security has been designed to be independent of transport. However, for interoperability between e-speak Cores and interoperability between e-speak Cores and Clients, direct implementation over TCP is assumed. Other implementations are possible, including passing SLS messages over HTTP, or through shared memory.

Core to Core Communication

Communication between e-speak Cores uses the Session Layer Security protocol. Two core-managed Resources are used for remote communication between e-speak cores: the Connection Manager (for connection management) and Remote Resource Manager (for management of remote resource metadata).

The Connection Manager sets up the initial connection, manages it and closes it down when it is no longer needed. It requires the host name (or IP address) and port of the remote e-speak Core to set up a remote connection. The Connection Manager has a well known name: `es://<server>/CORE/ConnectionManager`. So given the host and port number (i.e. the `<serve>` part) a Connection Manager can negotiate with the remote Connection Manager to establish a connection between the two e-speak Cores. Once the two Connection Managers have established a connection, Cores exchange Resources with each other using their Remote Resource Managers for Resource export and import.

The Remote Resource Manager is responsible for managing metadata: importing and exporting resources from the remote e-speak core. The Remote Resource Manager on any given e-speak core is: `es://<server>/CORE/RemoteResourceManager`. So given that two Connection Managers have established a connection between two e-speak Cores, the Remote Resource Managers can communicate with each other to exchange Resources.

All resources can be exported by reference, in which case a copy of the metadata of the Resource is sent to the remote core. In addition certain Core-managed Resources can be exported by value, in which case a copy of the Resource is sent to the remote e-speak Core.

Resource import and export serves a number of purposes in e-speak.

- Resource discovery is made more efficient for local Clients, because a copy of the metadata is available locally.

- The lookup mechanism requires that a vocabulary is available locally for both Resource registration and lookup in that vocabulary. Using Resource export, a vocabulary can be defined once and exported to wherever it is needed.
- Name Frames can be defined containing a set of useful bindings (akin to an environment for a Client). Using Resource export, these Name Frames can be made available locally wherever a Client needs them. This can be particularly useful for mobile clients.

An End-to-End Example

When the Client on Logical Machine A sends a message to its Core for a Resource on Logical Machine B, the following steps take place (see Figure 3):

- 1 The Client constructs and Session Layer Security message setting the "to" address to the Name of the Remote Resource (e.g. `es://<host_for_core_B>/resource/foo`). The from address is set to the Name of the Client (e.g. `es://<host_for_core_A>/client/bar`). This message is sent using TCP to Core A, where it is placed in the Client's outbox.
- 2 A message handling thread in Core A, picks up the message and sends it to Core A's router. Core A's router determines that the message is for Core B. It checks that it has a connection with Core B and forwards the message to the relevant inbox.
- 3 A message handling thread on Core A picks the message up from the inbox and transmits it to Core B (via a TCP connection) where it is placed in the outbox for incoming messages from Core A.
- 4 The router on Core B resolves the Name for the "to address" in its root Name Frame. The resolved name is a binding to the Resource metadata.
- 5 Core B's router retrieves the Resource's metadata. This tells it to which inbox to send the message. It also extracts the Private Resource Specific data and various security information that is used by the Resource Handler to process the message.

- 6 A message handling thread picks the message up from the inbox and sends it to the Resource Handler through a TCP connection.
- 7 Any communication between the Resource Handler and the physical Resource is outside of the control of the e-speak Core.




Figure 3 Distributed e-speak

The processing for any return message is similar, except the roles of the respective e-speak Cores are reversed (recall e-speak is asynchronous - the Core does not distinguish between request and reply messages when routing them).

The E-speak Service Interface (Informational)

An e-speak Client is an application running in its own address space that was written using an e-speak Service Interface (ESI). There is one ESI for each programming language supported. An example ESI is shown in Chapter 1 of the E-

speak *Programmer's Guide*. This provides a rich environment offering rapid, secure-service development, deployment, and management in a heterogeneous networked environment.

E-speak Services

E-speak has the following services: Event, management and advertising:

- The Event Service allows applications to collaborate by publishing Events and subscribing to Event distributors. The e-speak Core uses the Event Service to publish Events to the management service.
- The Management Services manage interconnecting sets of e-speak Cores, managing the distribution of metadata, and e-services registered as e-speak Resources.
- The Advertising Service is used for distributed Resource discovery in large-scale environments.

Standards

The e-speak platform builds upon and uses existing industry standards wherever possible. In some cases, integration with industry standards is under way or planned. The specific areas of integration include:

- Database access- The persistent back-end for the Repository uses Java Database Connectivity, thus making it possible to send Repository queries to almost any relational database.
- Advertising services- The Advertising Service back-end is provided by Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
- Transport protocols: The ESIP messaging stack supports pluggable transports. TCP/IP, IrDA, WAP, and HTTP are all candidate transports.

- Service description: E-speak supports multiple different Vocabularies, including forthcoming support for XML and X.500 schemas.
- Component models: These models integrate the e-speak service abstraction with standard component models such as (Enterprise) Java Beans, CORBA, and COM+.
- Management protocols and standards: Support for SNMP, ARM, and DEN is planned.
- Languages: An E-speak library exists for Java, but e-speak has been designed to be language independent. Any language can be used to construct an Session Layer Security message which is all that is required to use e-speak.

Summary

E-speak presents a uniform service abstraction, mediated access, and manipulation of Resource metadata. This creates an open service model, allowing all kinds of digital functionality to be reasoned about through a common set of APIs. New service types and semantics can be dynamically modeled using the common service representation of an e-speak Resource.

The naming system provides active bindings and personal name spaces. The connection between Clients and Resources can be reasoned about and formed at run-time (upon each access if necessary) based on arbitrary search characteristics. Personalization of views and environments and hot-plug replacement of Resources all become possible.

The access control is based on a Public Key Infrastructure using attribute certificates for scalable distributed security. This is supported by the Session Layer Security protocol which allows messages to be protected against tampering, eavesdropping or replay. In addition the Session Layer Security protocol allows unprotected messages to be sent, should security not be needed. Session Layer also supports authenticated tunneling for efficient and secure firewall traversal.

The metadata system defines Vocabulary models as first-class entities in the system that can be reasoned about in the same manner as all other services. Translation and lookup through scalable advertising services are integrated into the model. Service location and discovery can thus seamlessly deal with a situation where the Client describes its requirement in an X.500 schema, while the service provider describes its service using an XML DTD.

The distribution model supports a flexible set of access methods. Thus, downloading printer drivers and the remote access of a file are equally well supported by the model. The separation of the infrastructure into interacting Logical Machines builds on the autonomous machine model provided by the Web.

These are the defining features of an open services platform. The collection of the capabilities discussed above creates an environment where services on the Internet can interact in a secure, dynamic, manageable way. The next chapter of the Internet (e-services) is being written, and e-speak helps us understand it.

Chapter 3 Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies

Outline


E-speak Resources include all the entities called "Services" in the ESI, together with programs and data entities held in the Core to enable the use and management of Services. The Services are called "External Resources" in the Core software, and the aids to using them are called "Core-Managed Resources". The programs and data of an external Resource are not seen by the core, and are managed by an external Resource Handler. What is held in the core for any Resource is its *metadata*, consisting of:

- *Resource Description*, allowing Clients to find the Resource.
- *Resource Specification*, enabling use of the Resource.

The types of Resource and a breakdown of the metadata that each Resource has are tabulated below. The terms will all be explained in this Chapter.

(One complication has been left out of the diagram and will not be discussed in this Chapter: the metadata for any Resource is itself an instance of a core-managed Resource class called *MetaResource*. *MetaResource* is discussed in Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources" under "Resource manipulation" on page 71 - the name of the interface used to act on Metadata.)

In the table below, *Vocabularies* and *Contracts* are separated from all the other Core-Managed Resources because they are both types of Resource and items of metadata. Advertising is distinguished from other (external) Resources because an ESI is likely to handle advertising differently from the creation of Services, as J-ESI does. The e-speak Core makes no distinction between advertising and other external Resources.

[illegible]



Resource Descriptions

The simplest Resource Description consists of a set of names and corresponding values, together with an ESName referring to a Vocabulary which specifies the kind of data under each name. For example, a translation Resource could have the description:

es://17.561.12.337:12356/vocabs/translation (Vocabulary reference)

name (String)	value (Value)	essential (boolean)
SourceLanguage	0x00 Japanese	true
TargetLanguage	0x0E English, Korean, Russian, Mandarin	false
InputFormat	0x00 Unicode	false
OutputFormats	0x0E ASCII, Unicode	false
Price	0x08 20000	false

This description is an instance of `AttributeSet`. The rows consisting of a name, a Value and the boolean `essential` are instances of `Attribute`. A `ResourceDescription` consists of one or more `AttributeSet` instances. Different parts of the description may have different Vocabularies, and if so must be expressed in different `AttributeSets`.

Vocabularies are explained at the end of this Chapter. Although each instance of Value has a value-type code (seen above), a Vocabulary is needed to define its significance. The "price" could be in Yen per kilobyte of input, for example.



The boolean `essential`, if true, means that the Resource will not be returned in response to a SearchRecipe that omits this Attribute name and value. This can be used to set passwords for the discovery of a Resource. (The use of the Resource is controlled by the security mechanisms in (Chapter 5, "Access Control").

Value class

Instances of Value have a 1-byte `tcode` and an Object `val`. The `tcode` indicates the type of `val`. It is one of these static final codes defined in the class:

```
STRING_TYPE_CODE = 0x00;  
LONG_TYPE_CODE = 0x01;  
DOUBLE_TYPE_CODE = 0x02;  
BOOLEAN_TYPE_CODE = 0x03;  
BIG_DECIMAL_TYPE_CODE = 0x04;  
TIMESTAMP_TYPE_CODE = 0x05;  
DATE_TYPE_CODE = 0x06;  
TIME_TYPE_CODE = 0x07;  
INTEGER_TYPE_CODE = 0x08;  
FLOAT_TYPE_CODE = 0x09;  
CHAR_TYPE_CODE = 0x0A;  
BYTE_ARRAY_TYPE_CODE = 0x0B;  
BYTE_TYPE_CODE = 0x0C;  
SHORT_TYPE_CODE = 0x0D;  
SET_TYPE_CODE = 0x0E;  
NAMEDOBJECT_TYPE_CODE = 0x0F;  
OTHER_TYPE_CODE = 0xFF;  
INVALID_BASE_TYPE_CODE = 0xFF;
```

In all but the following cases, a Value is marshalled in e-speak serialization format. The exceptions are:

- `tCode = SET_TYPE_CODE`: `val` contains a set of values. This is not supported in the current release.
- `tCode = BIG_DECIMAL, DATE, TIME, TIMESTAMP, NAMEDOBJECT`: `val` is sent as a String. The first 4 types are taken from the java packages:
 - `java.math.BigDecimal`,
 - `java.sql.Date`,
 - `java.sql.Time`,
 - `java.sql.Timestamp`.

Resource Specifications

The ResourceSpecification class is defined below.

```
public class ResourceSpecification
{
    boolean byValue;
    ESName contract;
    FilterSpec filter;
    ADR metadataMask;
    ADR resourceMask;
    ADR ownerPublicKey;
    ADR ServiceId;
    ESMAP privateRSD; //Not exported if export by reference
    ESMAP publicRSD;
    ESName owner;      //Not exported
    ESName resourceHandler; //Not exported
    int eventControl;
    ESUID uid;
    String URL;
}
```

boolean byValue

This flag governs the export of the Resource to another Logical Machine. See (Chapter 6, "Communication"). If byValue is True, a copy of the Resource itself will be included with the Resource Specification and Resource Description exported. The copy of the Resource can then be used on the receiving platform. The Core will provide this copy for Core-managed Resources. Currently, there is no mechanism for providing copies of external Resources. They can only be exported "by Reference", and only used remotely.

ESName contract

The contract field is the name of the Contract Resource associated with the Resource. An e-speak Contract is not an agreement between parties, but a provision to make a Resource usable. It can contain:

- an interface which the Resource will implement.


- one or more Vocabularies which can be used to frame queries in a search for Resources implementing that interface.¹

A search may be required because several Resources may implement the same interface.

A Resource cannot be registered without a valid `contract` field, so the Contract itself must have already been registered. The Contract given in the Specification of a Contract is `ContractContract` - what else? It is supplied by the Core.

Contract implementation (informational)

The current J-ESI creates ESContracts, containing an interface which has been generated by an Interface Definition Language (IDL) compiler, ES-IDL. The ESContract also contains Terms of Use, a Conversations scheme and the ESName of the interface. An ESContract creates a core Contract. All the interface information is put in the `privateRSD` field of this core Contract's metadata, in a format interpreted by J-ESI. The following diagram illustrates this.



A core Contract is constructed with an array of Vocabulary identifiers² and a `ResourceType`. The latter is one of several integer constants defined in the `ResourceType` class, and listed below. Contracts for all external Resources have a `ResourceType` of `EXTERNAL_CODE`, = 1000. Each Core-Managed Resource has an appropriately named `ResourceType`.

Current ResourceTypes:

```
static int INBOX_CODE = 0;
```

¹ This feature may be discontinued

² Vocabularies may be omitted from contracts in future releases

```
static int META_RESOURCE_CODE = 1;
static int PROTECTION_DOMAIN_CODE = 2;
static int RESOURCE_FACTORY_CODE = 3;
static int CONTRACT_CODE = 100;
static int CORE_DISTRIBUTOR_CODE = 110;
static int IMPORTER_EXPORTER_CODE = 120;
static int MAPPING_OBJECT_CODE = 140;
static int NAME_FRAME_CODE = 150;
static int REPOSITORY_VIEW_CODE = 160;
static int SECURE_BOOT_CODE = 170;
static int SYSTEM_MONITOR_CODE = 180;
static int VOCABULARY_CODE = 190;
static int CORE_MANAGEMENT_SERVICE_CODE = 200;
static int DEFAULT_VOCABULARY_CODE = 210;
static int DEFAULT_CONTRACT_CODE = 220;
static int FINDER_SERVICE_CODE = 230;
static int CONNECTION_MANAGER_CODE = 240;
static int REMOTE_RESOURCE_MANAGER_CODE = 250;
static int EXTERNAL_CODE = 1000;
static int EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_CONTRACT_CODE = 1001;
```

Contract Methods

Contract methods include:

- void register (ResourceDescription, ResourceSpecification, boolean persistence)
- RepositoryHandle[] getVocabularies()
- void addVocabulary(RepositoryHandle vocab)³
- String getResourceType()
- AbstractResource createResource(ResourceDescription, ResourceSpecification, boolean persistence, Object arg)
- void SendObject(MessageOutputStream) used to export a Contract
- Object ReceiveObject(MessageInputStream) used to import a contract

This is only a sample. A RepositoryHandle is a unique identifier of an item in a Repository (see Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources"). The last three methods provide a standard signature for creation, export and import of every kind of Resource.

FilterSpec filter

```
class FilterSpec{
    ESSet Vocabularies;
    String constraint;
}
```

The filter is a way to restrict discovery of the Resource to particular Clients or classes of client. The constraint String is made up of conditions which the Client making a search must satisfy. All the names of Attributes must be in one of the Vocabularies, and all the values must be of the type and within the range specified in that Vocabulary.

³ May be omitted in future releases

Filter implementation (informational)

The constraint String has to specify a source for each Attribute value, and the Vocabulary for it if there is more than one - because the Vocabularies might include different Attributes with the same name.

The source of Client details is commonly the Client's UserProfile - part of the AccountManager Resource (see Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources"). When this is so, the Attribute name in the constraint is prefixed \$user/. Otherwise, the Attribute can only be taken from the Resource Description. For example, if a ResourceDescription and a UserProfile both include the Attribute "State", the constraint might include "\$user/State = State".

If there are multiple Vocabularies, Attributes are preceded by the Vocabulary name and a colon. For instance, where Vocabularies called "home" and "workplace" are in the FilterSpec, the constraint could include "\$user/home:State = workplace:State". The second "State" here must be in the ResourceDescription.

ADR metadataMask

The metadataMask controls which operations manipulating the Resource's metadata will have security disabled - so no certificates or Message Authentication Code are required to invoke them. The interface name in the metadataMask will always be the ResourceManipulationInterface. The format of the metadata Masks is specified in Chapter 5, "Access Control" - Section "Disabling Security" on page 102.

ADR stands for Ascii Data Representation. It is an abstract class: one extension of it is ADRAtom, and other extensions implement the interface Tag. These are the real classes which a metadataMask can instantiate. The Tag or ADRAtom identifies the operations that are free of security restrictions. Tags are described in (Chapter 5, "Access Control").

ADR resourceMask

The resourceMask determines which operations supported by the Resource will have security disabled. The format of the Resource Masks is specified in Chapter 5, "Access Control" - Section "Disabling Security" on page 102.

ADR `ownerPublicKey`

This field contains the owner's public key or a hash of it. The format is specified in Chapter 5, "Access Control" - Section "SPKI BNF Formats" on page 109). The ADR extensions that can be used for `ownerPublicKey` are `PublicKey` and `Hash`.

ADR `serviceId`

This field contains the `serviceId` of the Resource. `ServiceIds` are defined in Chapter 5, "Access Control" - Section "Service Identity" on page 88". This field can be any extension of ADR; it usually implements `Tag`.

ESMap `publicRSD`

"RSD" stands for Resource Specific Data. `PublicRSD` is used by the Client registering the Resource to insert any information he wants potential users to know.

ESMap is an e-speak implementation of Hashtable. It consists of a series of Objects, each even-numbered Object being used as a key, and the following Object being the associated value. Both the key and value Objects are byte-arrays in the two RSD classes. ESMap is serialized as ESArray (see Chapter 6, "Communication" for the e-speak serialization format for ESArray). The e-speak convention for ESArray is that it consists of a sequence of pairs - preserving the key-value pairs of the ESMap.

In the two RSD classes, no duplicate keys, null keys or null values are allowed. Any of these raises an exception.

ESMap `privateRSD`

This field is used by the Resource Handler when a Client sends a message to the Resource. Access to the `privateRSD` is commonly confined to the Resource Handler, but permission can be granted to any task using the e-speak security mechanisms. The use of this field in a Contract for the interface implemented by the Resource has been noted. Otherwise the field is most often used to carry the Resource Handler's designation for the Resource.

ESName owner

The owner field is the ESName of the active Protection Domain of the Client that registered the Resource. A Protection Domain is a Core-Managed Resource corresponding to a user's home directory in Unix, or to a "folder" in J-ESI. (See [E-speak Programmer's Guide] and Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources".) This field can be changed to another Protection Domain by any Client that has authorization. It is an error if the ESName is not bound to any Protection Domain.

The owner and resourceHandler fields are not included when the ResourceSpecification is serialized for export (see Chapter 6, "Communication"). The privateRSD field is only included in an export serialization if the export is by value.

ESName ResourceHandler

This is the ESName of the inbox, to which messages sent to this Resource will be delivered. This field is always NULL for Core-managed Resources, and only for these. The Client that has connected to this Inbox will receive messages for this Resource. (The format of these messages is defined in Chapter 6, "Communication" - Section "Protocol Data Unit (PDU)"). It is an error if the ResourceHandler ESName specified by the Client is not bound to an Inbox.

int eventControl

If eventControl is non-zero, then whenever the Resource metadata (the Resource Description or the Resource Specification) is changed, an Event will be published to the Core's Event distributor.

ESUID

```
public class ESUID
{
    byte[] UniqueId;
}
```

An ESUID contains a byte array that is up to 64 bytes long. The ESUID of a Resource is guaranteed unique to a very high probability. As the URL and the ServiceId also identify the Resource, it is not certain that this field will be retained. Currently it is used in some Core programs.

String URL

This field is the ESName (represented as a String) by which the registering entity refers to the Resource. It is an ESName (URL) which others can use to access the Resource.

Searches

Search Context (Informational)

A search is initiated by a Client. In the current J-ESI, the Client can create a Finder of one of three classes - ESVocabularyFinder, ESContractFinder or ESServiceFinder. Each has a `find` (ESQuery) method, where the ESQuery expresses the attributes the Client needs. Clients providing a Service are likely to use the ESVocabularyFinder, to obtain a suitable standard Vocabulary to describe the Service. This can make it more widely visible. Either providers or users may search for a standard Contract. A user may then:

- Construct an ESServiceFinder, stating the Contract or its interface.
- Use Vocabularies obtained from the Contract⁴ or an ESVocabularyFinder to frame an ESQuery argument
- Call ESServiceFinder.find with that ESQuery to discover the Service he wants - in one or more stages.

⁴ Contracts may not continue to hold vocabularies

If the J-ESI find is successful, a stub for the Resource is returned to the client. He can then call the Resource as if it were on the same platform. The stub will generate, serialize and send the PDU messages through the core needed to invoke the Vocabulary, Contract or Service methods (see Chapter 6, "Communication").

All three J-ESI Finders use the same core Finder Resource class, and there is no distinction in the core software between finding a Vocabulary, Contract or external Resource. The ESQuery is represented by a *SearchRecipe*, described below. The information content of the SearchRecipe will be the same as that of the ESQuery.

Finder Resource

This is a Core-Managed Resource to carry out a Client's find() command. It provides for searching in several stages, if many Resources satisfy the query.

Initial Search

An initial search is carried out by this method:

```
interface FinderInterface {
    FinderResults find(SearchRecipe recipe, int maxToFind)
    throws ESInvocationException, LookupFailedException;
```

The argument `maxToFind` is the maximum number of results to return. If it is set to 0 then the request is only to know if there are any search results - not what they are. If it is set to -1 the method returns all results found. There is a field in `SearchRecipe` which serves the same general purpose, so `maxToFind` may be discontinued. We refer below to "the limit" however it is set.

The returned `FinderResults` has these fields and public `get ---()` methods to retrieve each of them:

```
class FinderResults{
    private ESname[] esnames;
    private int [] serviceIds;
    private FinderContext context;
```

The first two fields contain `ESNames` and `serviceIds` of Resources matching the `SearchRecipe`. The size of each array will be either the number of Resources which match, or the limit - whichever is least. A `FinderResults` method, `boolean hasMoreResults()` returns true if there are more Resources than the limit

Follow-on searches

If `hasMoreResults()` is true, then another batch, again up to the limit, can be obtained from a follow-on search, using the opaque `FinderContext` byte array context from the previous `FinderResults`. (The `getContext()` method obtains context, but is not available for Clients to use directly.) The follow-on method is:

```
FinderResults find(FinderContext context)
throws ESInvocationException, LookupFailedException;
}
class FinderContext{
byte[] queryContext
```

Finder details:

- The `LookupFailedException` is raised when there was an error in the Core during the search.
- When the limit is 0, (meaning one only wants to know if any Resources match the SearchRecipe) the initial search will return a non-null `FinderResults` object if there are some. Call this "outcome". The code:

```
ESNames[] outray = outcome.getESNames();
```

will yield an array of length 1, but `outray[0]` will be null. If there are no results, outcome is null.

SearchRecipe

A SearchRecipe is the expression of attributes a Resource must have to satisfy a Client's needs. Instances of the class are constructed with the following arguments:

- `ESSet vocabularies` - a set of `ESNames` of the vocabularies holding the attributes used in the constraint and preferences. The registered names of these vocabularies are prefixed to the attribute-names in the constraint and preferences if more than one vocabulary is used - otherwise there could be confusion between homonymous attributes.

- String constraint - consisting of attribute-values, relational operators and logical operators, which must be satisfied by the corresponding attributes in a ResourceDescription, for the Resource to qualify. For instance: "price LE 20000 AND maker's_name EQ Hewlett-Packard" could in principle be part of a constraint. (The current syntax used is different - see below.)
- An optional ESArray preferences - an array of Preference objects, described below, which can be used to rank Resources in an order of preference, if more than one Resource satisfies constraint.
- An optional int arbitration - limiting the number of resources to return.
- An optional ESName repositoryView - a set of RepositoryHandles delimiting the ResourceDescriptions which will be checked against the constraint. (See Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources").

SearchRecipe Context (Informational)

Clients specify SearchRecipes only indirectly, using an e-speak API. The Core architecture only specifies the data types of the SearchRecipe fields, not their internal syntax or meaning. However, implementers may need to know about the latter, which is that of the corresponding fields in a Client's ESQuery.

Constraint field

The syntax of the constraint field conforms to the OMG Trader Services Constraint Language, except for the means of testing multi-valued attributes. See [ESRL Spec V4.1] and [CORBA services Document 12].

Preferences field

The elements of the ESArray preferences are instances of the Preference class:

```
Class Preference
{
    final static int MIN= 1;
    final static int MAX= 2;
    final static int WITH= 3;
    private int type;
    private String expression;
    private String weight;
    .....
}
```

The type must be MIN, MAX, or WITH. The expression must be subject to comparison operators if the element has type MIN or MAX. It must have a boolean value if type is WITH. A weight needs to be specified only for Preference elements of type WITH: it must then have a numeric value. The order of the MIN and MAX elements in the preferences array is important.

Examples (omitting vocabulary qualifiers, and not using a formal syntax):

MAX "Year_of_manufacture"

MIN "Price * Mileage"

WITH "Color == Blue" "5"

WITH "Color != Green" "2"

How Preferences work

Assume these Preferences, in the order given, are used to order a set of car "Resources" which have already passed the constraint.

- The WITH elements take precedence. Each car is given a score: the sum of the weights in the WITH tests that it passes. Any blue car will have a weight of 7 (because it is blue and not-green). All blue cars will lead the list of preferences, followed by all other cars that are not green, with green cars at the bottom of the list.
- In each set based on the WITH tests, the MAX and MIN comparisons are applied, in the order they are listed. The year 2000 cars will be at the top of each set based on the WITH weights.
- Each year-group will finally be ordered by the MIN Price * Mileage test - those with the lowest Price.Mileage product coming first in their group.

Arbitration field

Any positive value N in this field means "Return up to N Resources". Suppose M Resources passed the constraint, then the number $C = \min(N, M)$ will be returned. If there are preferences, the first C in the preference list will be returned. Otherwise C Resources are returned, but the choice is undefined.

The field may be negative, with values defined in:

```
class ArbitrationPolicy
{
    public static final int ALL= -1;
    // To return all resources passing the constraint
    public static final int ANY= -2;
    // To return 1 resource - the most preferred if there are
    preferences
    public static final int NEGOTIATE= -3;
    // Reserved to invoke an arbitrator resource - not currently used
}
```


Vocabularies

An e-speak Vocabulary is a description of terms used in a Resource Description, in parts of a Resource Specification or in a Search Recipe.

Formally, a Vocabulary is an `AttributePropertySet`, as described below, with a description String. It is itself a (Core-Managed) Resource, with a ResourceDescription and Specification, and it can be searched for. The ResourceDescription of a Vocabulary must itself have a Vocabulary.....To end the recursion, the e-speak Core will ship with a *Base Vocabulary* preloaded. The Base Vocabulary will always be in the Core and accessible to all clients. Descriptions that don't use any other Vocabulary use the Base Vocabulary. The Core also supplies a Vocabulary Contract, for the ResourceSpecification of a Vocabulary.


The following diagram summarizes the use and make-up of Vocabularies.

Figure 5 Vocabularies and their Uses



Notes on Preceding Figure:

- Items followed by a '?', such as "essential?" are boolean.



- The dashed line from t Code to value type indicates a one-to-one correspondence. For example, if an Attribute "Price" in an AttributeSet has the tCode INTEGER_TYPE_CODE (0x08), the Vocabulary of that AttributeSet must have the ValueType "Integer" in the entry for "Price".

Vocabulary Context (Informational)

Vocabularies are essential both to describe and specify Resources, and to discover them. Any Client can make up and register his own Vocabularies, but if most of them did so, we'd have a tower of Babel, or worse. It is expected that standardization bodies or Service associations will develop all the significant Vocabularies, advertise them and control them using Access Control (Chapter 5, "Access Control").

Vocabulary class and methods

The Vocabulary class is outlined below:

```
class Vocabulary
{
    private String description;
    private AttributePropertySet props;

    String getDescription()
        throws ESInvocationException;

    AttributePropertySet getProperties()
        throws ESInvocationException;

    boolean mutateProperties(AttributePropertySet props)
        throws ESInvocationException QuotaExhaustedException,
        StaleEntryAccessException;
    // Exchanges current AttributePropertySet for props - returns
    // true if any difference
    boolean isLegalSet(AttributeSet ast)
    // Checks if ast is legal under this Vocabulary, using
    // AttributePropertySet.isLegalSet()
    public Vocabulary release()
    public void finalize()
    // Both of these take the Vocabulary out of use
}
```

The standard `createResource()`, `sendObject()` and `receiveObject()` methods are not listed.

AttributePropertySet (APS) Methods

The following methods of AttributePropertySet are used in building a Vocabulary or registering a Resource

- Object `addAttributeProperty(AttributeProperty ap)` - this is the way an APS is built up.
- boolean `isLegalSet(AttributeSet attrs)` - this is called by Vocabulary. `isLegalSet()` to test whether `attrs` is valid for this APS. The tests made are:
 - Are all mandatory attributes included in `attrs`?
 - Is every attribute in `attrs` in this APS?
 - Do all the `tCodes` of the Values in `attrs` agree with the corresponding `ValueType` in the APS?
 - Where there is a range defined in the APS, is the Value of the corresponding Attribute in `attrs` within that range?
- `AttributePropertySet getMandatoryAttributes()` - used by the preceding method, and maybe by others.

Attribute Properties

An APS is an `ESMap`: it consists of a paired name and `AttributeProperty` instance for each Attribute in the Vocabulary. The name is duplicated within the `AttributeProperty`. The following table shows the fields of `AttributeProperty`.

Table 2 Components of an attribute property

Type	Field	Meaning
String	attrName	Attribute name
String	description	Human-readable description
ValueType	attrValueType	See Table 3 for encoding
Value	defaultValue	Default value
String	definition	Expression to evaluate for a dynamic attribute
boolean	multiValued	True if multiple values
boolean	mandatory	The attribute must be specified if mandatory is True
int	rangeKind	0 NO_RANGE 1 LEFT_RANGE 2 RIGHT_RANGE 3 FULL_RANGE
int	keyIndexType	Use for repository lookup: see below
double	minRange	Smallest allowed value
double	maxRange	Largest allowed value

- **defaultValue**: If the attribute is absent from an AttributeSet A, and is not mandatory, the XXXXXX will insert it in A with defaultValue.
- **definition** : Dynamic attributes are not supported in the current release.

- **multivalued**: If this is true, an ESSet of values is expected, and the **defaultValue** should be such a set. (See the e-speak serialization format in Chapter 6, "Communication" for the definition of ESSet).
- **mandatory**: If true, all AttributeSets under this Vocabulary must include the Attribute named. You won't be able to register a Resource whose description uses the Vocabulary, if the AttributeSet lacks this Attribute.
- **rangeKind**: specifies what kind of range-checking will be done on the Attribute's value, in relation to **minRange** and/or **maxRange**. The capitalized alternatives are integer constants defined (static final) for the class:
 - **NO_RANGE** - There is no restriction, whatever **minRange** and **maxRange** may be.
 - **LEFT_RANGE** - Values must be \geq **minRange**
 - **RIGHT_RANGE** - Value must be \leq **maxRange**
 - **FULL_RANGE** - Both **LEFT_RANGE** and **RIGHT_RANGE** rules apply.
- **keyIndexType**: To support lookup in a repository based on a Database Management System (DBMS). Valid values of **keyIndexType** are: **NO_INDEX** (0), **HASH_INDEX** (1) and **TREE_INDEX** (2). If the value is **HASH_INDEX** or **TREE_INDEX** the attribute will be used for index look-up by the DBMS. This is discussed further in Chapter 10, "Repository (Informational)".

Class ValueType

Instances of this class have the private fields:

```
String typeName;      // Must be one of the designators in Table 3
String description;  // Human-readable description
String matcher;      // An applicable relation, such as "islessThan"
int baseTypeCode;    // Equal to tCode in Values, except for invalid Type
```

typeName must be one of the Designators in the following table. These are defined (as static final String) in the ValueType class. Each corresponds to one of the allowable **tCodes** in class Value. The Matching rules and Operations are used to check the validity of expressions in a SearchRecipe or filter.

Table 3 Supported value types

Data type	Designator	Matching rules	Operations
Big decimal	"BigDecimal"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	+, -, *, /
Boolean	"Boolean"	eq, ne	AND, OR
Byte	"Byte"	eq, ne	
Byte array	"ByteArray"	eq, ne	
Char	"Char"	eq, ne	+ (concatenate, returns String)
Date	"Date"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	
Double	"Double" ¹	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	+, -, *, /
Float	"Float"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	+, -, *, /
Int	"Integer"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	+, -, *, /
Long	"Long"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	+, -, *, /
Object	"NamedObject"		
Short	"Short"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	+, -, *, /
String	"String"	eq, ne	+ (concatenate)
Time	"Time"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	
Time stamp	"Timestamp"	eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge	

¹ Equality tests with a Float or Double may give "false" unexpectedly

Base Vocabulary

The Base Vocabulary available at system start-up includes the attributes and value types shown in Table 4.

Table 4 Base Vocabulary definition

Attribute name	Value type	Comments
Name	String	
Type	String	
ResourceSubtype	String	
ESGroup	String	
ESCategory	String	
Description	String	
KeyWords	String	Multivalued
Version	String	
ESDate	Date	"YYYY-MM-DD"
ESTime	Time	"HH:MM:SS"
ESTimeStamp	TimeStamp	"YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.FFFFFFFF"
HashAlgorithm	String	
HashCode	BigDecimal	To authenticate contents

The hash algorithm is specified using well-known names, for example, MD5.

Base Account Vocabulary

The Base Account Vocabulary is also available at startup. It is used for discovering user accounts.

Table 5 Base Account Vocabulary

Attribute name	Value type
UserName	String
UserInfo	String
UserType	String
UserLocation	String
UserESURL	String

The above attributes match the fields defined in AuthInfo and UserProfile. For more information, see "The Account Manager Resource" section in Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources."

The description string for the Base Account Vocabulary is: "E-speak base user vocabulary".

Translators (Informational)

The interoperation of different Vocabularies may be supported through *Vocabulary Translators*. The translator would map attributes from one Vocabulary into another, but there is no direct linkage between a Translator Resource and any Vocabulary Resource. A translator service is not part of the e-speak architecture; it would be an external Resource.

The translator envisaged would implement:

```
ESName [] [2] getVocabularyPairs();
```

which queries the translator about Vocabularies known to it. The translator returns an array listing all Vocabularies that it can translate in an ordered set. Each element in this array is a pair of Vocabulary names.

```
boolean isCompatible(Vocabulary vocabulary1,  
Vocabulary vocabulary2)
```

checks if the translator can translate from the first given Vocabulary into the second given Vocabulary. If the translator can perform the translation operation on the given pair of Vocabularies, it will return true. If the translator cannot perform the translation, or if it does not understand either of the Vocabularies, it will return false. The translation is done by:

```
SearchRecipe translate(SearchRecipe s,  
Vocabulary v2;
```

which returns a Search Recipe in the specified Vocabulary.

References

CORBA Services Document 12: CORBA Services: Common Object Services Specification, Ch. 16, 1997 - <ftp://ftp.omg.org/pub/docs/formal/97-12-23.pdf>

E-Speak Programmer's Guide Beta 3.0, June 2000

ESRL Spec. V4.1: E-Speak Registration and Lookup Specification Proposal, July 2000

Chapter 4 Core-Managed Resources

Clients interact with the e-speak Core by sending messages to Core-managed Resources. For example, the Resource Factory is used to register new Resource metadata. This Chapter lists all the core-managed resources and describes those which are not described in other Chapters. It also describes the internal state that is passed if the Core-managed Resource is exported by value to another Logical Machine.

Conventions

All the methods described in this Chapter throw `ESInvocationException` (see Chapter 7, "Exceptions"), the base class for exceptions thrown by the e-speak Core to the Client during message processing.

Each class, of which instances can be exported by value, starts with a list of static declarations. Each declaration contains a permissible content of the payload in a PDU (see) requesting the core to invoke a method in that class.

The Account Manager Resource

The Account Manager Resource is for managing user accounts on an e-speak Core. A user account contains information about the user including its PSE (Private Security Environment). This enables a user to authenticate to the Account Manager (via userid, password) and to retrieve its PSE. In the current implementation it will

then need a passphrase to unlock the PSE to access its key material. The placing of the PSE under the Account Manager Resource does not implement the SPKI requirement for absolute security of private keys (see Chapter 5, "Access Control").

User Profile

The class `UserProfile` defines the basic information stored by the Account Manager for each user.

```
class UserProfile{
    AuthInfo authInfo;
    String userESURL;
    String userInformation;
    String userType;
    ProfileAttributeSet preferences;
    byte[] pse;
}
```

User Identity

The class `AuthInfo` defines the basic information used by the Account manager to identify a user

```
class AuthInfo{
    String userName;
    String passPhrase;
    String homeAddress;
}
```

The home address indicates the "home e-speak Core of a user" in `host:portNumber` format. An example is:

```
myhost.myCo.com:1234
```

User's Account

The `userESURL` is the ESName of the user's Account Resource. This is a Protection Domain. This ESName is bound to the user's Protection Domain in a Name Frame created by the Account Manager. Note that this ESName also includes the host and portNumber of the user's "home e-speak Core". An example of a `userESURL` is:

```
es://myhost.myco.com:12345/Core/AccountManager/
myhost.myco.com:1234/myName
```

When the Account is registered a Protection Domain is created and registered using the Base Account Vocabulary (see in Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies") with attributes from `AuthInfo` and `UserProfile`. This means the Account Resource (Protection Domain) can be discovered using attribute-based `find()`, just like any other e-speak Resource.

User Type and Information

`UserType` and `UserInfo` are arbitrary strings that can be assigned by an application. These are defined in the BaseAccount Vocabulary, so they can be used to find Users.

Private Secure Environment (PSE)

The byte array `pse` is opaque, not interpreted by the e-speak Core.

Preferences

The `<ProfileAttributeSet preferences>` field is a set of name, value pairs defined as follows.

```
class ProfileAttributeSet{
  AttributeSet attrs;
  String format;
}
```

If the format string is set to "vocab", the `AttributeSet attrs` will be defined in a vocabulary specified in the `attrVocab` field of the `AttributeSet` (see Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies"). Otherwise the format string will be set to "SIMPLE" and `attrs` will contain an arbitrary set of name-value pairs, not necessarily valid in any vocabulary.

The `ProfileAttributeSet` contains secret information. The intent is that this information should not be visible to any application other than the one that registered the account..

Account Manager methods

The following methods can be specified in the method field of a MessageForResource PDU with AccountManagerInterface in the interface field.

```
public interface AccountManagerInterface {

    public String registerUser(UserProfile up)
    throws PermissionDeniedException, StaleEntryAccessException,
    NameNotFoundException;

    public boolean unregisterUser(AuthInfo authInfo,
    String accountName)
    throws PermissionDeniedException, StaleEntryAccessException,
    NameNotFoundException;

    public boolean authenticateUser(AuthInfo authInfo)
    throws PermissionDeniedException, StaleEntryAccessException,
    NameNotFoundException;

    public UserProfile getUserProfile(AuthInfo authInfo,
    String accountName)
    throws PermissionDeniedException, StaleEntryAccessException,
    NameNotFoundException;

    public boolean setUserProfile(AuthInfo authInfo, UserProfile up)
    throws PermissionDeniedException, StaleEntryAccessException,
    NameNotFoundException;

    public String[] getAllUsers()
    throws ESInvocationException;

    public boolean addDescription(AuthInfo authInfo,
    String accountName, AttributeSet as)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    public String getUserESURL(String accountName)
    throws ESInvocationException;
}
```

The function getAllUsers returns a list of the ESNames (in stringified form) of the Account Resource (Protection Domains) of all registered users.



The function `getUserESURL` returns a `String` corresponding to the `ESNames` (URLs) of the user's Account Resource (Protection Domain).

The connection manager is described in Chapter 6, “Communication”.

The core management Resource is deprecated in the current release. It may later be part of a Management API, and/or be changed. The current methods are:

```

interface CoreManagementInterface extends ManagedServiceIntf{
    int ping(int pingValue)
    throws ESInvocationException;
    ESName[] getClientConnections()
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean stopServingOutbox(ESName ProtectionDomain)
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean stopServingInbox(ESName Inbox)
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean startServingOutbox(ESName ProtectionDomain)
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean startServingInbox(ESName Inbox)
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean removeProtectionDomain(ESName ProtectionDomain)
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean denyNewClientSessions()
    throws ESInvocationException;
    boolean acceptNewClientSessions()

```

```

throws ESInvocationException;
long getTotalMemory();
throws ESInvocationException;
long getFreeMemory();
throws ESInvocationException;
void startJVMGC();
throws ESInvocationException;
void stopJVMGC();
throws ESInvocationException;
void setJVMGCInterval(int millis)
throws ESInvocationException;
int getJVMGCInterval();
throws ESInvocationException;
boolean isJVMGCRunning();
throws ESInvocationException;
void startScavenger();
throws ESInvocationException;
void stopScavenger();
throws ESInvocationException;
void setStatsNum(int num)
throws ESInvocationException;
ESArray1 getScavengerStats();
throws ESInvocationException;
}

```

The Core Management Resource provides a way for a client to manage its core. By invoking the Resource on another core it can use the same methods on that too. (The client must have appropriate certificates in any case.) The Core Management Resource is itself a Core-managed resource: it implements the interface `ManagedServiceIntf` described in Chapter 9, "Management".

The method `ping` checks that the core is up and returns the value specified

The method `getClientConnections` returns a list of protection domains that are currently being used.

The methods `stopServingOutbox` and `startServingOutbox` tell the e-speak core to stop or start serving the outbox associated with the protection domain specified.

The methods `stopServingInbox` and `startServingInbox` tell the e-speak Core to stop or start serving messages to the Inbox specified.

¹ The current implementation returns an instance of the Java Vector class.

The method `removeProtectionDomain` removes the Protection Domain specified. Any client using the Protection Domain is disconnected and any Resources contained in the Protection Domain are deregistered.

The methods `denyNewClientSessions` and `acceptNewClientSessions` tells the e-speak core to stop or start accepting new connections from clients.

JVM management methods

The following methods are specific to e-speak Cores implemented in Java. Some e-speak Cores may not implement these methods: if so, the method will return a `MethodNotImplemented` exception.

The methods `getFreeMemory` and `getTotalMemory` get the free memory or total memory in the e-speak Core's Java Virtual Machine (JVM).

The methods `startJVMGC()` and `stopJVMGC()` start and stop the e-speak Core's JVM garbage collector.

The methods `setJVMGCInterval` and `getJVMGCInterval()` set and get in milliseconds the interval between runs of the JVM garbage collector.

The method `isJVMGCRunning()` returns true if the JVM garbage collector is running.

Scavenger management methods

The current implementation of the e-speak Core has a scavenger that looks for resources in the repository that are no longer valid and removes them. It can remove resources even if references to them still exist, unlike the JVM garbage collector. Examples of resource that may no longer be valid include the following.

- Resources registered in a Protection Domain that has been removed.
- Resources imported from another e-speak Core after the connection to that Core is closed.

Some e-speak Cores may not implement these methods: if so the method will return a `MethodNotImplemented` exception.

The methods `startScavenger` and `stopScavenger` enable and disable the scavenger from running.

The scavenger also records statistics for each run as follows.

```
class ScavengerStats
{
    Int runNo;
    Long timeElapsed;
    Int numInspected;
    Int numCollected;
    Int totalNumInspected;
    Int totalNumCollected;
    String phase;
}
```

The `runNo` field indicates the current run (the first run is run number 1).

The `timeElapsed` field is the time taken for the run in milliseconds.

The field `numInspected` indicates the total number of Resources inspected in this run.

The field `numCollected` indicates the total number of Resources removed in this run.

The fields `totalNumInspected` and `totalNumCollected` are the running totals since the e-speak Core was started.

The `phase` field will contain the string "Mark" or "Sweep", this denotes whether the run was a "mark" or "sweep" run. Resources are only removed from the repository (and the `numCollected` count incremented) on a sweep run. There is no notion of "mark" or "sweep" phases on Resources in the cache.

The scavenger keeps statistics for a certain number of runs. This is set by method `setStatsNum` in the `CoreManagementInterface`. The method `getScavengerStats` returns an `ESArray` of containing an instances of `ScavengerStats` in each element. (The current implementation returns an instance of the Java Vector class.)

Finder Resource

The finder, with a principal method

```
FinderResults find(SearchRecipe sr)
```

is discussed in Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies". It enables discovery of Resources matching the SearchRecipe, and optionally putting them in an order of preference, by examination of the Resource Descriptions in the Metadata.

Mailbox

E-speak has both Outboxes and Inboxes, but only Inboxes are exposed to Clients as Core-managed Resources. The Core's only actions on outboxes are the `startServingOutbox()` and `stopServingOutbox()` methods of the `CoreManagementInterface`. An Inbox is where a Client gets messages from the Core. A Client can have more than one Inbox, but each Inbox must be explicitly connected by the Client before it can be used to receive messages.

An Inbox cannot be exported.

The `Inbox` class implements the `MailboxInterface` defined below:

```
interface MailboxInterface
{
    boolean isConnected()
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void connect(int slot)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void disconnect()
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void reconnect(int slot)
    throws ESInvocationException;
}
```


An Inbox is a Core-managed Resource that provides a unidirectional communication channel from the e-speak Core to a Client. When a Client registers a Resource with the e-speak Core, it must assign an Inbox Resource as the "Resource Handler" for the Resource. Any service requests directed to the Resource are delivered to the Client on the I/O channel associated with the Inbox that was named the Resource Handler.

An Inbox can be in one of the two states: connected or disconnected. Upon creation, the Inbox starts in the connected state. The creator of the Inbox becomes the owner of the Inbox, and the Inbox is set up to use the I/O channel information passed with the request to create the Inbox. The Inbox remains in the connected state until the Client requests an explicit disconnect, or until the I/O channel associated with the Inbox is closed, at which time it is put in the disconnected state. If a Client sends a message to a Resource whose handler is an Inbox in the disconnected state, an exception is thrown by the e-speak Core.

One may argue that Inboxes are unnecessary and that the e-speak Core could store the I/O channel information in the Resource Handler field directly. There are two main reasons for having the Inbox store the I/O channel information and not the Resource- one has to do with Client restart, and the other with delegation. These are explained in the following subsections

Inbox and Client Restart

In the e-speak environment, a Client can recover from some types of failures, one of which is the failure of a Client process. If a Client process dies and restarts, it can reconnect to the Core, discover and activate its previous Protection Domain, and discover and connect to the Inboxes owned by it. That way it can continue to serve the Resources that were registered by it during its previous incarnation.

Connecting to an Inbox involves updating the I/O channel information maintained by the Inbox. Keeping the I/O channel information in the Inbox helps simplify the Client's job at restart. It only has to discover and re-connect to one or a few inboxes. If, instead, the I/O channel information is stored in all the Resources registered by the Client, it would somehow need to be updated all over the place upon reconnection by the Client.

Inbox and Delegation of Resource Handling

Under certain circumstances, a Client may want to delegate the handling of one or more Resources served by it to another Client. Inboxes make the delegation easy. Let's say Client A has registered 100 Resources, and named Inbox IB as its handler. After a while, Client A wants Client B to take over the handling of all these Resources. This can be achieved as follows:

- 1 Client A passes the name of the Inbox IB to the other Client, along with a certificate to perform a reconnect operation on the Inbox.
- 2 Client B requests the e-speak Core to reconnect it to the Inbox IB. The Core replaces Client A's I/O channel information with Client B's I/O channel information.
- 3 Any further service requests directed to any of the 100 Resources are diverted to the I/O channel specified by Client B. The process of reconnection is performed atomically. Though logically the reconnect operation involves a disconnect operation on behalf of Client A and a connect operation by Client B, no one really sees the transient disconnected state.

Name Frame

A Name Frame manages the bindings of ESNames to Resources. A Client's default Name Frame is part of its Protection Domain. This section first describes the structure of an ESName and a binding and then describes Name Frames and data structures used by Name Frames.

ESNames

The only way a Client can refer to a Resource when communicating with the Core is to specify an ESName for the Resource. ESNames are defined fully in Chapter 6, "Communication", Section "ESNames" on page 165".

Bindings

In e-speak, a name is bound to a *Mapping Object*, which consists of an array of Accessors. An Accessor can be one of two types, as represented in Table 6.

Table 6 Mapping Object accessor types and descriptions

Accessor Type	Descriptions
Search request	A set of attributes, their corresponding values, and a Vocabulary to use in interpreting them
Explicit binding	A single instance of a Resource

Thus, a name can be bound to:

- Zero or more Resources
- Zero or more Search Recipes
- Some combination of explicit bindings and search request bindings

The term *simple binding* is applied to a name bound to a Mapping Object that has a single explicit binding. The term *complex binding* is used otherwise.

NameSearchPolicy

A NameSearchPolicy is used when a find request has returned some bindings. The NameFrameInterface listBindings or listNames methods listed below are used with a NameSearchPolicy argument:

```
class NameSearchPolicy
{
    static final int NSP_ANY = 0;
    static final int NSP_SIMPLE = 1;
    static final int NSP_EXPLICIT = 2;
    static final int NSP_PARTIAL = 3;
    ESName contract;
    int bindingType;
    boolean matchSense;
}
```

NSP_ANY means match any binding types. NSP_SIMPLE means match simple binding types. NSP_EXPLICIT means match explicit binding types. NSP_PARTIAL means match partial binding types (this is not implemented in the current release, and will cause undefined behavior if used).

If matchSense is false, the meaning of the Name Search Policy is negated, so listBindings will return the names of bindings that do not satisfy the Name Search Policy.

Name Frame Methods

Some NameFrame methods throw ESServiceException. Chapter 7, "Exceptions" lists the exception hierarchy for NameFrame methods.

The NameFrame methods are defined below:

```
interface NameFrameInterface
{
    boolean isBound(String baseName)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void bind(String baseName, SearchRecipe recipe)
    throws NameCollisionException, QuotaExhaustedException,
    ESInvocationException, ESServiceException;

    void rebind(String baseName, SearchRecipe recipe)
    throws ESInvocationException, NameCollisionException;

    void unbind(String name)
    throws ESInvocationException, InvalidNameException,
    QuotaExhaustedException;

    void rename(String oldName, String newName)
    throws ESInvocationException, ESServiceException,
    InvalidNameException, NameCollisionException;

    void copy(String toName, ESName from)
    throws ESInvocationException, ESServiceException,
    NameCollisionException, InvalidNameException,
    StaleEntryAccessException, QuotaExhaustedException;

    void add(String name, ESName from)
    throws ESInvocationException, InvalidNameException,
    StaleEntryAccessException;
```

```

    void subtract(String name, ESName from)
    throws ESInvocationException InvalidNameException,
    StaleEntryAccessException;

    String[] listNames(NameSearchPolicy nsp)
    throws ESInvocationException, NameNotFoundException;

    String[] listBindings(String aBaseName,
    NameSearchPolicy nsp,
    ESName targetFrame)
    throws ESInvocationExceptionInvalidNameException,
    StaleEntryAccessException, QuotaExhaustedException;
}

```

A Name Frame can be exported by value or by reference. In the case of export by value, the Name Frame state is the bindings ESMaP. The serialization for ESMaP is defined by the e-speak serialization format. ESMaP is an ESArray in which the convention is that consecutive elements are treated as pairs. In the case of bindings, the first element of a pair is the string component of ESName; the second is a MappingObject to which ESName is bound. A MappingObject consists of a set of SearchRecipes and explicit bindings to resources. The explicit bindings are internal pointers (repository handles) to the resource metadata in the e-speak Core's repository. A MappingObject is serialized as an ESSet containing the SearchRecipes in the MappingObject (explicit bindings are not contained in the serialized form transmitted in the case of pass by value).

All methods that create a new entry in a Name Frame return a Name Collision Exception if the name already appears in the target Name Frame. An explicit rebind or unbind is required before the name can be reused.

The `isBound` method checks to see if the specified name (`baseName`) is bound in this Name Frame. It returns true if the name is bound.

The method `bind` binds SearchRecipe to a specified name (`baseName`) in this Name Frame.

The method `rebind` changes the binding of the specified name (`baseName`) in this Name Frame to the new SearchRecipe.

The method `unbind` removes the binding from NameFrame.

The method `rename` renames the binding associated with `oldname` to `newname`.

The method `copy` copies the binding of `from` to `toName`.

The method `add` adds the binding of `from` to the binding of `name` to give a new binding for `name`.

The method `subtract` subtracts the bindings of `from` from the bindings associated with `name` to give a new binding for `name`.

The method `listNames` returns an array of strings corresponding to all bindings that match `NameSearchPolicy nsp`. The Name Search Policy allows the Client to specify the type of binding and/or Contract in which the Resource is registered.

The method `listBindings` lists all the bindings of the argument `aBaseName` that match `NameSearchPolicy nsp`. These bindings are placed in the `NameFrame` named by `targetFrame`. The return value is an array of `String`, each element being the name of a new binding in `targetFrame`.

Protection Domain

A Client's Protection Domain is analogous to a user's home directory in an operating system. It contains a root Name Frame in which the Client can place bindings.

Each Protection Domain is associated with a quota. The goal of this is to track and manage use of space in the Repository. To support this, each Protection Domain has three fields associated with it: used, soft limit, and hard limit. A Protection Domain is guaranteed to be able to allocate Resources up to its soft limit. A Protection Domain may be able to allocate Resources up to its hard limit, depending on the memory usage of the Core. The default hard limit is 10,000,000 bytes, and the default soft limit is 30,000 bytes.

A Protection Domain cannot be exported.

The `ProtectionDomain` interface is defined below:

```
interface ProtectionDomainInterface
{
    ESName[] switchPD()
```

```

throws ESInvocationException, PermissionDeniedException,
NameNotFoundException StaleEntryAccessException,
QuotaExhaustedException;

Object[] getQuotaInfo()
throws ESInvocationException PermissionDeniedException,
NameNotFoundException;

Object[] setQuota(long softQuota, long hardQuota)
throws ESInvocationException, PermissionDeniedException,
NameNotFoundException;

ESName newProtectionDomain(String name,
boolean persistent
)
throws PermissionDeniedException;
}

```

The method `switchPD` switches the Client's active Protection Domain to this Protection Domain (i.e., the Protection Domain receiving the method invocation). It returns an array of two `ESNames`. Element [0] is the `ESName` for the old Protection Domain, and element [1] is the `ESName` for the new Protection Domain.

The `Object []` array returned by `getQuotaInfo` and `setQuota` contains at least three values. The first is `Long` containing the total number of bytes currently consumed in the Core by this Protection Domain. The second is `Long` containing the soft limit in bytes. The third is `Long` containing the hard limit in bytes for this Protection Domain.

The method `newProtectionDomain` creates a new Protection Domain. The `name` parameter is the name given when registering the new Protection Domain in the default vocabulary. The parameter `persistent` is set to true, if the new Protection Domain is to be made persistent. The return value is the `ESName` of the new Protection Domain.

The following initial names are defined in the default `NameFrame` of a new Protection Domain:

"CurrentPD" is bound to the Protection Domain itself

"Core" is bound to the core name frame (`es://host/core`) (see Chapter 6, "Communication", section on `ESNames`).



Remote resource manager

The Remote Resource Manager is described in Chapter 6, "Communication".

Repository

This is described in Chapter 10, "Repository (Informational)".

Repository View

A Repository View contains references to a set of Resources.

When a Client does a find in a Repository View, the Core will attempt to match only those Resources included in the view. If no match is found, no accessor is added to the Mapping Object.

A Repository View can be exported by reference or by value.

The RepositoryView class is defined below:

```
class RepositoryView
{
    ESName[] Resources;

    boolean add (ESName res)
    throws ESInvocationException PermissionDeniedException,
    StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException,
    QuotaExhaustedException;

    boolean remove (ESName res)
    throws ESInvocationException PermissionDeniedException,
    StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException,
    QuotaExhaustedException;

    boolean contains (ESName res)
    throws ESInvocationException PermissionDeniedException,
    StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException;
```



```
boolean clear ();  
throws ESInvocationException QuotaExhaustedException  
PermissionDeniedException, NameNotFoundException;  
  
boolean addExternalLookupHandler(ESName res);  
throws ESInvocationException PermissionDeniedException,  
StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException;  
  
boolean removeExternalLookupHandler()  
throws ESInvocationException StaleEntryAccessException  
PermissionDeniedException, NameNotFoundException;  
}
```

An externalLookupHandler is not used in this release. Any attempt to use addExternalLookupHandler or removeExternalLookupHandler will cause undefined behavior.

In general, all methods return true if they are successful, false if they fail. Clients can add Resources to and remove Resources from a Repository View. Attempts to add a Resource already in a Repository View will fail, as will attempting to remove a non-existing Resource. The method clear removes all Resources from the Repository View. The method contains returns true if the Resource, res, is contained in the Repository View.

Resource Contract

An e-speak Resource Contract is *not* an agreement between a Client of a Resource and the Resource Handler. Instead, it states the interface to which the Resource Handler will respond and conform.

Two Resource Contracts are available at system start-up in addition to those for Core-managed Resources. The default Resource Contract allows any Client to register a Resource. It is useful for Clients wishing to define Resources that don't specify a particular interface, such as Callback Resources. The second Resource Contract is for creating new Resource Contracts.

A Resource Contract contains a type string. This denotes the Resource type that is registered in this Resource Contract. A Resource Contract also contains a set of Vocabularies that can be used to discover and call upon Resources of this type².

A Contract can be exported by value or by reference.

The ResourceContract class is defined below:

```
class ResourceContract
{
    ESName[] Vocabularies;
    string type;

    void getVocabularies(ESName targetFrame);
    throws ESInvocationException PermissionDeniedException,
    StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException;
}
```

The method getVocabularies populates the Name Frame, targetFrame, with the names of the Vocabularies supported by the Resource Contract. The Name Frame targetFrame is cleared before the operation.

² This may be omitted in future releases

[illegible]

The `ResourceFactoryInterface` class is defined below:

The `registerResource` method takes a `ResourceDescription` and a `ResourceSpecification` as parameters. If `persistence` is `true`, the Core will preserve the metadata after the Client's connection is closed, and also the state, in the case of a core-managed Resource only. The state of an external Resource is never preserved after the Client's connection is closed. The `targetFrame` parameter is the `ESName` of a Name Frame in which the name for the new Resource will be put. The `toBaseName` parameter is the name of the new Resource in the Name Frame. The `Object` param is intended to hold Resource-specific information for creating Core-managed Resources, but is not currently used. It can be of any type supported in the e-speak serialization format.



Resource manipulation

Every instance of e-speak provides a MetaResource that provides access to metadata (Resource Descriptions and Resource Specifications). Once a Resource has been registered using a Resource Factory, the only way to access its metadata is through a message sent to the MetaResource, using the ResourceManipulationInterface defined below.

MetaResources are not exported.

```
interface ResourceManipulationInterface
{
    void unregister (ESName resource)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void setResourceOwner (ESName resource)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ESName getResourceOwner (ESName resource)
    throw ESInvocationException;

    ESName getResourceProxy (ESName resource)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void setResourceProxy (ESName resource,
    ESName resourceHandler)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ESName getResourceContract (ESName resource)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ADR getMetadataMask (ESName target)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void setMetadataMask (ESName target, ADR mask)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ADR getResourceMask (ESName target)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void setResourceMask (ESName target, ADR mask)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ADR getOwnerPublicKey (ESName target)
    throws ESInvocationException;
```

```
void setOwnerPublicKey(ESName target, ADR key)
throws ESInvocationException

ESMap getPublicRSD(ESName resource)
throws ESInvocationException;

void setPublicRSD(ESName resource,ESMap rsds)
throws ESInvocationException;

ESMap getPrivateRSD(ESName resource)
throws ESInvocationException;

void setPrivateRSD(ESName resource, ESMap rsds)
throws ESInvocationException;

ResourceDescription getResourceDescription(ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;

void setResourceDescription(ESName resource,
ResourceDescription desc)
throws ESInvocationException;

int getEventControl (ESName resource)
throws ESInvocationException;

void setEventControl (int setting)
throws ESInvocationException;

boolean isPersistent (ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;

boolean isTransient (ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;

void setPersistent (ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;

void setTransient (ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;

ESUID getESUID(ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;

ESName getUrl(ESName target)
throws ESInvocationException;
```

```

    long getQuota(ESName target)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ResourceType getType(ESName target)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    ADR getServiceID(ESName target)
    throws ESInvocationException;

    void setServiceID(ESName target, ADR id)
    throws ESInvocationException
}

```

All methods can throw `PermissionDeniedException`, `StaleEntryAccessException` and `NameNotFoundException`.

The convention for a Resource-specific data (RSD) array is that it consists of a sequence of pairs- the first element of each pair is a string used to tag the second element. (This is represented in an `ESMap`, for example in the return from `getPublicRSD`).

Most of the methods in a `MetaResource` are for setting or getting the fields of its Resource metadata. Some aspects of these methods warrant explanation:

The `unregister` method removes (unregisters) the Resource, `resource`, from the Repository. This removes `ResourceDescription` and `ResourceSpecification`; no more messages can be sent to the Resource after this operation.

The `setResourceOwner` method sets the owner of the Resource, `resource`, to the `ESName` of the calling Client's Protection Domain.

The `setResourceProxy` and `getResourceProxy` methods set and get the Resource Handler.

There is no method for setting the Resource Contract, because this cannot be changed once the Resource has been registered.

The method `getQuota()` returns the total charge in bytes to the owner's quota due to that Resource.

The methods `getMetadataMask` and `setMetadataMask` are used for getting and setting the operations for which security is disabled for a particular Resource's metadata: anybody can invoke the methods listed in this mask to manipulate the particular Resource's metadata. The methods `getResourceMask` and `setResourceMask` perform the analogous function for the operations supported by the Resource itself.

The user Interface

This is not implemented in the current release

```
interface UserInterface {
    public String getDescription()
        throws PermissionDeniedException, NameNotFoundException;

    public AttributePropertySet getProperties()
        throws PermissionDeniedException, NameNotFoundException;

    public void mutateProperties (AttributePropertySet props)
        throws PermissionDeniedException, NameNotFoundException;
}
```

Vocabulary

See Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies".

Appendix: Method Names

In messages sent to Core-managed Resources (see Chapter 6, "Communication") the method is identified by a string. The following strings are used.

```
AccountManagerInterface
PF_REGISTERUSER
```

PF_UNREGISTERUSER
PF_AUTHENTICATEUSER
PF_GETUSERPROFILE
PF_SETUSERPROFILE
PF_GETALLUSERS
PF_ADDDESCRIPTION

ConnectionManagerInterface
OPENCONNECTION
GETCONNECTIONS
CLOSECONNECTION
CLOSECONNECTIONFROMREMOTE

CoreManagementInterface
PING
GETCLIENTCONNECTIONS
STOPSERVINGOUTBOX
STOPSERVINGINBOX
STARTSERVINGOUTBOX
STARTSERVINGINBOX
REMOVEPROTECTIONDOMAIN
DENYNEWCLIENTSESSIONS
ACCEPTNEWCLIENTSESSIONS
GETTOTALMEMORY
GETFREEMEMORY
START_JVM_GC
STOP_JVM_GC
SET_JVM_GC_INTERVAL
GET_JVM_GC_INTERVAL
IS_JVM_GC_RUNNING
START_SCAVENGER
STOP_SCAVENGER
GET_SCAVENGER_STATS
SET_NUM_STATS
FinderInterface
FIND
FINDNEXT

MailboxInterface
ISCONNECTED
CONNECT
DISCONNECT
RECONNECT

ManagedServiceIntf (implemented by Core management resource)
GETNAME

GETDESCRIPTION
GETOWNER
GETUPTIME
GETVERSION
GETERRORCONDITION
GETSTATICINFO
COLDRESET
WARMRESET
START
STOP
SHUTDOWN
REMOVE
GETSTATE
GETVARIABLEENTRIES
GETVARIABLENAMES
GETVARIABLEENTRY
SETVARIABLE
GETRESOURCEENTRIES
GETRESOURCE NAMES
GETRESOURCEENTRY
SETRESOURCE

NameFrameInterface
ISBOUND
BIND
REBIND
UNBIND
RENAME
COPY
ADD
SUBTRACT
LISTNAMES
LISTBINDINGS
NEW_SUB_FRAME

ProtectionDomainInterface
SWITCHPD
GETDEFAULTFRAME
SETDEFAULTFRAME
GETQUOTAINFO
SETQUOTA
NEW_PROTECTION_DOMAIN

RemoteResourceManagerInterface
EXPORTRESOURCE
IMPORTRESOURCEFROMMSG

GETDESCRIPTION



IMPORTRESOURCE
EXPORTRESOURCEFROMMSG
UNEXPORTRESOURCE
UNEXPORTRESOURCEFROMMSG
UPDATEEXPORTEDRESOURCE
UPDATEEXPORTEDRESOURCEFROMMSG
UPDATEIMPORTEDRESOURCE
UPDATEIMPORTEDRESOURCEFROMMSG
EXPORTONCONNECTING

RepositoryViewInterface
ADD
REMOVE
CONTAINS
CLEAR
ADD_ELOOKUP
REMOVE_ELOOKUP

ResourceContractInterface
REGISTERRESOURCE
GETVOCABULARIES

ResourceFactoryInterface
REGISTER_RESOURCE

ResourceManipulationInterface
UNREGISTER
GETESUID
SETRESOURCEOWNER
GETRESOURCEOWNER
GETRESOURCEPROXY
SETRESOURCEPROXY
GETRESOURCECONTRACT
GETPUBLICRSD
SETPUBLICRSD
GETPRIVATERSD
SETPRIVATERSD
GETRESOURCEDESCRIPTION
SETRESOURCEDESCRIPTION
GETEVENTCONTROL
SETEVENTCONTROL
ISEXPORTEDBYVALUE
SETEXPORTTYPE
GETQUOTA
GETMETADATAMASK
SETMETADATAMASK

```
VocabularyInterface
GETDESCRIPTION
GETPROPERTIES
MUTATEPROPERTIES
```

Chapter 5 Access Control

Overview

The basis of e-speak access control is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In the remainder of this chapter we assume the reader is familiar with the principles of PKI, sometimes also known as Public Key Cryptography. There are many texts to which the reader can refer [see for example *Schneier, Pfleeger, Stallings*].

All entities in e-speak (users, services, cores etc) are identified by public keys. To authenticate an entity we verify it knows the private key corresponding to the given public key. No entity should ever intentionally share its private key or give anybody access to the private key.

The means by which a private key is protected is implementation dependent: not part of the architecture. It is very important that the private key is held securely, so it is not unintentionally made available to others. In the default implementation the private key is encapsulated inside a Private Security Environment (PSE) object, described below.

Any entity can create a key-pair. Provided the private key is kept secret, the key-pair will be unique to that entity. However, having a key-pair gives you no power in the system. It is necessary also to have Certificates stating the access rights issued to your public key.

To decide whether to honor an incoming request a service must decide if the accompanying certificate (or certificates) grant access rights for the request. Before that, it verifies that the sender of the request knows the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate to which the access rights have been given (formally this is the Subject of the certificate). It does this by a cryptographic protocol described in Chapter 6, "Communication" .

Finally before honoring the request, the service must verify that it trusts whoever issued the certificate. It does this by verifying that the certificate has been signed by an entity that it trusts.

Comparison with X.509 Certificates

The most common use of certificates is in X.509 based infrastructures to link an entity's name to its public key (technically the X.509 Distinguished Name). This is how certificates are used in the web. A drawback is that, typically, having used the certificate to verify the name, a service needs to consult an authorization database to determine the access to be granted.

E-speak certificates are more general than this. They are signed (authenticated statements) linking a public key to a Name or a Tag. (Certificates linking a Name to another Name also exist, and are described below.) The word "tag" distinguishes the field concerned from an X.509 "attribute", whose function is broadly similar. A Tag typically states an access right. Thus to make an access control decision a service does the following:

- Examines the tag in the certificate to see if it grants access
- Checks the entity making the request knows the corresponding private key
- Verifies the certificate has been issued (is signed by) an entity it trusts

X.509 name certificates are issued by entities called Certificate Authorities. To avoid confusion with this, in e-speak we refer to entities issuing certificates as Issuers. E-speak Issuers can issue either Name or Attribute certificates.

Another feature in e-speak not found in X.509 is that it implements a split trust model. An entity does not have to trust all Issuers equally. It need not trust any given Issuer at all. Those it does trust, it may only trust to issue certificates granting access to a subset of its operations.

Conversely, issuing certificates in e-speak is not a reserved prerogative: anyone can do it. Whether or not the certificate will grant access to any Resource depends on whether the Resource Handler trusts the Issuer for the service in question. The list of which Issuers are trusted for what is called Trust Assumptions. This is discussed later in this chapter.

Derivation from SPKI

E-speak implements the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (or SPKI) [see *RFC 2692-2693*]. In addition to the properties already described, SPKI specifies a structure and set of operations on Tag and Name certificates. These are used to parse and process the certificates when making access control decisions. The processing and access control is discussed later in this chapter. Certain tags (e-speak tags) are defined that will be checked explicitly by the e-speak infrastructure before an access is authorized. However, applications can choose to use any syntactically valid SPKI tag. E-speak will check that certificates containing such tags are valid, but will not use them for an access control decision. The application will have to interpret these non e-speak tags when making access control decisions. Core managed Resources will ignore non e-speak tags.

Certificate Management


The process by which an Issuer decides to issue a certificate granting access rights to an entity is implementation dependent and therefore not part of the architecture. The general process would be for entities to register either with some Issuer or with a separate Registration Authority (RA). For registration the entity may need to provide credentials such as credit card number, social security number, bank details, employee ID, user id., and full name. Once the registering body is satisfied it will issue a certificate, or give instructions for issue. The registering body may be fully automated, or may queue registrations for human inspection.

A given entity may have several certificates that have been issued to it. If no strategy is adopted to structure and manage certificate issuing then there may be very large numbers of certificates required. Administrators and operators would find it difficult to run e-speak systems, and operations such as access revocation would be extremely hard. Hence we discuss and recommend certain strategies for certificate management. These are based around familiar concepts such as user-groups (or roles), found in several common operating systems. These are not part of the architecture. The management strategy practised must reflect the business requirements of the deploying organization.

Anybody can create a key-pair in e-speak and then register to get an Issuer to issue certificates to the public key. There is no notion of a centralized, all powerful, trusted Certificate Authority. Instead entities choose which Issuers they trust for what. Authentication in e-speak relies on proof of knowledge of the private key: there is no centralized authentication service. Hence the e-speak security architecture is a global, fully distributed and single sign-on.

Example of certificate-based Security (Informational)

Consider the diagram below. Two large ".com" companies are accessing a portal to use services provided by the portal. For simplicity we have shown only 3 services.



The data held by the services may be sensitive, so both companies would like to be sure that their employees are accessing the correct portal and services. In addition, having made arrangements for access to the portal (and paid fees), both companies might prefer to be responsible for managing their own lists of employees and control who can access the portal's services.

From the portal's point of view, it probably only wants to deliver services to paying customers and only to deliver those services that each customer has paid for.

Suppose CO_1 has done a deal with the portal to access services A, B and C, and CO_2 has done a deal to access service A and C only. Lets further suppose that CO_1 and CO_2 are each running an Issuer , called Issuer1 and Issuer2 respectively. The portal configures A and C to trust both Issuer1 and Issuer2; it configures B to trust Issuer1 only. Then CO_1 and CO_2 can issue certificates to each of their employees. CO_1's certificates will be honored at A, B and C, but CO_2 certificates will only be honored at A and C.

Each time a service sees a certificate from either company that grants access, it increments the bill for that company. This leaves each company in control of who among its employees gets access to the services for which it has paid. Each company is in control of revocation (e.g. if the employee leaves). In addition the portal can immediately revoke access to an entire company, by removing the company's Issuer from the list of trusted Issuers.

Each company may want to make sure that their employees are accessing only genuine services. To do so CO_1's Issuer issues a Tag certificate binding each of service A, B and C's public keys to a tag such as : "CO_1 approved". It must then ensure that its employees configure their clients to check for this tag before accessing the service. Similarly CO_2's Issuer issues a Tag certificate to services A and C conferring an attribute that is meaningful to CO_2.

Note that this requires very little authorization data to be held and managed by the portal. It only needs to remember the public keys of CO_1 and CO_2's Issuer. If access control were based on authenticating a name and mapping accesses to that name, then the portal would have to keep a list of all employees in each company that can access any of the services, and which accesses are allowed for each name - much more data to manage and maintain.

Authorization Data

The informal structure of an authorization certificate is:

Certificate header: a constant field starting " (cert "
 Issuer: the public key of the Issuer
 Subject: the public key or the name of the entity granted the certificate
 An optional "delegation" field
 Tag: Details of what is authorized
 Optional validity qualification and comment.

In this structure, it is the tag that requires most attention by client applications.

Tags

As e-speak implements SPKI, any valid SPKI tag can appear in a certificate. The BNF for SPKI is given in the *SPKI BNF Format* section. In this section we give some example SPKI tags that can appear in certificates and explain the BNF for a tag.

E-speak defines a set of standard tabs (see "E-speak Authorization Tags" on page 87), that will be checked automatically by the infrastructure. The examples given in this section are not standard e-speak tags, so they would have to be checked explicitly by the application.

An SPKI tag is an S-expression, that is a list enclosed in matching "(" and ")".

The BNF for a tag is:

```
<tag> = "(" "tag" <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<tag-and> = "(" "*" "and" <tag-expr>+ ")" ;
<tag-expr> = <byte-string> | <tag-simple>
            | <tag-prefix> | <tag-range>
            | <tag-set> | <tag-and>
            | <tag-star> ;
<tag-simple> = "(" <byte-string> <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<tag-prefix> = "(" "*" "prefix" <byte-string> ")" ;
<tag-range> = "(" "*" "range" <range-ordering> <low-lim>? <up-lim>? ")" ;
<tag-set> = "(" "*" "set" <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<tag-star> = "(" "*" ")" ;
```

```

<tag-and> = "(" "*" "and" <tag-expr>+ ")" ;1
<range-ordering>= "alpha" | "numeric" | "time" | "binary" |
"date" ;
<up-lim> = <lte> <byte-string> ;
<low-lim> = <gte> <byte-string> ;
<lte> = "l" | "le" ;
<gte> = "g" | "ge" ;

```

A tag is a list of lists, with each list denoted by brackets. In its simplest form (tag-simple), a tag is simply composed of byte-strings. The access control machinery must interpret the meaning of the tag when making an access control decision. The following examples are adapted from SPKI examples previously published as Internet drafts. An example form for tags applying to a file system is:

```
(tag (files <pathname> <access> ))
```

An instance of such a tag is:

```
(tag (files //ftp.espeak.net/pub/EspeakArch.pdf read))
```

A client presenting a certificate containing the above tag is allowed read access to EspeakArch.pdf (assuming authentication was successful).

<tag-set> field

Groups of permissions can be granted using the "tag-set" form:

```
(tag (files //ftp.espeak.net/pub/EspeakArch.pdf (* set read
write)))
```

This grants read and write access to the file.

<tag-prefix> field

A set of permissions having a common prefix can be granted using the "tag-prefix" form:

```
(tag (files (* prefix //ftp.espeak.net/pub/ ) (* set read write)))
```

This grants read and write access to any file under the pub directory.

<tag-star> field

The "tag-star" form stands for the set of all valid s-expressions and byte strings.

¹ The <tag-and> field is an e-speak specific extension to SPKI.

E-speak Authorization Tags

E-speak tags are valid SPKI tags that will be checked by the infrastructure. For core-managed Resources the e-speak core will check that a valid certificate is presented containing a tag that authorizes the operation. For non-core-managed Resources, it is assumed that the resource handler will check there is a valid certificate containing a tag that authorizes the operation. However, the e-speak core cannot enforce this; the resource handler is responsible for Resource security.

E-speak tags that authorize access to services have the following form:

```
(tag (net.espeak.method <interface> <method> <serviceId>))
```

The following tag authorizes the "stop" operation in the `ServiceManagementInterface` for the identified Resource.

```
(tag (net.espeak.method ServiceManagementInterface stop
xxxxyyyyzzzz))
```

The forms tag-star, tag-prefix, tag-set and tag-range can all be used within an e-speak tag. So the following tag authorizes operations on the `ServiceManagement` interface in two different Resources.

```
(tag (* set (net.espeak.method ServiceManagementInterface stop
xxxxyyyyzzzz)
(net.espeak.method ServiceManagementInterface (* set stop start)
aaaabbbbcccc)))
```

The long strings at the end represent the `ServiceId`, described below.

The following form authorizes every method on every `ServiceManagementInterface` on Resources that trust the issuer.

```
(tag (net.espeak.method ServiceManagementInterface (*) (*) ))
```

Or equivalently:

```
(tag (net.espeak.method ServiceManagementInterface ))
```

The following authorizes any method within the given interfaces (core managed Resources) on any object:

```
(tag (
  (net.espeak.method
    (* set
      ResourceFactoryInterface
```

```

ResourceManipulationInterface
ManagedServiceInterface
CoreManagementInterface
NameFrameInterface
    )
)

```

Lets assume we have an interface called "file" and the serviceID is set to a notional path name (a non default value). The following tag authorizes the read operation on all files below the pub directory.

```

(tag (net.espeak.method file read (* prefix es.espeak.net/pub/
)))

```

If serviceId's are set to ordered numerical or alphabetical values, then the tag-range form may be useful in the <serviceId> portion of a tag.

Currently we have only defined e-speak tags for the Network Object Model. This assumes a set of services with one or more interfaces, each interface containing one or more methods. The programming of J-ESI and the interaction with core-managed Resources follow this model. However, e-speak can support other programming models: an XML document exchange model and a direct messaging model have both been implemented. The tags used by these models are part of the programming models. There are not part of the core architecture, since the core does not need to interpret them: the resource handlers do it.

Service Identity

The serviceId field in the Resource specification (see Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies") can contain any valid SPKI tag-expression, defined as a "tag-expr" in the BNF (see "SPKI BNF Formats" on page 109). This tag-expression can be set by anybody with a certificate, from an Issuer trusted by the MetaResource, authorizing setServiceId in the MetaResource. The serviceId field is delivered to the resource handler with each message for the Resource.

The service identity is used by the resource handler when verifying standard e-speak tags (see "Verifying tags and tag intersection" on page 100).

Default ServiceId

A default assignment is made by the core when it encounters a standard e-speak authorization tag without an authorized service id. The format is:

```
<serviceId> = "(" "net.espeak.service" <service class> <service  
name> <unique id> ")"
```

<service class> is set to the first available value of:

- 1.) The name attribute in the Resource specification contract, if any.
- 2.) The contract type, if any.
- 3.) A 64-bit random no. if neither of the above exists.

<service name> is set to:

- 1.) The "name" in the Resource description
- 2.) A 64-bit random no., if 1) is not found.

<unique id> is a 64-bit random no.

A secure random number generator should be used, so that the probability of accidental authorization when the default has been used will be infinitesimal..

Advantages of ServiceIds

The serviceId is intended for use by applications to identify services without using the Resource name or access path (ESNames). This decouples authorization from resource naming and has several advantages:

- Service ESNames can be changed without affecting authorization
- Authorization can be revoked by changing a service's identity, without changing its ESName
- In a replicated service replicas can all have the same identity
- Tag patterns (the "tag-star" form) can be used effectively, limiting the number of certificates issued

None of this is possible using ESName for service identity.

Protection of Servicelds

Service identity plays a crucial role in authorizing access to a service (see "Verifying tags and tag intersection" on page 100). It is essential that the `setServiceID` operation source is protected, so that a valid certificate is required to invoke it.

Names: Userids, Groups....


E-speak also supports SPKI name certificates, of two types. In the first place, an Issuer can issue a certificate that binds a public key to a name. This has similarities to X.509 certificates which bind a public key to an X.509 Distinguished Name. (A Distinguished Name is a name in a special format, distinguishing it globally from any other name.)

SPKI name certificates do not restrict the syntax of the name, other than requiring them to be a bytestring. Instead, names are scoped by the public key of the issuer. Referring back to our example (see "Example of certificate-based Security (Informational)" on page 82), both CO_1 and CO_2 could have an employee named John Doe. Assuming each company had an Issuer that issued name certificates binding these names to public keys, the fully qualified name for each John Doe is:

Public key of CO_1 issuer: John Doe
Public key of CO_2 issuer: John Doe

Hence the portal (and anybody else) would have no difficulty distinguishing between the two instances of John Doe.

The second type of name certificate binds a name to a name. For example we might want to bind John Doe to the name "users". This kind of certificate confers membership of the group "users" on the userid John Doe. It can be used to build a role- or group- based security model, such as represented below (see "Managing certificates (informational)" on page 106).



The algorithm which relates a public key to an authorization in this case is described below (see "Name Reduction" on page 97). [See also *RFC 2693*]

Certificate Structure

The two kinds of certificates in e-speak are Authorization Certificates that bind a tag to a public key or a name and Name Certificates that bind a name to a public key or a name. The following sections describe and explain the BNF which specify these types.

Some general features of the specification are:

Nearly every field begins with its name as a literal string.

* is used to mean "0 or more cases of the preceding field"

* is also used to mean "anything valid" in the tag-star field described above

+ means "one or more instances of the preceding field"

? means the preceding field is optional

"uris" means a field with one or more URI's.

The full SPKI BNF is given at the end of this Chapter (see "SPKI BNF Formats" on page 109).

Authorization Certificates

The format for an authorization certificate is:

```
<cert> = "(" "cert" <version>? <cert-display>?
<issuer> <issuer-info>?
<subject> <subject-info>?
<deleg>?
<tag>
<valid>?
<comment>? ")" ;
```

The optional <version> field defines the <version> of the certificate. The optional <cert-display> field is designed to provide hints for display. Neither of these fields is used in the current version of e-speak; the parser will ignore them.

Issuer field

The <issuer> field is the public key of the Issuer issuing the certificate; it is defined as follows.

```
<issuer> = "(" "issuer" <principal> ")" ;
<principal> = <public-key> | <hash-of-key> ;
<hash-of-key> = <hash> ;
<hash> = "(" "hash" <hash-alg-name> <hash-value><uris>? ")" ;
<hash-alg-name> = "md5" | "sha1" | <uri> ;
<hash-value> = <byte-string> ;
<public-key> = "(" "public-key" <pub-sig-alg-id> <s-expr>*
<uris>? ")" ;
<pub-sig-alg-id> = "rsa-pkcs1-md5" | "rsa-pkcs1-sha1" | "rsa-
pkcs1" | "dsa-sha1" | <uri> ;
```

The <issuer-info> field is intended in SPKI to provide a list of one or more URIs for certificates from which the Issuer derives its authority to issue the certificate. This is to support delegation: one Issuer may issue a certificate to another Issuer with

the delegation field present. (It is the literal "propagate".) Suppose a service trusts the first Issuer directly, and not the second Issuer. If a client presents a certificate issued from the second Issuer, the service will need to see the delegate certificate conferring the privilege on the second Issuer before it authorizes access. The URIs would specify the location of delegate certificates. This is not used in the current version of e-speak. Instead, the required supporting certificates are obtained during the Session Layer handshake (see Chapter 6, "Communication"). The parser will ignore this field.

The "hash-alg-name" and "pub-sig-alg-id" fields identify algorithms used for hashing and for signature verification - usually the literal abbreviated algorithm names given. The "uri" alternative in each case could be used to give a URI of some other algorithm.

Subject field

The <subject> field denotes the entity to which the certificate is issued.

```
<subject> = "(" "subject" <subj-obj> ")" ;
<subj-obj> = <principal> | <name> | <object-hash> ;2
<principal> = <public-key> | <hash-of-key> ;
<name> = <relative-name> | <full-name> ;
<relative-name> = "(" "name" <byte-string>* ")" ;
<full-name> = "(" "name" <principal> <byte-string>* ")" ;
```

The <subject> is either a public key, a name or the hash of an object. If the subject is a public key, then the entity presenting the certificate must prove possession of the corresponding private key before authorization is granted. This uses the cryptographic protocols described in Chapter 6, "Communication".

If the <subject> is a name, then authorization is granted to the entity that has a certificate binding that name to its public key (see "Name Certificates" on page 96). Several certificates may be required to prove this. For example the authorization

² The definition here departs from SPKI slightly. SPKI defines <subj-obj> = <principal> | <name> | <object-hash> | <keyholder>; E-speak does not support <keyholder>. If the parser encounters a keyholder field, it will throw an exception. Which exception depends on the point from which it is invoked. One of the e-speak exceptions specified in Chapter 7, "Exceptions" will be thrown.

certificate may be issued to a name such as "users". The name "users" may be conferred on another name "John Doe", a real world person. So to get authorization three certificates are needed:

- A certificate binding John Doe's public key to his name
- A certificate binding John Doe to the name "users"
- A certificate granting the authorization to "users"

John Doe needs to prove possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in the first certificate using the protocols described in Chapter 6, "Communication". The algorithm for name reduction to arrive at the certificate binding the name to a key and handling compound names such as <public key: "John Doe" "Favorite People"> is described below (see "Name Reduction" on page 97).

<relative-name> and <full-name>

A <relative-name> is assumed to have been issued by the Issuer whose public key is in the issuer field. In contrast, a <full-name> is a fully qualified name, explicitly scoped by the public key of the Issuer which conferred it. This principle is extended for names "issued by" names [see *Compound Names* below]. The use of qualified names allows any Issuer to issue certificates to names that have been issued by any other Issuer.

<object-hash> (Informational)

An <object-hash> is intended for the issue of authorization certificates to entities such as files and executables. The tag in such a certificate might describe a property of the file or the executable. This is not used in the current version of e-speak. The parser will ignore the field.

<subject-info> (Informational)

The optional <subject-info?> field is defined as follows.

```
<subject-info> = "(" "subject-info" <uris> ")" ;
```

The intent of this field is to provide a list of URIs that provide information about the subject. For example if the subject is a hash of a key, it might provide the location of the key being hashed. If the subject is a name, it might provide the location of the name certificates. This field is not used in the current version of e-speak. The parser will ignore it.

Delegation field

The optional <deleg> field is defined as follows.

```
<deleg> = "(" "propagate" ")" ;
```

If this field is included in a certificate, then the subject is authorized to delegate the authorization specified in the certificates tag. The subject does this by issuing certificates containing the tag, or a subset of the tag's privileges. This is discussed further under *Delegation*.

Validity field

The optional <valid> field is defined as follows.

```
<valid> = <valid-basic> <online-test>* <restrictions> ;
<valid-basic> = <not-before>? <not-after>? ;
<not-after> = "(" "not-after" <date> ")" ;
<not-before> = "(" "not-before" <date> ")" ;
<date> = <byte-string> ;
```

If the valid field is missing, the certificate is assumed to be valid without constraints. The fields <online-test> and <restrictions> defined in [*Working Draft*] are not supported in the current version of e-speak; the parser will ignore them. The <valid-basic> field is used to support time-based revocation, as described under *Certificate Revocation*.

A <date> field is an ASCII byte string of the form:

```
YYYY-MM-DD_HH:mm:ss
```

This is always UTC. For example, "1997-07-26_23:15:10" is a valid date. So is "2001-01-01_00:00:00". "MM" is a two digit integer in the range 1 to 12; "mm" and "SS" are two-digit integers in the range 0 to 59.

The optional comment field is defined as follows:



Anything in this field is intended to provide information to humans. It is ignored by e-speak.

The format for name certificates is:

The characteristic feature of a name certificate is the the <issuer-name> field. This defines the issuer of the certificate plus the name of the certificate holder. "Issuer-name" does not mean "name of issuer". The byte-string in this field is the certificate holder's name, and the <principal> is the issuer's public key, or a hash of it. In the latter case, there may be a following field containing a URI of the full key, but this is not currently used or supported in e-speak.

An example of a public key is:

The long string between "|" 's is a number encoded in base64 notation for relative brevity. This is a feature of BNF advanced syntax [see *BNF Notation* below].

Such items may have to be written in certificates, but in the following text, we use "PK XXX" as an abbreviation for "XXX's public key".

Example

Taking the example (see "Names: Userids, Groups...." on page 90), the following certificate could be issued by CO_1's Issuer.

```
(cert      Certificate A
  (issuer (name (PK CO 1) "John Doe"))
  (subject (PK John Doe))
  (not-after "2001-01-01_00:00:00")
)
```

The underlining is referred to in the next paragraph.

Name Reduction

The objective of name reduction is to reduce the name that appears in a subject field to a single public key, a <principal>. Name reduction replaces the name in a subject field, by rewriting it with the subject field from the corresponding name certificate. It uses the fact that a fully qualified name in a subject field has the same format as <principal> <byte-string> in an issuer-name field. For example, given Certificate A above, suppose there is an authorization certificate:

```
(cert
Certificate B
  (issuer PK X)
  (subject (name (PK CO 1) "John Doe"))
  (tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
)
```

The two underlined fields being the same, we can replace <subject> in B by <subject> in A, giving certificate C:

```
(cert
Certificate C
  (issuer PK X)
  (subject (PK John Doe))
  (tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
)
```

Compound Names

Suppose an entity "Editor" issues a name certificate to "Foreign Desk"; and this entity in turn issues one to "Paris Correspondent". Each will have PK holder as its Subject. An authorization certificate could be made out as follows:

```
(cert
  (issuer PK Accounts)
  (subject (name (PK Editor) "Foreign Desk" "Paris Correspondent"
    (tag (Dinner_Expenses (*range 1e 200) (currency FF)))3
  )
)
```

The subject field is a Compound Name. Accessing the name certificates implied in the subject field from left to right, we replace this field successively by:

```
(subject (name (PK Foreign Desk) "Paris Correspondent)
(subject (PK Paris Correspondent) )
```

- yielding a certificate which can be authenticated.

Name reduction is defined formally as part of the tuple reduction rules in [*SPKI theory, RFC 2693*]. This also includes an algorithm for combining validity fields. If the validity fields are dates (as in the current e-speak implementation), then informally we take the latest <not-before> date and the earliest <not-after> date. If the <not-after> date obtained in this way is before the <not-before> date, then the reduction has failed.

Wire format for certificates

The "on-the-wire" format for certificates is the BNF Canonical Syntax (see "SPKI BNF Formats" on page 109).

Delegation

E-speak supports SPKI delegation. If an Issuer is not trusted directly by the entity checking the authorization, its certificates cannot effectively authorize more than the delegate certificate authorizes. The SPKI certificate reduction rules [see

³ Not an e-speak tag.

RFC2693 - AIntersect describe formally how this is enforced. Informally, it is done by intersecting the authorizations specified by all tags in the delegation chain, and taking the smallest validity period as described in the *Name Reduction* section.

Consider the following certificate.

```
(cert
  (issuer PK X)
  (subject PK Y)
  (propagate)
  (tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
  (not-after "2000-10-01_00:00:00")
)
```

Suppose Y now issues a certificate to Z as follows.

```
(cert
  (issuer PK Y)
  (subject PK Z)
  (tag (net.espeak.method ))
  (not-after "2001-01-01_00:00:00")
)
```

Here Y is attempting to authorize more, for longer than was contained in the certificate issued to it by X.

Suppose an entity, checking that Z is authorized, trusts X directly, but not Y. The two certificates above form the delegate chain by which Z is obtaining its power. The entity intersects the two tags (as described below), combines the validity times (as described above) and rewrites the issuer field according to the reduction rules described in *[RFC2693]* to get the following certificate.

```
(cert
  (issuer PK X)
  (subject PK Z)
  (tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
  (not-after "2000-10-01_00:00:00")
)
```

Hence it is not possible for Y's certificate to authorize more for longer than the original certificate granted to Y by X, from entities which don't trust Y directly.

Verifying tags and tag intersection

Tag verification is the process of determining whether the set of certificates presented contain the required authorization. SPKI tags define sets of authorizations. For example the following tag authorizes all methods on all instances of the CoreManagementInterface.

```
(tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
```

So the above tag "contains" the following tag (xxxxyyyyzzzz is the serviceID).

```
(tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ping
xxxxyyyyzzzz))
```

Appending elements to the end of a tag reduces the set of authorizations specified. So:

```
(tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ping))
```

specifies less than

```
(tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
```

In the case of a delegation chain, where the successive certificates authorize:

- 1 services A, B, C
- 2 services B, C, D
- 3 services B, D, E -

the only service authorized will be B - the only member of the "intersection" of the three certificates.

Implementing Verification

In e-speak, each time an object receives a request to invoke a method, the security infrastructure will check that there is a certificate that contains the tag needed to invoke the operation. For Core-managed Resources the security infrastructure is contained in the core. For other Resources, it is part of the Resource. The security infrastructure is part of the current implementation of J-ESI, and clients can use the security infrastructure API's for their own resource handlers.

For example, if an attempt is made by a client to invoke the "ping" operation on a `CoreManagementInterface`, the infrastructure will check that there is a certificate that contains the tag (tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ping xxxxyyyyzzzz)), where xxxxyyyyzzzz is the serviceID of the service being invoked.

For this to work the infrastructure must know the serviceID of the Resource. The serviceID is part of the Resource's metadata, and the core presents the serviceID with each request. It is trusted to present the correct serviceID.

For a certificate to authorize an operation we also have to check that the certificate is issued by somebody trusted to authorize the particular operation on the particular Resource [see *Trust Assumptions* section]. This means checking the public key of the issuer and the signature of the certificate. It is done automatically by the security infrastructure.

Authorization certificates can be issued to names as well as public keys. If a certificate issued to a name is presented that authorizes the operation, the name must be reduced to the public key of the invoker, as described in the *Name Reduction* section. The invoker's public key will be authenticated by the protocols described in Chapter 6, "Communication".

Authentication of Services (Informational)

In addition to the e-speak tags specified in the *E-speak Authorization Tags* section, a client or service can ask for application-specific tags to be checked, by invoking the security infrastructure APIs. Since no e-speak tags are specified for servers to present to clients, any authentication of the service by the client will be application-specific. For example a client might check for a tag identifying the Id. of a service, such as:

```
(tag (net.espeak.serviceID xxxxyyyyzzzz))
```

This means that the server will have to get a certificate issued to it containing this tag. See the *Certificate Issuers and Registration* section below.

The security APIs for checking application-specific tags are outside the architecture. They are application-specific, and no application-specific tags are supported for core-managed Resources.

Disabling Security

This is done by sets of tags called "masks" in the ResourceSpecification (see Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies". Two masks occur in the ResourceDescription:

The **Metadata mask**, which disables security on methods in the ResourceManipulationInterface.

The **ResourceMask**, which disables security on methods in an interface of the Resource being specified.

The basic method tag format is

```
(net.espeak.method <interface name> <method name>)
```

In the metadataMask the interface name is the core interface being specified, and the method name is the operation in that interface. For metadata this will be the ResourceManipulationInterface, and the method name one of its methods. For the resourceMask the interface name will be one of the interfaces supported by the Resource.

In the resource mask for an external Resource the interface name is the fully-qualified name of the interface class. For a Core-managed Resource, the interface name is not qualified, so we just have "NameFrameInterface" and "ProtectionDomainInterface" etc. The method name is the name of the method in the interface, plus the concatenated argument types. This allows overloaded methods to be distinguished.

The metadata mask is used by the in-core metaresource when performing metadata operations. The resource mask is passed to the service handler by the core for the service handler to use when performing operations on the service itself.

The masks are completely general tags, so the mask tag itself, or any of its fields, may use the tag matching features such as sets, prefixes and ranges. The interface and method names, for example, do not have to be string literals, they can be sets or prefixes.

This tag masks method foo in interface net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf:

```
(net.espeak.method net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf foo)
```

This tag masks method foo in interface net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf and method bar in interface net.espeak.examples.Example2Intf

```
(net.espeak.method (*set
(net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf foo)
(net.espeak.examples.Example2Intf bar)
```

This tag masks all methods beginning with foo:

```
(net.espeak.method net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf (* prefix
foo))
```

This tag masks methods foo and bar:

```
(net.espeak.method net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf (* set foo
bar))
```

To mask methods with prefix foo or bar:

```
(net.espeak.method net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf
(* set (* prefix foo) (* prefix bar)))
```

To mask all methods in the interface:

```
(net.espeak.method net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf )
```

This is equivalent to

```
(net.espeak.method net.espeak.examples.ExampleIntf (*))
```

since missing trailing elements match anything.

To mask methods foo in InterfaceA and bar in InterfaceB:

```
(* set (net.espeak.method InterfaceA foo)
(net.espeak.method InterfaceB bar))
```

To mask all methods:

```
(net.espeak.method)
```

or simply

```
(*)
```

Certificate Issuers and Registration (Informational)

There is no restriction in e-speak on who can issue a certificate. Anything that has a public key can do it. A certificate gets its power either from trust in the Issuer, or from a delegation chain down from a trusted Issuer. If the issuer is not trusted directly by a service and has no delegate certificate, its certificates will not authorize access to that service.

The processes of issuing a certificate and of deciding to issue one are application-specific: not part of the architecture. In some applications an entity may have to undergo a registration process whereby some real-world characteristics are verified (credit card numbers, social security numbers and the like). Registration may be fully automated, or it may involve human inspection.

Service Ids.

Problems can arise if services have the same service identity, either accidentally or deliberately. For example, a service might use a fake serviceId and ask someone to issue privileges for that serviceId. The issuer would then think it was issuing privileges on the fake service, when in fact it was issuing privileges on the real service. To avoid these problems, anyone claiming ownership of a serviceId must be required to produce a certificate granting it to them. This prevents serviceId spoofing.

Unique service identities can be enforced by all Issuers knowing all previously issued service identities, or having the Issuer itself generate and issue a cryptographically secure and unique service identity in a certificate, or by relying on the service identities generated by e-speak, using a cryptographically secure random-number generator.

Note that sometimes we may want to have the same identity for multiple services. For example, the services might be replicated. So, whether service identities are required to be unique and how this is enforced is not part of the architecture.

Trust Assumptions (Informational)

The basis for establishing trust assumptions is:

- Who you trust and for what.
- The importance of protecting this information from tampering.
- The need to conceal or to reveal who you trust.

All this is application specific, and trust assumptions are not part of the e-speak core's architecture.

Trust assumptions define whose certificates will be honored, and the acceptable set of tags in each case. Both clients and services may have trust assumptions. Trust assumptions do not appear in any of the e-speak protocols (core to core, or client to core APIs).

It may be important for a client or server not to reveal certain trust assumptions, containing information of potential use to an attacker. Conversely, a trust assumption might need to be broadcast, for example to let potential (paying) clients know the Issuer they need to get a certificate from, to access a service.

It is essential to prevent unauthorized tampering with trust assumptions, so that attackers cannot add themselves to the list of trusted entities.

The current implementation uses self-issued certificates to store trust assumptions. A certificate is only accepted as a trust assumption if it is self-issued. The format of trust assumption certificates in the current implementation of e-speak is exactly like that of an authorization certificate. The client or service must distinguish between authorization certificates and trust-assumption certificates. This should be easy: authorization certificates will be exchanged between two entities as part of the message protocols (see Chapter 6, "Communication"). Trust assumption certificates will probably be stored locally on disk. They should in any case be separate from authorization certificates.

The following certificate authorizes the entity CertificateIssuer to issue certificates authorizing any method in the CoreManagementInterface.

```
(cert
  (issuer PK self)
  (subject PK CertificateIssuer)
```

```
(tag (net.espeak.method CoreManagementInterface ))
)
```

The following certificate means the entity trust itself to issue any certificate.

```
(cert
  (issuer PK self)
  (subject PK self)
  (tag (* ))
)
```

Note that trust assumptions can use names or public keys as subjects.

Certificate Revocation

In the current implementation the only supported means of expressing validity is time (the <valid-basic> element). Once a certificate is issued it is valid until it expires.

SPKI supports online tests for validity. Future releases of e-speak will probably do the same, and support the principle of a certificate revocation list (CRL).

Managing certificates (informational)

The current implementation of e-speak has a Certificate Issuing Service (CI) that can be used to issue certificates authorizing access to services that trust it. This CI might be used to manage access to a set of services on a set of e-speak cores. Here we outline the way in which the CI manages its certificates as a guideline to those who may wish to implement their own CI.

The CI implements a notion of users and groups. When a user registers with the CI, this service issues a name certificate binding the user's name (userid) to a public key. Thereafter all certificates are issued to the userid rather than the user's public key. This means that to revoke all access to a user we need only revoke the certificate binding the userid to the public key.

The CI also maintains a list of groups analagous to the groups you might find used in operating system security architectures (e.g. "users" and "administrator"). An operator of the CI can create new groups. To add a user or users to a group, the operator selects the userid or userids and group. The CI then issues a name certificate to each user, binding the userid name to the group name.

To issue authorization certificates for a service, the CI needs to know what interfaces and methods are available on the service (the client stub is used for this). The CI presents a simple GUI listing the methods for each interface as well as listing groups and userids. The operator can select the group or individual user and what interfaces or methods they will be allowed to access. The CI issues an authorization certificate to the userid or the group.

Whenever the CI issues a certificate, it records this in its policy database. The policy database is used to drive access revocation and certificate renewal.

The CI provides a certificate directory interface from which stored certificates can be retrieved. This allows services to see what certificates have been issued to users and permits users to retrieve certificates that have been issued to them.

Revoking and Renewing certificates

A certificate is valid until it expires. To save having to renew all certificates frequently, an Issuer might choose a relatively short period of validity when issuing name certificates binding a user's name to a public key. Other certificates, particularly authorization certificates would have longer periods of validity.

The policy for certificate renewal, enforced by the CI, is to renew automatically all certificates in its policy database as they approach expiry. Renewed certificates can be retrieved from the CI's certificate directory.

If a CI operator revokes access or removes a user, the certificate(s) are removed from the policy database immediately. This means the certificates will not be renewed and can no longer be retrieved from the directory. Entities that have retrieved certificates from the certificate directory may continue to use them until they have expired.

Note that all a user's power is revoked as soon as the certificate binding their name to a public key expires.

Renewing keys

The CI supports key renewal by issuing a certificate binding the user's new key to the user's name. All other certificates issued to the user will remain valid as they are issued to the user's userid (name). The user may have to undergo a process similar to registration to convince the CI that the new key is valid.

Private Security Environments (Informational)

Private keys must never be shared and so need to be stored securely. How private keys are stored is a matter for the owner of the key and has no impact on the e-speak protocols or APIs used to interact with the core. It is therefore not part of the architecture. In the current implementation a PSE or Private Security Environment is used. This stores the keys in an encrypted file on a disk.

The private keys are never revealed to the application. Instead data is sent to the PSE object when it requires signing. The PSE framework has been designed so that the underlying mechanisms can be changed to accomodate devices like smart cards.

Interoperability with X.509 (Informational)

X.509 certificate infrastructures [see *RFC 2459*] are becoming more and more common. An X.509 certificate binds an entity's distinguished name to its public key. This is very similar to the way in which a SPKI name certificate binds a name to a public key. One difficulty is that in SPKI the Issuer is denoted by a public key. In X.509 the Certificate Authority is denoted by a "distinguished name". Its public key is not required to be in the certificate. When it isn't there, the Certificate Authority is assumed to have a well-known public key.

An e-speak CI can take an X.509 certificate, verify it (check it is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority) and issue an e-speak Name Certificate binding an encoding of the subject's X.509 distinguished name to the subject's public key. (This is not supported in the current release.)

In addition the e-speak certificate verifier could be extended to handle X.509 name certificates natively, automatically converting them to SPKI name certificates as outlined above. (This is not supported in the current release.)

X.509 version 3 also supports attribute certificates and work is on going within the IETF on defining a profile for attributes to use within the Internet's PKIX infrastructure. It is not possible to define a useable mapping from X.509 attribute certificates into SPKI authorization certificates, as X.509 attributes can be arbitrary. In principle it should be possible to define a mapping from SPKI certificates into X.509 attribute certificates.

SPKI BNF Formats

E-speak uses two BNF syntaxes. The "advanced" syntax is used for manually-input data and human reading. It has been used throughout this document. Its advantages for this purpose are allowing white spaces (including line-feed), and base64 and hex codings of numbers. The base64 coding allows public keys to be written with relative brevity.

The parser accepts certificates in advanced syntax or canonical syntax, and outputs them in canonical syntax. This is used for all internal operations, such as protocol exchanges, and for serialized transmission. All hashes are computed on data in canonical syntax. This is necessary, because varying numbers of white spaces would produce invalid hashes.

Advanced Syntax

The advanced syntax follows. Its initial non-terminal is <s-part>.

```
<alpha> = [a-zA-Z];
<base64> = "##" (<base64-char> | <space>)* "#" ;
<base64-char> = <alpha> | <digit> | [+/=];
```

```

<bytes> = <token> | <string> | <raw-bytes> | <quoted-string> |
<base64> | <hex> ;
<byte-string> = <display-type>? <bytes> <decimal> = [0-9]+ ;
<digit> = [0-9];
<display-type> = "[" <bytes> "]" ;
<hex> = "#|" (<hex-digit> | <space>)* "|" ;
<hex-digit> = [0-9A-Fa-f];
<punctuation> = [\-. / _ : * + =] | [' ` , @] | [$%^&\[\]\#~<>?:|] ;
<quoted-string> = "#<" {delimiter char c} {delimiter string s
not containing c} {c}
                    {any character string not containing s} {s} ;
<raw-bytes> = "#<decimal> "*" {binary byte string of that
length} ;
<s-expr> = "(" (<s-part> | <space>)* ")" ;
<space> = [ \t\r\n]*;
<s-part> = <byte-string> | <s-expr> ;
<string> = "\" {string chars} \"" ;
<token> = (<alpha> | <punctuation>)
(<alpha> | <punctuation> | <digit>)* ;

```

We also allow end-of-line comments indicated by !. Comments are treated as white space.

Within a string C conventions may be used, including octal escape sequences. Specifically:

```

\b backspace (010)
\f formfeed (014)
\n newline (016)
\r return (015)
\t tab (011)
\nnn octal escape

```

Where nnn is a 3-digit octal numeric in the range $0_8 - 177_8$, which is $0_{10} - 127_{10}$

Canonical Syntax

The canonical syntax defines the following.

```

<bytes> = <raw-bytes> ;
<decimal> = [1-9] [0-9]* | "0" ;
<s-expr> = "(" <s-part>* ")" ;

```

This disallows space in lists, all byte forms except counted string, and insists that decimal numbers have no redundant leading zeros. Hashes are always computed over canonical forms.

Within certificates, lists must start with a byte string and be non-empty:

```
<s-expr> = "(" <bytes> <s-part>* ")" ;
```

The following is the BNF currently recognized. The top-level non-terminals are:

- _ <cert>: a certificate.
- _ <name-cert>: a name certificate
- _ <proof> : a certificate justification.
- <proof> is used in the messaging protocol. (See]

In the messaging protocol (See Chapter 6, "Communication") we use tag lists for queries and requirements.

```
<cert> = "(" "cert" <version>? <cert-display>?
        <issuer> <issuer-info>?
        <subject> <subject-info>?
        <deleg>? <tag> <valid>? <comment>? ")" ;
<cert-display> = "(" "display" <byte-string> ")" ;
<comment> = "(" "comment" <byte-string> ")" ;
<date> = <byte-string> ;
<date-expr> = <byte-string> ;
<deleg> = "(" "propagate" ")" ;
<full-name> = "(" "name" <principal> <byte-string>+ ")" ;
<gte> = "g" | "ge" ;
<hash> = "(" "hash" <hash-alg-name> <hash-value><uris>? ")" ;
<hash-alg-name> = "md5" | "sha1" | <uri> ;
<hash-of-key> = <hash> ;
<hash-value> = <byte-string> ;
<issuer> = "(" "issuer" <principal> ")" ;
<issuer-info> = "(" "issuer-info" <uris> ")" ;
<issuer-name> = "(" "issuer" "(" "name" <principal> <byte-
string> ")" ")" ;
<low-lim> = <gte> <byte-string> ;
<lte> = "l" | "le" ;
<name> = <relative-name> | <full-name> ;
<name-cert> = "(" "cert" <version>? <cert-display>?
        <issuer-name> <issuer-info>?
        <subject> <subject-info>?
        <valid> <comment>? ")" ;
<not-after> = "(" "not-after" <date> ")" ;
<not-before> = "(" "not-before" <date> ")" ;
<n-val> = <byte-string> ;
<object-hash> = "(" "object-hash" <hash> ")" ;
<one-valid> = "(" "one-time" <byte-string> ")" ;
<online-test> = "(" "online" <online-type> <uris>? <principal>
<s-part>* ")" ;
```



```

<online-type> = "crl" | "reval" | "one-time" ;
<principal> = <public-key> | <hash-of-key> ;
<proof> = (<cert> | <name-cert>)*
<public-key> = "(" "public-key" <pub-sig-alg-id> <s-expr>*
<uris>? ")" ;
<pub-sig-alg-id>= "rsa-pkcs1-md5" | "rsa-pkcs1-sha1" | "rsa-
pkcs1" | "dsa-sha1" | <uri> ;
<range-ordering>= "alpha" | "numeric" | "time" | "binary" |
"date" ;
<relative-name> = "(" "name" <byte-string>+ ")" ;
<requires> = "(" "requires" <tag>* ")" ;
<restrict-date> = "(" "date" <date-expr> ")" ;
<restriction> = <restrict-date> | <target> | <requires> ;
<restrictions> = <restriction>* ;
<reval> = "(" "reval" <version>? <subj-hash> <reval-body> ")" ;
<reval-body> = <one-valid> | <valid-basic> ;
<signature> = "(" "signature" <hash> <principal> <sig-val> ")" ;
<sig-val> = <s-part> ;
<subject> = "(" "subject" <subj-obj> ")" ;
<subject-info> = "(" "subject-info" <uris> ")" ;
<subj-hash> = "(" "cert" <hash> ")" ;
<subj-obj> = <principal> | <name> | <object-hash>;
<tag> = "(" "tag" <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<tag-and> = "(" "*" "and" <tag-expr>+ ")" ;
<tag-expr> = <byte-string> | <tag-simple>
| <tag-prefix> | <tag-range>
| <tag-set> | <tag-and>
| <tag-star> ;
<tag-simple> = "(" <byte-string> <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<tag-prefix> = "(" "*" "prefix" <byte-string> ")" ;
<tag-range> = "(" "*" "range" <range-ordering>
<low-lim>? <up-lim>? ")" ;
<tag-set> = "(" "*" "set" <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<tag-star> = "(" "*" ")" ;
<target> = "(" "target" <tag-expr>* ")" ;
<up-lim> = <lte> <byte-string> ;
<uri> = <byte-string> ;
<uris> = "(" "uri" <uri>* ")" ;
<valid> = <valid-basic> <online-test>* <restrictions> ;
<valid-basic> = <not-before>? <not-after>? ;
<version> = "(" "version" <byte-string> ")" ;

```

The elements <reval>, <online-test> (and related elements such as crl) and <restrictions> are parsed but silently ignored in the current implementation. Architectural extensions will be introduced to support these elements.

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Chapter 6 Communication

Overview

The only way for a Client to request access to a Resource from a Resource Handler is to send a message through the e-speak core. The only way for a Resource Handler to return a reply to a Client is to send a message through the e-speak core. Thus, the core mediates all access between Clients and Resource Handlers. It is the only entity to accept connections: Clients and Resource Handlers establish connections to an e-speak Core so that they can communicate with each other.

All messages handled by e-speak cores are Protocol Data Units (PDU's), described below.

The possible exchanges of messages follow the Session Layer Security protocol "Session Layer Security Protocol (SLS)" on page 132.

Mediation by the e-speak core may include:

- Determining to which Inbox to route the message.
- Determining how to route the message (its routing path).
- Processing and transforming the message headers and contents. Only limited processing of the message is possible if security is enabled, implying that a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is appended. If so, fields of the PDU header which have been used to form the MAC must not be changed "Authentication of messages" on page 144.

Mediation is transparent to the Client and Resource Handler.

The e-speak core keeps no state information about messages beyond the time needed to complete processing. It does not keep any information about replies to messages. As far as the core is concerned, a reply is another message. It doesn't distinguish between clients and resource handlers: an entity which sends it a message is a "client" so far as it is concerned, and the destination is simply an Inbox.

If a Client needs a reply, it may wait or send another message; all messaging is asynchronous. Each asynchronous message has an identifier set by the sender. A reply can refer to this identifier so the Client knows to which message the reply has been sent.

Figure 6 shows the flow of messages through an e-speak core when a Client sends and receives messages from a Resource Handler.




Figure 6 Message flow with an e-speak core

A client is not restricted to resources connected to the same e-speak core as itself. Figure 7 shows the message flow when a Client sends and receives messages from a Resource Handler on a remote e-speak core. The same protocol is used to exchange messages between e-speak cores as is used to exchange messages between Clients and e-speak Cores.




Figure 7 Core-to-core message flow

The creation and management of core-to-core communications is described below (see "Core to core communication" on page 151).

Protocol Data Unit (PDU)

All messages exchanged between e-speak cores, and between e-speak cores and clients are PDUs. A single PDU corresponds to a single Session Layer Security (SLS) Message.


A class hierarchy for PDU's is shown in Figure 8. The members PDU.data, HandShake.data and MessageForResource.payload are all byte-arrays which in principle could hold an object of any class. Which class-instances are present in a PDU is given by the values of:

- PDU.messageType - for the contents of PDU.data
- HandShake.type - for the contents of HandShake.data, if present.
- MessageForResource.payloadType - for the contents of MessageForResource.payload, if present

The permissible values of PDU.messageType and the corresponding contents of PDU.data are:

ALERT (0)	Alert
HANDSHAKE (1)	HandShake
APPLICATION_MESSAGE (2)	MessageForResource
TUNNEL (3)	(Tunneling) PDU
PING (4)	Ping

Figure 8 PDU class hierarchy



The class PDU is:

```
class PDU {  
    int versionMajor;  
    int versionMinor;  
    int spi;  
    int spiSender;  
    int serial;  
    int inReplyTo;  
    int messageType;  
    int encodingType;  
    String toAddress;  
    String fromAddress;  
    byte[] route;  
    byte[] data;  
}
```

Version no.s

The current value for versionMajor is 1, and for versionMinor is 0.

SPI members

SPI stands for Session Parameter Index. This is used by the two endpoints in the Session Layer Security protocol to indicate which session the message is being sent on. Since the sender and the receiver may identify the SPI separately we have two fields: spi denotes the recipient's SPI; spiSender denotes the sender's SPI.

Message serial no. fields

Two fields are used by SLS to protect against replay attacks: serial is set by the sender; inReply to is the serial field of the message to which the sender is responding.

Message types

The following values for message type are defined: alert(0), handshake(1), application message(2), tunnel(3), ping(4). Alert, handshake, tunnel and ping are used in SLS to manage sessions "Session Layer Security Protocol (SLS)" on page 132. These types are described in the following section.

Encoding types

The following encoding types are defined for a PDU: clear data (0); protected data(1); secure data(2). Protected data is authenticated and protected from tampering by a Message Authentication Code (MAC) [see *Schneier pp. 455-459*]. Secure data is protected by a MAC and also encrypted for confidentiality.

Addresses

The String toAddress is an absolute ESName [see *ESNames* section below] and denotes the destination for the message. The String fromAddress is also an absolute ESName. It denotes the sender of the message and can be used for replies. The e-speak core attempts to resolve these names in its Root name-frame by finding the Mapping Object (see Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources") associated with each ESName. The Mapping Object is used by the e-speak core to refer to a Resource, a Search Recipe, or any combination.

If the e-speak core cannot unambiguously identify the Resource Handler for the toAddress, it will send an exception message to the Client. The format for an exception message is described in Chapter 7, "Exceptions". The possible exceptions are shown in Table 7 on page 131.

Route member

The byte-array route can be used by applications to pass routing data. This is never encrypted or protected by a MAC.

Data member

The format of this byte-array is determined by the encoding type. If the encoding is clear data, the byte array is a message body, of contents indicated by the message type.

If the encoding is secure data, then it has been encrypted according to the cipher negotiated in the SLS session set-up. Once it has been decrypted, it will have the same format as protected data: a MAC, followed by the message body. The contents of the message body is indicated by the message type. It will be an object of one of the classes described below.

These elements of a PDU are marshalled in the order of member definition shown in the class declaration above.

Marshalling of PDU Elements

In general, PDU's are marshalled according to the PDU marshalling format (PDFM) described below (see "PDU Marshalling format" on page 170). This applies to the PDU class listed above. However, for application messages the e-speak serialization format (ESF) (see "E-speak Serialization Format" on page 170) is used in principle. Currently this is not compatible with SPKI certificate formats (see Chapter 5, "Access Control"), so some messages are serialized partly using PDFM and partly using ESF. Where this happens we label each field either *(PDFM)* or *(ESF)*. Otherwise we label the class corresponding to the message type.

Top Level PDU Message types

The data member of a PDU will contain an instance of one of the following classes, depending on PDU.messageType, as explained above. The elements of each message are marshalled in the order in which they appear in the class definition.

Alert

```
Class Alert{ (PDFM)
  byte level;
  byte code;
  String detail;
}
```

The Alert message is used for SLS session management. Valid `level` values are:

```
fatal(0x00)
warning (0x01)
debug (0x02).
```

All codes are normally sent with a level of fatal, unless indicated. Valid codes are:

- CLOSE_NOTIFY (0x00) (warning)
- UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE (0x01)
- BAD_SPI (0x0A)
- BAD_SERIAL (0x0B)
- BAD_MAC (0x0C)

- HANDSHAKE_FAILURE (0x14)
- BAD_CERTIFICATE (0x15)
- UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE (0x16)
- CERTIFICATE_REVOKED (0x17)
- CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_FAILED (0x18)
- ILLEGAL_PARAMETER (0x1E) = 30;
- BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION (0x1F)
- INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY (0x20);
- NO_RENEGOTIATION(0x28) (warning)
- ERROR (0x32)

The detail String is intended for human consumption and is left unspecified.

Default and Implicit Session Alerts

These are newly introduced, to handle the following situations:

- A request is made on the default Session (SPI = 0, no security), but the recipient requires a secure Session. The recipient sends back an alert with the code INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, and the requestor can establish a secure Session in response.
- A request is made on a secure Session, to a Resource that previously communicated on that Session, but that Session has died (due to disconnection or other causes) at the recipient's end. The recipient sends an alert with the code BAD_SPI. The requestor removes that Session (which it previously had stored under the URL of the Resource) and may negotiate a new Session.

Handshake

```
class Handshake{ (PDFM)
int type;
byte data[];
}
```


The possible values of `Handshake.type` and the corresponding contents of `HandShake.data` are described below (see "Handshake message types" on page 125)

Application message

When `APPLICATION_MESSAGE` is the message type, the data field of the PDU contains an instance of `MessageForResource`.

```
class MessageForResource { (PDFM)
    byte versionMajor;
    byte versionMinor;
    ADRLIST tags;
    short secondaryABIVersion;
    byte payloadType;
    boolean isVoid;
    byte payload[]; (ESF this field only)
}
```

The current value of **versionMajor** is 2 and of **versionMinor** is 0. These are different from the members with the same names in the PDU class.

ADRLIST is a list of SPKI tags using the *-set form as defined in "SPKI BNF Formats" (Chapter 5, "Access Control")

secondaryABIVersion currently has the value 0. It specifies the format of the data field when communicating with core-managed resources.

isVoid indicates whether or not there is a payload. If **isVoid** is true, there is no payload and it is not marshalled or unmarshalled.

payloadType and the corresponding class-instances held in **payload** are described below (see "Payload Message Types" on page 128).

Tunnel

If the message type of PDU is `TUNNEL`, the data field of the PDU contains another PDU. The outer PDU is removed. The PDU contained in the data field is unmarshalled and forwarded to the address contained in the **toAddress** field of the inner PDU. The contents of the inner PDU, except for the **toAddress** field, may be encrypted - the object is to pass encrypted messages across a firewall.

Ping

```
class ping{ (PDFM)
String ID;
byte type;
}
```

Ping messages are used by SLS for session management.

The current value of ID is "SLS:Ping:v1.0".

Two values of type are defined:

- Request (0x00)
- Reply (0x01)

Handshake message types

The value of HandShake.type indicates the contents of HandShake.data, as follows:

<u>TYPE VALUE</u>	<u>CLASS-INSTANCE IN DATA</u>
HANDSHAKE_REQUEST (0)	HandShakeRequest
HANDSHAKE_START (1)	HandShakeStart
HANDSHAKE_REPLY (2)	HandShakeReply
HANDSHAKE_FINISH (3)	HandShakeFinish

In all the classes, listed below:

- The current value of the **ID** member is "SLS:HandshakeStart:v1.0".
- The current values of **majorVersion** and **minorVersion**, if present, are 0x01 and 0x00 respectively. They indicate the highest version of SLS supported by the sender.

Handshake request

```
class HandShakeRequest { (PDFM)
String ID;
boolean flag;
PDU pdu;
}
```

Handshake request is used to request a renegotiation of the session parameters.

The boolean flag is set to true if the request includes a PDU, otherwise no PDU is included. The PDU is intended to be used for synchronization: it would contain the last message between the two parties. Currently it is not used.

Handshake start

```
class HandShakeStart { (PDFM)
  String ID;
  byte majorVersion;
  byte minorVersion;
  int spi;
  ADR group;
  ADR keyData;
  ADR cipherSuiteList;
  ADR tags;
  ADR query;
}
```

The type ADR (ASCII Data Representation) is an s-expression as defined in Chapter 5, "Access Control" - "SPKI BNF Formats". All the Handshake classes have ADR members.

spi is the session parameter index of the sender of this message.

group is the definition of the Diffie-Hellman group.

keyData is the sender's part of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange.

cipherSuiteList is the list of valid cipher suites in decreasing order of preference.

tags is the list of SPKI tags the sender is requiring the receiver to prove.

query is the sender's query on the recipient. The sender can use this field to declare the operations it wishes to invoke within the session once it is established. This can be used by the recipient to determine what tags it will require the sender to prove.

Handshake Reply

```
class HandshakeReply{ (PDFM)
  String id;
  byte majorversion;
  byte minorversion;
  int spi;
  adr keydata;
```

```

    adr ciphersuite;
    adr proof;
    adr tags;
    boolean relay;
    String forwardaddress;
    adr signature;
}

```

spi is the Session Parameter Index of the sender.

keydata is the sender's part of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

ciphersuite is the sender's chosen cipher suite selected from the list of cipher suites in the initial HandshakeStart message.

proof is the list of certificates that will prove the tags that the sender of the HandshakeStart message required.

tags is the list of tags the sender is requiring the receiver to prove. This may have been generated by having examined the **query** member in the initial HandshakeStart message.

relay is set to true if the responder will relay subsequent messages to the addressee: a tunnel is to be set up. If relay is true, the responder will not have to produce certificates authorizing the tags requested in the HandshakeStart message.

If **relay** is set to true, **forwardAddress** will contain the absolute ESName of the recipient to which this message is to be forwarded.

signature is the signature of the hash of this message and the initial HandshakeStart message.

Handshake finish

```

class HandshakeFinish{ (PDFM)
String id;
adr proof;
adr signature;
}

```

proof is the list of certificates that will prove the tags that the HandshakeReply message requires (in that message's **tags** member).

signature is the signature of the hash of this message, the previous HandshakeReply and the HandshakeRequest message.

Payload Message Types

The value of `MessageForResource.payloadType` indicates the contents of payload as follows:

<u>PAYLOADTYPE VALUE</u>	<u>CLASS-INSTANCE IN PAYLOAD</u>
METHOD_CALL (0)	methodCall
METHOD_RESULT (1)	methodResult
EXCEPTION (2)	exceptionResponse
EVENT (3)	eventMessage
OBJECT (4)	(unspecified)

The payload field contains the message for the resource.

The payload format is not specified if the payload type is set to OBJECT. This is for use by applications to communicate with external resources. The Resource Handler can specify any format it chooses.

Payload of messages to Core-Managed Resources

A PDU sent to a core-managed resource has the payload type `METHOD_CALL`, and the payload member contains a `methodCall` object:

```
public class methodCall (ESF)
{
    String interfaceName;
    String methodName
    Ob[] arguments;
}
```

The first two fields define the interface and method to be invoked. The type "Ob" stands for any object that can be marshalled in ESF.

Initial Connection Request

A client's initial request for connection is an example of a PDU with a payload as above.. The fields are set as follows:

```
interfaceName = "core"
methodName = "bootstrap"
arguments = null
```

Routing to External Resources

A message to an external resource is also sent as a PDU to the e-speak core, but with the payloadType OBJECT and a payload unspecified by e-speak. The e-speak core will route this message to the resource handler if it can.

It cannot do so if the "To" field of the message is not a valid Resource, or if the Inbox specified in the destination Resource metadata is not connected to a Resource Handler, or if the Resource Handler's Inbox is full.

When it cannot deliver the message, the e-speak core will return an error (exception) message to the Client, if it can. If the Client's Inbox can't take the error message for any reason, the e-speak core discards the message.

Normally, the e-speak core places the following data in the route field of the PDU:

```
class routeData{
  String slot; (PDFM)
  boolean specificationNonNull; (PDFM)
  ESmap privateRSD; (ESF)
  ADR mask; (PDFM)
  ADR serviceID; (PDFM)
}
```

The slot field is used to enable many Inboxes to share a single channel (TCP connection in the current implementation). The slot identifies which Inbox the message is for.

If specificationNonNull is set to false, the three fields following are not marshalled.

These three fields are parts of the resource's metadata held by the e-speak core.

The privateRSD field is the resource's private RSD.

The mask field tells the resource handler which methods have security disabled.

The serviceID field is the service identity for the resource. Both these fields are <tag-expr> as defined in Chapter 5, "Access Control" - "SPKI BNF Formats".

Payload of messages from Core-Managed Resources

Initial Connection to the Core

The e-speak Core listens on a TCP port for Client connections (the default port is 12345). When it receives a connection request (see "Initial Connection Request" on page 128) a TCP channel is created between the Client and the Core. The Core creates a default protection domain for the Client and sends a PDU back to the Client, of type `MessageForResource`, with `payloadType` set to `METHOD_RESULT`. The `methodResult` in the payload will contain a `bootstrapReply` object:

```
class bootstrapReply{ (ESF)
    ESname Inbox;
    String InboxSlot;
    ESname CallbackResource;
    ESname ExceptionHandlerResource;
    String anchor;
}
```

`Inbox` and `InboxSlot` are the ESnames of the inbox and the slot allocated by the e-speak core to the client. The `CallbackResource` field is the ESname to be used to send messages to the client. This should be used in the `fromAddress` field of PDU's sent by the client.

The `ExceptionHandlerResource` is deprecated and should not be used.

The `anchor` field is the URL of the root name-frame of the Protection Domain which has been created by the e-speak core for the client.

Normal reply

A PDU sent from a Core-managed Resource, in reply to a `methodCall` when no exception has been thrown, has the payload type `METHOD_RESULT`, and the payload member contains a `methodResult` object:

```
public class methodResult
{
    Ob result; (ESF)
}
```

The `bootstrapReply` sent in response to a connection request is a special case of `methodResult`.



Exceptions

When an exception is thrown the payloadType is EXCEPTION and the payload member of messageFor|Resource is an instance of exceptionResponse:

```
public class exceptionResponse {  
    Ob result; (ESF)  
}
```

One of the following exceptions will be thrown when the e-speak core cannot unambiguously identify the Resource Handler for a given toaddress:

Table 7 Exceptions for unresolved Resource Handler

Exception	Description
NameNotFoundException	The lookup procedure failed to find a Mapping Object.
UnresolvedBindingException	The only accessors in the Mapping Object are Search Recipes.
MultipleResolvedBindingException	The explicit bindings in the accessors refer to Resources with different Resource Handlers.
UndeliverableRequestException	The Resource Handler does not have the Resources needed to receive this message, or the Handler Inbox is not currently connected.

Events

When the core generates an event it will send a PDU with the data field containing a messageForResource, which will have the payloadType set to EVENT. The payload will be an eventMessage.

```
public class eventMessage  
{  
    Ob result; (ESF)  
}
```


Messages from a Resource Handler to a Client

E-Speak implements a peer-to-peer communications model for messaging.

The Core does not distinguish between a message sent from a Client to a Resource Handler and a reply from the Resource Handler back to the Client. The Resource Handler sending a reply to a Callback Resource is treated as the Client, and the Client receiving the reply is treated as the Resource Handler for the Callback Resource.

Clients may have more than one Inbox. The only way for a Client to receive a message from any other Client is to register a Resource listing one of its Inboxes in the Resource Handler field of the metadata. Clients can manage different classes of messages by registering different Resources designating different Inboxes. Clients can also deal with different message classes by associating certain classes with Events.

Session Layer Security Protocol (SLS)

The Session Layer Security (SLS) Protocol determines all possible exchanges of PDU messages between clients, e-speak cores and resource handlers. The protocol, used between a client and a resource handler, may establish a secure session between them. It can also be used to establish an open, non-secure session. All SLS communication is carried in PDU messages, and all PDU messages are sent under the SLS protocol.

A secure session has the following properties.

- All messages exchanged between the two end points are authenticated. This prevents messages being changed or messages being inserted into the TCP connection by a third party (e.g. an attacker).
- All message exchanged between the two end points are protected against replay. This prevents a third party capturing the messaging and replaying it at a later date to trigger a repeat of the action taken by the recipient.

Messages exchanged in a secure session may be encrypted for confidentiality. This prevents a third party from reading the contents of a message.

In a non-secure session messages are exchanged without encryption, authentication or protection against replay.

The SLS (Session Layer Security) protocol extends the capabilities of SSL [see *RFC 2246*], a protocol that is supported by most modern web browsers, and is currently the default way to secure client/server interactions over the web. The motives for departing from SSL are:

- **Transport independence:** SSL links a security session with a TCP socket. If the socket dies the security session dies with it: something undesirable when the life expectation of a security session is very different from the life expectation of the transport. Also, we cannot multiplex several security sessions onto the same socket, or perform dynamic load balancing of the end-point without starting the session from scratch. Moreover, even though properties like reliability and in-order delivery of messages are critical for a security protocol, some TCP details are not, and this might put unnecessary restrictions on the applicability of SSL. Finally, in some cases we might want to use a different transport for sending and receiving messages (i.e., outgoing messages use a different firewall needing two sockets). SLS tries to make the minimum number of assumptions on the communication transport solving most of the issues above.
- **Tunnelling support:** During firewall traversal we might want the firewall to control the client access rights to the internal LAN for every packet. However, we might not want the firewall to see all the traffic in clear (therefore, losing the end-to-end security property). This is difficult to achieve with SSL because either we let the client open a direct socket to the service or the firewall will see all the traffic in clear. On the other hand, with SLS we can nest a secure session inside another one, possibly with different end points, allowing to achieve both goals simultaneously.
- **Elliptic cryptography:** Most implementations of SSL only support Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithms based on exponentiation. SLS uses a faster algorithm based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) described by [Seroussi and Smart].

- Attribute certificates using SPKI [see *RFC 2692 - 2693*]. SSL only supports X509 name certificates, mainly to authenticate that the end-point "owns", according to a configured "trusted CA", the web address that we wanted to reach. Only one certificate by each party can be used, and in most cases only server authentication is performed. On the other hand, SLS performs a negotiation of tags that need to be proven represented by multiple SPKI certificates. This allows a fine grained control of security by mapping tags to actual permissions, raising the level of abstraction from "a stream of bytes" in SSL to a particular operation on service X in SLS, making it easier to integrate with application level security. Details on the use of SPKI certificates in SLS can be found in Chapter 5, "Access Control".
- Latency minimization: SLS allows the client to send application data after a round-trip negotiation has succeeded. In SSL two round-trips are needed before the application data is sent. This can have important performance implications when network delays are large and we need a quick response from the server.

Functional Description of SLS

In this section we describe the expected behavior of the protocol.

Protocol message types

Every SLS message is embedded in a PDU (Protocol Data Unit) (see "Protocol Data Unit (PDU)" on page 118), which contains header information allowing the system to dispatch it to the correct security context, route it through the network, identify replies, ensure the protocol version and so on. Two fields of this header relevant to our discussion classify messages according to the type of encoding and their purpose:

Supported encoding types

- CLEAR_DATA: The message is not encrypted or protected against modification.
- PROTECTED_DATA: The message is not encrypted but it is protected against modification with a signed digest (MAC)
- SECURE_DATA: The message is encrypted and protected against modification using a MAC.

Supported message types

- **HANDSHAKE:** Message exchanged during the key-agreement protocol. There are four types of handshake messages that will be discussed later.
- **ALERT:** Message that identifies an abnormal situation during the handshake or after the session has been established. ALERT messages can be fatal, forcing session termination, or just warnings, for which the response is implementation dependent.
- **APPLICATION_MESSAGE:** Message that communicates application data.
- **TUNNEL:** A message that contains another PDU in its payload. This is used to nest sessions, something important for firewall traversal.
- **PING:** A heartbeat message that is used by the session scavenger to know if the session is still active.
- **REKEY:** Forces a key offset of the instantiated cipher suite based on the previously negotiated shared secret. (REKEY is not supported in the current implementation.)

High level protocol state machine

Figure 9 High level state transitions in SLS.




Figure 9 shows the possible states of a session, and what triggers transitions between them. There are four possible states:

- **START:** the session object has been created but it is not fully configured. Also, the key agreement protocol has not started.

- **SET_UP**: the key agreement protocol has started. We do not have a shared secret yet, so all the messages have **CLEAR_DATA** encoding. It depends on the implementation whether any response is made to unauthenticated **ALERT** messages.
- **READY**: the key agreement protocol has successfully completed. We have a working session that we can use to encrypt/decrypt messages and validate whether the session has certain security tags associated with it. At this point **ALERT** messages are authenticated and should not be ignored.
- **DEAD**: the session is no longer operational, and will never be. We can safely scavenge it.

Also, we can see in Figure 9 the events that trigger state transitions:

- **init**: complete the initialization of the session object and send a message to the other party (if needed) to start the key agreement.
- **sessionOK**: The key agreement has finished successfully and we have a new cipher suite to install in the session.
- **timeout**: a timeout expired. The different timeouts are explained in detail below (see "Timeouts description" on page 146).
- **alert**: an authenticated (or optionally non-authenticated) fatal alert was handled/sent forcing a shutdown of the session.
- **close**: a client forced termination of a session by invoking the `close()` method.

Two important operations on a session are handling and sending a PDU.

SLS Handling a PDU

The handling operation assumes that the PDU has already been received from the transport and invokes some security processing on the PDU (i.e., decryption/authentication).

Depending on the state of the session, and the encoding/type of the PDU, the session behaves differently while handling PDUs. Table 8 on page 138 shows the expected behavior of a session when handling a PDU.

The terms in that table have these meanings:

- MAC: either PROTECTED_DATA or SECURE_DATA encoding type. Obviously, the important property is that the PDU is correctly authenticated, otherwise we will always ignore the message regardless of its claims.
- Exception: notify the client doing the handling that the session is not operational.
- Ignore: do not take any significant action based on that PDU (i.e., change session internal state). Optionally, an implementation could log the event that a PDU is being ignored.
- Optional: an action is considered optional if an implementation can decide to ignore the PDU instead.
- Warning: send a warning ALERT response to the other party.
- HandleHsh: handle a HANDSHAKE PDU by making progress in the key agreement protocol. This could involve an Internal Send of a HANDSHAKE or ALERT PDU to the other party.
- HandleAl: handle an ALERT PDU. This might involve closing the session if it is a fatal alert, or logging the event otherwise
- HandleApp: handle an APPLICATION_MESSAGE PDU. Typically, the PDU will be passed in clear text to the client if it authenticates and/or decrypts correctly; otherwise it is ignored.
- HandleTun: handle a TUNNEL PDU. This could involve "peeling off" the outer PDU, returning the inner one (after decryption/authentication of the outer one) or calling a custom handler to deal with it.
- HandlePin: handle a PING PDU. This handling might require sending a reply PING PDU or just record that our previous PING has been replied successfully.
- HandleRe: handle a REKEY PDU. Forces the re-key of the handler part of the crypto suite.
-

Table 8 PDU handling behaviour depending on state

TYPE	ENCODE	START	SET_UP	READY	DEAD
HAND-SHAKE	CLEAR	Exception	HandleHsk	Ignore	Exception
	MAC	Exception	Ignore	Warning	Exception
ALERT	CLEAR	Exception	HandleAl Optional	Ignore	Exception
	MAC	Exception	Ignore	HandleAl	Exception
APPLICA-TION	CLEAR	Exception	Ignore	Ignore	Exception
	MAC	Exception	Ignore	HandleApp	Exception
TUNNEL	CLEAR	Exception	Ignore	Ignore	Exception
	MAC	Exception	Ignore	HandleTun	Exception
PING	CLEAR	Exception	Ignore	Ignore	Exception
	MAC	Exception	Ignore	HandlePin	Exception
REKEY	CLEAR	Exception	Ignore	Ignore	Exception
	MAC	Exception	Ignore	HandleRe	Exception

SLS Sending a PDU

The sending operation will first invoke the required security processing (i.e., encoding, MAC computation) and then it will use the underlying transport to deliver the message at the other end. Note that handling a PDU might have as a side effect that another PDU is sent to the other party, i.e., a response to a handshake message during the key agreement. We call that case an internal send as opposed to an external send directly invoked by the client.

Table 9 shows the expected behavior when trying to send a PDU through a session.

Table 9 PDU sending behavior depending on state

TYPE	MODE	START	SET_UP	READY	DEAD
HAND-SHAKE	Internal	NotApply	OK	OK	NotApply
	External	Exception	Retry	OK	Exception
ALERT	Internal	NotApply	OK	OK	NotApply
	External	Exception	Retry	OK	Exception
APPLICA-TION	Internal	NotApply	NotApply	NotApply	NotApply
	External	Exception	Retry	OK	Exception
TUNNEL	Internal	NotApply	NotApply	NotApply	NotApply
	External	Exception	Retry	OK	Exception
PING	Internal	NotApply	NotApply	OK	NotApply
	External	Exception	Retry	OK	Exception
REKEY	Internal	NotApply	NotApply	OK	NotApply
	External	Exception	Retry	OK	Exception

Some terms in that table deserve further explanation:

- **NotApply**: it is an implementation error if the protocol tries to send this message. This is only relevant for internal messages: the implementation does not have control over possible external messages.
- **OK**: this means that the session will perform the appropriate processing and try to deliver it to the lower layer. This does not mean that the message has been correctly sent, because this depends on the status of the underlying transport/session.

- **Retry:** The client is informed that the session is currently unavailable to send messages but this might change in the future.
- **Exception:** The client is informed that the session is permanently unavailable.

The key-exchange protocol

The key-exchange protocol is an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. From the session key agreed in the Diffie-Hellman exchange further keys are derived for encryption and confidentiality.

Features of the exchange are:

- **Elliptic Diffie-Hellman key exchange** instead of modulus exponentiation. Instead of choosing a group and checking its validity at the other end, we pick one of a pre-determined family of elliptic curves [see *Seroussi & Smart*]. Each party uses a random point on the curve as a private key, generates a second point from the first to send as a public key, and checks that the point he receives belongs to the same curve.
- There is no current support for multiple public keys of the same principal. This extension should be trivial by adding more than one signature in the handshake.
- **Added tunneling support:** we allow the responder to notify in its first handshake message that it wants to relay the session. Tunneling is described below (see "Support for tunneling" on page 149). When tunneling is indicated, the responder might not have to prove the tags requested.
- **Randomized Session Parameter Indices (SPIs).** We want SPIs to be hard to guess, to avert denial-of-service attacks. If SPI's are predictable, it is too easy to flood the client/server with fatal alert messages. At the same time, we want to be able to pay attention to non-authenticated alerts during the handshake (handling alerts is described in (see "Handling alert messages" on page 145)).

Figure 10 Key agreement protocol




Figure 10 shows the key agreement interactions and corresponding state machines of the handlers that control these interactions. These state machines are embedded in the state SET_UP in Figure 9. Sub-states READY and DEAD are not necessarily related to the ones in Figure 9. For example, killing the handler does not mean that the session will die. It is perfectly normal that the handler will terminate when the key agreement finishes successfully, and the cipher suite gets "instantiated" in the session.

A quick summary of the messages sent during the handshake:

- **HskRequest:** a request from either party to re-negotiate a session
- **HskStart:** a request (or acknowledgement) from the client to the server to start a session. It contains the elliptic curve and cipher suite list suggested, the SPI at this end, a hint on the tags that the server should prove, a hint on the operations that we want to perform, and a public Diffie-Hellman (DH) key.
- **HskReply:** a reply to the previous HskStart from the server to the client. It contains the cipher suite chosen, the SPI at the server end, whether the server is a relay, certificates to prove the requested tags, a hint of tags that the client need to prove, a public DH key and a signature.

- We made the Initiator and Responder state machines similar by always introducing a HskStart message. If the protocol is started by the Initiator the HskStart is generated locally. Otherwise it will be generated by the Responder and transmitted through the network. We pay attention to alerts and “incorrect” messages that have valid random SPI, so we can end the session at any time during HandShake.

[illegible]

Elliptic Curve Cryptography is used for the initial Diffie-Hellman shared secret negotiation instead of modulus exponentiation. The handshake has established an elliptic curve (in an integer space) and each party has chosen a point at random on this curve, which he keeps entirely secret. Call these two points U and V . They are private keys. A function f generates two other points $f(U)$ and $f(V)$, on the same curve. These are public keys, and are exchanged. (Inverting f , to find the argument from the function value, is not believed to be practicable for our current choices of curve and of f .) The two parties both check that the points they receive are valid points on the curve: There is a function g such that:

$$g[U, f(V)] = g[V, f(U)] = z$$

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Key generation algorithm

For details of key-generation see [*Ferguson*, Section 4.]. Four fixed byte-arrays are used as follows:

```
array A - for the key  $K_A$  that authenticates client to server
array B - for the key  $K_B$  that authenticates server to client
array C - for the key  $K_C$  that encrypts client's messages to
server
array D - for the key  $K_D$  that encrypts server's messages to
client.
```

The keys are symmetric, so K_C is used to decrypt messages from the client, as well as to encrypt them; likewise K_D for messages from the server. K_A is used both to create and to verify the client's HMAC's, and K_B for the server's.

The keys are derived from the byte-arrays as follows. The shared secret Z (or a function of it) is expressed in a fixed byte-array. This is appended to each of arrays A to D, giving byte-arrays which we will call Key_array A, B etc. For example, Key_array A = array A | Z .

The hash function h is applied recursively to each Key_array. From the Key_array s , byte-arrays s_0, s_1, \dots, s_k are created, obeying:

$$\begin{aligned} s_0 &= h(s) \\ s_n &= h(s_0 \mid s_1 \mid \dots \mid s_{n-1} \mid s) \quad (n \geq 1) \end{aligned}$$

Repeated recursion generates longer and longer byte-arrays as the argument to h . There are two target lengths: L_A for the authentication keys K_A and K_B , and L_E for the encryption keys K_C and K_D , determined by the corresponding algorithms. For each key, recursion proceeds till the length of $s_0 \mid s_1 \mid \dots \mid s_k$ equals or exceeds the target length. The first L_A or L_E elements make up the key.

Cipher suite support

The encryption algorithms currently supported are Blowfish with a 128 bit key, and triple DES with three independent keys for encryption. Blowfish is the recommended cipher because of its speed but 3DES is the conservative choice. Also only CBC mode and PKCS 5 padding is supported.

Our current hash algorithm is SHA-1 and our MAC algorithm is an HMAC construction based on SHA-1.

SPKI certificates are signed/verified using ElGamal with a 768-bit key as default. RSA with a 1024 bit key can be used if the client prefers. (All the named algorithms are explained in [Schneier].)

Authentication of messages

See [Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone p.355] and [Ferguson, Section 4.]

A hash is generated from the appropriate authentication key (K_A or K_B above), selected fields of the PDU header, and the PDU body. This is the MAC: it has a fixed length (of 20 bytes in our implementation). It is pre-fixed to the PDU body. If the encoding type is SECURE_DATA, the resulting string (MAC + PDU body) is encrypted using K_C or K_D . The resulting encrypted string we call Q. The PDU transmitted will consist of:

- PDU header
- PDU body + MAC if type is PROTECTED_DATA
- Encrypted string Q if type is SECURE_DATA

For the recipient to check the message, if the type is SECURE_DATA, it begins by decrypting Q, using K_C or K_D as before. This gives a string: MAC + PDU body. The selected header fields, the PDU body (without the MAC) and the authentication key K_A or K_B are input to the same hash algorithm to generate a second MAC. This is compared with the MAC received in the message: if they are unequal, the message is not authentic.

The PDU header fields omitted from the MAC derivation are:

toAddress, fromAddress, route.

Handling alert messages

During the key agreement protocol the default is to pay attention to non-authenticated alert messages that have the correct random SPI. These identifiers are sent in clear, so if the attacker listens to all our traffic and sends fatal alerts with the right SPI before the other party responds, it will still stop the session set-up. However, this attack would be much easier if we had a predictable SPI. The attacker could just flood the system with fatal alerts with typical SPIs. In SLS this problem is more evident than in SSL, because of the independence of the session from the transport. In this case we cannot make the assumption that it takes some effort to hi-jack the transport, as is the case for a TCP socket in SSL.


If we want to disable this type of attack completely, we could ignore all non-authenticated alerts and rely on timeouts to close failed sessions. This is not the default. The convenience of quick and detailed notification of session set-up failure is believed to be more important than countering an impractical denial-of-service attack. The attack can always be done at transport level anyway.

In any case, after a session is established only authenticated alerts are respected. At that point many messages with the SPIs in clear have been exchanged, and the randomization does not help much.

Alert messages can be fatal, forcing the other end to close the session, or warning, that in our first implementation are just logged. We support both internal alerts, generated as a side-effect of a PDU handling, and external alerts, those explicitly sent by the client. It is recommended however to avoid sending external alerts and rely on internal ones as much as possible. The alert codes used in SLS are described above (see "Alert" on page 122).

Timeouts description

Figure 11 Session timeouts and state transitions




There are three built-in timeouts associated with a session:

- **Tsetup**: sets the maximum time taken by the key agreement protocol used in the SET_UP state. After that time the session becomes DEAD.
- **Tsession**: sets the maximum life expectancy of session. This value is the minimum of a fixed value (common for all sessions), and the life-expectancy of the certificates negotiated during the key agreement. After that time the session becomes DEAD.
- **Trekey**: sets the maximum time allowed before forcing a rekey operation on the session. Rekeying is currently not supported, and Trekey is set to infinity.

Figure 11 describes the behavior of the timeouts in relation to the session states. Tsetup sets a limit on the time spent on the SET_UP state, but it is reset after a transition to the READY state. Tsession limits the maximum time spent on the READY state. When Trekey expires we initiate the rekey and reset the timer, but this does not imply a state transition. Clearly, Trekey is only useful if it is smaller than Tsession, otherwise the session will never re-key.

Re-keying (not currently supported)

Figure 12 Rekey protocol.



After the session has been established it is possible to change the key used in the cipher and MAC operations by sending a REKEY message. However, this new key has to be based on the original shared secret negotiated using Diffie-Hellman (we do not re-run the key agreement protocol). Therefore, the re-key operation does not extend the life of the shared secret, only of the derived keys. In particular, the new key is obtained by exclusive-or of the first four bytes of the shared secret with a random integer before re-running the key generation algorithm. The one-way function used in that algorithm ensures that it is difficult to guess the next key, even if you know the previous one. The integer xor-ed with the shared secret is transmitted inside the REKEY message.


Figure 12 shows the basic protocol to re-key a session. Node B decides that it wants to start a rekey, so it generates a random number (2322) and sends a REKEY message with it. After that it re-keys the "send part" of its cipher suite right away, so the next message sent will be encrypted with the new key. When the REKEY message arrives to node A this node changes its "handle part" of the cipher suite to the new derived key. Then it checks that the message is a request and not a reply (the rekey was not initiated by him) and sends a REKEY reply message with possibly a different random integer (8898), changing the "send part" of its cipher suite too. When the reply message arrives to B, this node will update the "handle

part" of their cipher suite but it will not rekey the "send part" again because the message was tagged as "reply".

The important point of the protocol is that all the state is encoded in the messages. Provided that messages are not re-ordered, the receiver always has the right key to decrypt the message. It does not have to remember old keys or interrupt the service during re-keying. This avoids the need of an extra state in the protocol for re-keying.

Support for session scavenging

Figure 13 Ping protocol



SLS needs an external mechanism to detect that the other party in the session is no longer active. This is required because of the independence of transport and session "lives". We cannot assume that the underlying transport will detect that the other party abandons the session. The transport won't necessarily send a TCP keep-alive message, for example. We have to provide that service at a higher level.

Figure 13 shows the basic support provided for session scavenging. An external client can check whether the session is active by forcing its endpoint to send a PING message and resetting a flag that indicates a reply ping arrived. If the reply ping arrives the flag is set. After a certain time the client checks whether the flag is set, indicating whether the other end is still alive or not.

Support for tunneling

In SLS tunneling a PDU contains in its payload another PDU, so messages are sent using another SLS session as "transport". When the initiator sends the first protocol message, (HandShakeStart in the current implementation), the responder might reply that it is not the final end-point, so it cannot prove what was requested, and it wants to be a relay instead. At that point the client can decide whether to continue the key agreement or not. If it continues it will get a ready session that was negotiated as a "relay" and it can use that session to negotiate another one to the end-point. If this new end-point also wants to be a relay the process repeats. Typically the maximum depth of session nesting is limited to a fixed value to avoid a denial-of-service attack. As implemented, the Session objects are stacked. An initial session (A) is connected to the transport; a session B nested in A is "connected" to A, and so on. However arranged, it should be transparent to the client.


Figure 14 shows how to send messages from client to server and back after a nested session via an SLS gateway has been established. The diagram shows sender SPIs as initial characters with a colon, such as "A:" or "B:". The wrapped PDUs are bracketed. When a PDU passes through a session a layer of encryption is applied or removed. This is not shown in the diagram.

A session will perform automatic wrapping of a PDU inside another PDU while sending when:

- the sender SPI is valid (>0)
- the sender SPI does not match the one the session is going through (we use sender and not receiver SPI because the receiver one is not guaranteed to be unique).

In the current implementation, a PDU to be tunneled is initialized with an invalid sender SPI of -1. So session B just changes the sender SPI to "B". When the PDU is passed to session A, the conditions for wrapping are satisfied. During the wrapping the addresses of the inner PDU are copied into the header of the external PDU. This is given the message-type TUNNEL. The resulting TUNNEL PDU gets unwrapped when it is handled by session A in the gateway. The reply is wrapped by session A in the gateway, and unwrapped by session A at the client end. This is default behavior that can be overridden by a custom handler.

Figure 14 Tunnelling SLS sessions



An important feature of the tunneling implementation is that a session can be used to tunnel messages regardless of whether the session was negotiated as a relay session or not. The opposite is also true, we can send non-tunnelled messages for a session that requested to be a relay session. In fact, how sessions are created is orthogonal to what type of messages can be sent through them. This simplifies the re-use of sessions but:

- It can't be assumed that a message received in a normal session was not tunneled.
- Tunneled messages, which may have several layers of wrapping and encryption, can not be assumed to have traversed a firewall, and are not necessarily any more secure than normal messages.

Core to core communication

Two e-speak cores can exchange core-managed resources and resource metadata. The exchanges comprise import and export of resources. They are needed for several reasons, including the following.

- A resource cannot be discovered in a vocabulary on an e-speak core unless the vocabulary has been registered on that core. If the vocabulary was created on another e-speak core, it is registered by importing it.
- A resource cannot be registered in a contract on an e-speak core, unless the contract itself has been registered on that core. If the contract was created on another e-speak core, it is registered by importing it.
- Resource metadata can be imported into an e-speak core, to cache it. This will make lookup of those resources faster.

Two core-managed resources handle communication between e-speak cores.

- The Connection Manager CM, sets up the initial connection, manages it and closes it down. The ESName for the CM on any given e-speak core is:
`es://<server>/CORE/ConnectionManager`

- The Remote Resource Manager (RRM) is responsible for managing metadata: importing and exporting resources from the remote e-speak core. The ESName for the RRM on any given e-speak core is:
es://<server>/CORE/RemoteResourceManager




Figure 15 Core-core communication components

Connection Manager

The Connection Manager provides the core-to-core connection handling APIs. Each connection is associated with a Protection Domain, Outbox and an Inbox. The inbox and outbox along with the Router form the message forwarding subsystem to the remote core (see Figure 7).

The core-to-core connection can be a secured channel: SLS messages may be exchanged to set up a secure channel.

```
class connectionManager{
public synchronized String openConnection(String coreUrl) 1
throws UnknownHostException
public synchronized void closeConnection(String conID)
throws UnknownHostException
public synchronized CMArg closeConnectionFromRemote(CMArg
cmArg)
throws UnknownHostException
public synchronized ESArray getConnections()
}
```

1 The coreUrl should be type ESname, in the current implementation it is type String.

CM Methods: openConnection()

The openConnection() invocation is synchronous. The caller has to wait until the openConnection() returns or times out (the current default time out period is 10 seconds). The parameter is the URL of the remote core's root frame: a URL of the form es://host

When the Connection Manager executes this function it sends a PDU message to the remote core. The toAddress of the PDU is set to es://host/CORE. (Note that only "es://host" is the argument passed by the caller of openConnection().) The PDU is a messageForResource with a payload type of METHOD_CALL: the payload field is an instance of methodCall. The methodCall.interface is "Core" and the method field is "bootstrap". The fromAddress is set to es://<localCore>/CORE, where <localCore> is the host and port for the Connection Manager's e-speak core.²

The messageType field of PDU is set to HANDSHAKE for this request in the current implementation. It should, for consistency, be APPLICATION_MESSAGE.

Once the message has been sent, the Connection Manager waits for a reply PDU message. The remote core receiving the message replies with a bootstrapReply message (see "Initial Connection to the Core" on page 130). In the current implementation this reply is ignored.

Next the Connection Manager sends a "negotiate" message to the remote core. This consists of an empty messageForResource instance (payloadType is set to OBJECT and the payload contains the null object). The toAddress of the PDU is set to es://host/CORE/ConnectionManager. The fromAddress of the PDU is set to es://<localCore>/CORE/ConnectionManager.

Once this message is sent the Connection Manager waits for a reply from the remote Connection Manager. In the current implementation this reply is ignored.

The returned value of openConnection is a String denoting the server and port of the remote core to which a connection has been made. Thus a connection to es://foo.bar.com:8000/ returns a String: "foo.bar.com:8000". This String can be used to identify the connection for later connection management operations.

² In the current implementation all URLs created by the connectionManager begin with "tcp://" instead of "es://"

Only one connection exist between 2 cores. Once the connection is established subsequent `openConnection()` requests with the same parameter have no effect

CM Methods: proposed future negotiation

The "negotiate" message is a place holder for future extensions. The intended future behavior is as follows.

1. Initiator builds a negotiation proposal, and sends the proposal to the remote core. The offer includes parameters such as Core Version, e-speak version and PDU size (for buffering, fragmentation and reassembly).
2. The remote core then builds an offer based on the proposal and send the offer to the initiator.
3. The initiator then builds the agreed upon offer and sends the final offer to the remote core.

CM Methods: `closeConnection()`

The `closeConnection()` function performs a graceful close of connection between the cores. The `closeConnection` API sends a "close" message to the remote core and requests to cleanup the resources allocated to this connection. Upon receiving the close request message from a remote core the Connection Manager initiates the clean-up process, thereby deallocating the resources assigned for the connection.

The parameter `conID` to `closeConnection()` is the String previously returned from `openConnection()`. When `closeConnection()` is invoked the Connection Manager sends a PDU containing a `messageForResource` instance to the remote Connection Manager. The `MessageForResource` has a `payloadType` of `METHOD_CALL`. The `interfaceName` is "ConnectionManagerInterface" and the `methodName` is "closeConnectionFromRemote". The parameter `CMArg` is defined as follows:

```
class CMArg { (ESF)
    String localURL;
    String remoteURL;
    int type; // CLOSECONNECTIONREQUEST=1 CLOSECONNECTIONREPLY=2
}
```

The localURL field is set to the host+server port for the sending core for example: "initiator.bar.com:8080". The remoteURL field is set to host+server port for the remote core. The type is set to CLOSECONNECTIONREQUEST. When the remote core receives this message, it can use the localURL, remoteURL pair to identify the connection. The remote core sends a messageForResource with a payloadType of METHOD_RESULT. The Ob field of the MethodResult class is an instance of CMArg. The localURL and remoteURL are unchanged, but the type field is set to CLOSECONNECTIONREPLY. Having sent this, the remote core closes the connection. When the initiating core receives this reply, it closes the connection.

CM Methods: getConnections

The function getConnections() returns the state of current connections. Each element of the returned ESArray is a String of the form of the IP address of the remote host and the port number on which the remote e-speak core is located separated by a colon, e.g.: "host.foo.com:8000"

Remote Resource Manager

The Remote Resource Manager (RRM) handles metadata related functions. It provides the capability to export and import resources to and from remote e-speak cores.

RRM Message Class

Instances of the class payloadForRRM are used as arguments or returned by the RRM:

```
class payloadForRRM{ (ESF)
  int payloadType;
  boolean topLevel;
  int importExportMode;
  byte[] contextPDU;
  ESArray resourceTable;
  ESArray tablesArray;
}
```

The following are permissible values for payloadForRRM.payloadType:

```
EXPORT_REQUEST=0; //Export Request
EXPORT_REPLY=1;   //Export Reply
```



```

IMPORT_REQUEST=2; //Import Request
IMPORT_REPLY=3;   //Import Reply
UPDATE_EXPORTED_RESOURCE_REQUEST=4; //Update Export Resource
Request
UPDATE_EXPORTED_RESOURCE_REPLY=5; //Update Export Resource
Reply
UPDATE_IMPORTED_RESOURCE_REQUEST=6; //Update Import Resource
Request
UPDATE_IMPORTED_RESOURCE_REPLY=7; //Update Import Resource
Reply
UNEXPORT_REQUEST=8; //Unexport Resource Request
UNEXPORT_REPLY=9;   //Unexport Resource Reply
IMPORT_ERROR=10;    //Import Error
EXPORT_ERROR=11;    //Export Error

```

RRM Class:

```

class RemoteResourceManager{
void exportResource(ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int mode,
String server)
throws NameNotFoundException, StaleEntryAccessException

PayloadForRRM importResourceFromMsg(PayloadForRRM rrmPayload)
throws RemoteException

void importResource(ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int type,
String server)
throws ImportFailedException

PayloadForRRM exportResourceAsMsg(PayloadForRRM rrmPayload)
throws StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException,
RemoteException

void unExportResource(ESName esname, String server)
throws RequestNotDeliveredException

PayloadForRRM unExportResourceFromMsg(PayloadForRRM rrmPayload)
throws NameNotFoundException,
StaleEntryAccessException,
QuotaExhaustedException,
InvalidNameException,
PermissionDeniedException,
RemoteException

void updateExportedResource(ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int
mode, String server)

```

```

throws StaleEntryAccessException,
NameNotFoundException,
RequestNotDeliveredException,
ExportFailedException

PayloadForRRM updateExportedResourceFromMsg (PayloadForRRM
rrmPayload ,
String fromServer )
    throws NameNotFoundException,
           StaleEntryAccessException,
           PermissionDeniedException,
           InvalidValueException,
           UpdateFailedException,
           RemoteException

void updateImportedResource (ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int
type, String server)
throws NameNotFoundException,
StaleEntryAccessException,
RequestNotDeliveredException

PayloadForRRM updateImportedResourceFromMsg (PayloadForRRM
rrmPayload)
throws RemoteException

void exportOnConnecting (ESName esname, boolean toplevel, int
type)
throws NameNotFoundException;
}

```

RRM Methods: exportResource()

```

void exportResource (ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int mode,
String server)
throws NameNotFoundException, StaleEntryAccessException

```

The function exportResource exports the resource identified by esname to the server identified by server. The server parameter is a String of the form hostname:port, for example "foo.bar.com:8080". The boolean topLevel indicates whether this is to be a recursive export (topLevel = false) or not (topLevel = true). A recursive export will export all resources that are referenced in the metadata of the resource identified by esname (vocabularies, contracts and the like). The mode parameter indicates whether this is to be export by reference or export by value. Export by reference copies the metadata but not the resource state. Any invocation

of the exported resource will invoke the same copy. Export by value exports the resource state as well as its metadata: an invocation of the resource on the remote core will result in an invocation of its own copy of the resource. Recognized values for mode are BY_VALUE (0) and BY_REFERENCE (1). Export by value is only supported for Core-managed Resources. The RRM will invoke `importResourceFromMsg` on a remote RRM to export the resource to that RRM. The `payloadForRRM` will have a `payloadType` field set to `EXPORT_REQUEST`.

RRM Methods: `importResourceFromMsg()`

```
PayloadForRRM importResourceFromMsg (PayloadForRRM rrmPayload)
throws RemoteException
```

The function `importResourceFromMsg` is invoked by a remote RRM (B) to tell RRM (A) to import the resource(s) contained in the argument `rrmPayload`, an instance of `payloadForRRM`. The `payloadType` field is set to `EXPORT_REQUEST`. The `topLevel` field is set to `false` if the import is to be recursive. The `ImportExportmode` field is set to `BY_VALUE` (0) or `BY_REFERENCE` (1). The `contextPDU` is not used by RRM A; it is returned to RRM B. The intent of this field is to enable RRM B to identify the context (typically an attempt to send a message) that caused it to invoke `importResourceFromMsg`.

The `ESName` of each resource being exported is in `rrmPayload.resourceTable`. If the export is not recursive, this will have only one element: the `ESName` of the original resource passed to RRM A as the argument to `exportResource()`. If the export is recursive, this `ESArray` will contain all the `ESNames` of resources included in the metadata of the original resource and all the resources included in the metadata of these resources and soon on. If the export is `BY_VALUE` then resources included in resource state will also be included in the `resourceTable`.

Each element of `rrmPayload.tablesArray` is itself an `ESArray`. There is an `ESArray` in `tablesArray` corresponding to each element in `resourceTable`. Each `ESArray` in `tablesArray` consists of four elements.

Taken together these define the resource metadata and state for the resource identified by the `ESName` in `resourceTable`:

- `short typeCode`
- `ResourceSpecification spec`

- ResourceDescription desc
- Object resource

The following are permissible values for typeCode:

```

INBOX_CODE = 0
META_RESOURCE_CODE = 1
PROTECTION_DOMAIN_CODE = 2
RESOURCE_FACTORY_CODE = 3
CONTRACT_CODE = 100
CORE_DISTRIBUTOR_CODE = 110
IMPORTER_EXPORTER_CODE = 120
MAPPING_OBJECT_CODE = 140
NAME_FRAME_CODE = 150
REPOSITORY_VIEW_CODE = 160
SECURE_BOOT_CODE = 170
SYSTEM_MONITOR_CODE = 180
VOCABULARY_CODE = 190
CORE_MANAGEMENT_SERVICE_CODE = 200
DEFAULT_VOCABULARY_CODE = 210
DEFAULT_CONTRACT_CODE = 220
FINDER_SERVICE_CODE = 230
CONNECTION_MANAGER_CODE = 240
REMOTE_RESOURCE_MANAGER_CODE = 250
EXTERNAL_CODE = 1000
EXTERNAL_RESOURCE_CONTRACT_CODE = 1001

```

ResourceSpecification and ResourceDescription are defined in Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies".

The resource field is omitted if the resource identified by the ESName in resourceTable is an external resource (typeCode = EXTERNAL_CODE). Otherwise the resource field is an instance of the Core-managed resource specified. It will contain the data members defined for this Core-Managed Resource type in Chapter 4, "Core-Managed Resources". The resource field is included even if the export mode is BY_REFERENCE.

RRM Methods: importResource()

```

void importResource(ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int type,
String server)
throws ImportFailedException

```

This method instructs the RRM to import the named resource from the server identified by the String server (the format of this String is host:port). The boolean topLevel is set to false if the import is to be recursive. Permissible values of the argument type are BY_VALUE or BY_REFERENCE. When this function is invoked on the RRM it sends a message to the remote RRM on the core denoted by the server parameter. This is a messageForResource, containing an instance of methodCall with interfaceName: "RemoteResourceManagerInterface", methodName: "exportResourceFromMsg" and a single element in the argument array, of type payloadForRRM. The payloadType for payloadForRRM is IMPORT_REQUEST. The importExportMode is set to BY_VALUE or BY_REFERENCE. The contextPDU field is used by the RRM to identify the context for the reply to this message. Typically it contains a serialized PDU. The resourceTable contains a single element: the esname parameter passed in the call of importResource.

RRM Methods: exportResourceFromMsg()

```
PayloadForRRM exportResourceFromMsg(PayloadForRRM rrmPayload)
throws StaleEntryAccessException, NameNotFoundException,
RemoteException
```

The function exportResourceFromMsg is called from a remote RRM in response to an invocation of importResource on the remote RRM. The rrmPayload parameter contains the data defined in the description of importResource. The returned PayloadForRRM is sent in a messageForResource which contains an instance of methodResult. This PayloadForRRM has type IMPORT_REPLY. The importExportmode, topLevel and contextPDU fields will be those contained in the original rrmPayload. The resourceTable and tableArrays contains the list of ESNames of resources, and their metadata and state as described in the description of importResourceFromMsg.

RRM Methods: unExportResource()

```
void unExportResource(ESName esname, String server)
throws RequestNotDeliveredException
```

The function unExportResource causes the RRM to try to unexport the resource from the remote e-speak core identified by server (format "host:port"). It does this by sending an instance of methodCall with interfaceName "RemoteResourceManagerInterface", methodName "unExportResourceFromMsg" and a single element in the argument array of type payloadForRRM. The payloadType for payloadForRRM is UNEXPORT_REQUEST. The topLevel and

importExportMode fields are not used for this request. The resourceTable field contains a single element: the esname parameter to the function unExportResource. The tablesArray field is empty.

RRM Methods: unExportResourceFromMsg()

```
PayloadForRRM unExportResourceFromMsg (PayloadForRRM rrmPayload)
throws NameNotFoundException,
StaleEntryAccessException,
QuotaExhaustedException,
InvalidNameException,
PermissionDeniedException,
RemoteException
```

The unExportResourceFromMsg is invoked from a remote RRM in response to a call of unExportResourceFromMsg on the remote RRM. The rrmPayload contains the data defined in the description of unExportResourceFromMsg. The intent is that the RRM receiving an invocation of unExportResourceFromMsg should remove the resource contained in rrmPayload from its repository. The PayloadForRRM instance returned contains a payloadType of UNEXPORT_REPLY and the contextPDU passed in the rrmPayload parameter. All other fields are unused.

RRM Methods: updateExportedResource()

```
void updateExportedResource (ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int
mode, String server)
throws StaleEntryAccessException,
NameNotFoundException,
RequestNotDeliveredException,
ExportFailedException
```

The effect of calling the updateExportedResource function is very similar to calling ExportResource. The difference is that the RRM will invoke the updateExportedResourceFromMsg function on the remote RRM (instead of ExportResourceFromMsg) and the payloadType of the PayloadForRRM instance passed as a parameter in the remote invocation will be set to UPDATE_EXPORTED_RESOURCE_REQUEST.

RRM Methods: updateExportedResourceFromMsg()

```

PayloadForRRM updateExportedResourceFromMsg (PayloadForRRM
rrmPayload ,
String fromServer )
    throws NameNotFoundException,
           StaleEntryAccessException,
           PermissionDeniedException,
           InvalidValueException,
           UpdateFailedException,
           RemoteException

```

The function `updateExportedResourceFromMsg` is invoked by a remote RRM when it wishes to update resources which have been exported previously. The intent is that the RRM receiving the call of this function replaces the metadata (and the state in the case of an export BY_VALUE) of each resource in the resourceTable in `rrmPayload` with the metadata and state contained in `tablesArray`. Only resources that have already been registered will have their metadata and state updated. The `PayloadForRRM` returned as the result will have the contextPDU of the `rrmPayload` parameter and a `payloadType` of `UPDATE_EXPORTED_RESOURCE_REPLY`. All other fields will be ignored by the remote RRM that invoked `updateExportedResourceFromMsg`, when it receives this result.

RRM Methods: updateImportedResource()

```

void updateImportedResource (ESName esname, boolean topLevel, int
type, String server)
    throws NameNotFoundException,
           StaleEntryAccessException,
           RequestNotDeliveredException

```

The `updateImportedResource` function is similar to the `importResource` function. The major difference is that the RRM has previously imported the resource identified by `esname`. The RRM will invoke the `updateImportedResourceFromMsg` on the remote RRM identified by the `String server` (host:port). The `PayloadForRRM` passed as a parameter in `updateImportedResourceFromMsg` has `payloadType` of `UPDATE_IMPORTED_RESOURCE_REQUEST` and will have a single element in `resourceTable`: the `ESName` of the resource that needs updating. Note that this may not be the same `ESName` that is received as a parameter to

updateImportedResource, it must be the ESName used to identify the Resource when it was originally imported. So the RRM must remember this information about imported resources if it is to request updates of metadata.

RRM Methods: updateImportedResourceFromMsg()

```
PayloadForRRM updateImportedResourceFromMsg(PayloadForRRM
rrmPayload)
throws RemoteException
```

The function updateImportedResourceFromMsg is invoked by a remote RRM when it has received an invocation of updateImportedResource and needs to update a resource's metadata (and possibly state). The rrmPayload will contain the data described in the description of updateImportedResource above. The PayloadForRRM returned from the updateImportedResourceFromMsg function has a payloadType of UPDATE_IMPORTED_RESOURCE_REPLY. The topLevel, importExportMode and contextPDU fields will be the same as in the rrmPayload parameter. The resourceTable field and tablesArray respectively contain the ESNames and metadata (and possibly state) of the resources to be updates. Note that even though a single resource ESName is all that is contained in the rrmPayload parameter, the result can contain many ESNames if the topLevel flag is set to false (indicating recursive import/export).

RRM Methods: exportOnConnecting()

The resource is added to the list of resources to be exported when connection is established. The parameter esname is the ESName of the resource to be exported.

The parameter topLevel is set false if export is to be recursive.

The parameter type indicates the type of export. It can take the value BYVALUE (0) or BYREFERENCE (1).

Restrictions on import and export of core managed resources

The following Core-managed Resources cannot be exported or imported.

- Protection Domain
- Meta Resource

- Resource Factory
- Inbox
- System Monitor
- External Resource Contract

The Account Manager cannot be exported by value, only by reference.

Other Core-managed Resources have restrictions when exported by reference. In particular, such a Resource cannot be used as part of message processing as shown in Table 10 ..

Table 10 Core-managed Resource export restrictions

Resource	Pass by reference restrictions
name-frame	Cannot be used as a component of an ESName sent to the Core for name resolution
Repository View	Cannot be used in a Search Recipe
Resource Contract	Cannot register a Resource in this Contract
Vocabulary	Cannot be used in a Search Recipe

Removing imported resources (informational)

The Connection Manager provides the `closeConnection()` function to perform a graceful shutdown of a connection. The Connection Manager builds a close connection message and sends the message to the Connection Manager of the remote core, requesting the connection cleanup process. In the current implementation, the Connection Manager on the remote core removes the Protection Domain, Outbox and other resources allocated to the connection. Removing the Protection Domain used for the connection will remove all resources that have been imported from the connection (as they are registered in this Protection Domain).

The initiating core also performs similar clean up process. The Protection Domain, Outbox assigned to the connection are removed.

ESNames

ESNames denote an access path to a resource. ESNames conform to the format and grammar defined for Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs) [see *RFC 2396*].

ESNames are therefore URIs and more specifically, since they denote the access path for the resource, ESNames are also Universal Resource Locators (URLs). ESNames have the following format.

`es://<host>/<relative path>`

The host part of an ESName is either the host name or the IP address of the host on which the e-speak core is located together with an optional port number. If the port number is not specified, the current implementation will throw an exception.

Discussions are underway with IANA for a standard port number to be assigned.

The full form of an ESName (`es://<host>/<relative path>`) is known as an absolute ESName. Subsets of this syntax also denote ESNames (see "ESName BNF" on page 169). However, it may not be possible to resolve such ESNames if we do not have the necessary context.

The relative path component of an ESName must be unique on the given e-speak core. The path is relative in the sense that it is given a global context by the `<host>` element of the ESName. If the `<host>` element is missing (e.g. `es://path` or `es:/path`), then the resolver must decide the global context in which to begin resolution.

Usually the global context is assumed to be the current host.

The path consists of a set of Strings separated by `"/"`, for example `"a/b/c"`. The path is resolved by taking each String element in order and resolving that in the current name-frame. If this returns a name-frame the next element is resolved in that name-frame. The process continues until there are no more elements in the path in which case we have resolved the ESName to the intended resource. The first element will be resolved in the root name-frame of the e-speak core denoted by the server part of the ESName. For example, taking `"a/b/c"`, `"a"` is resolved in the e-speak core's root name-frame to return a name-frame which we denote `NF(a)`. Next `b` is resolved in `NF(a)`, to return a name-frame which we denote `NF(a b)`. Finally `c` is resolved in the name-frame `NF(a b)`.

If a String element of the path component other than the final component fails to resolve to a name-frame, name resolution has failed. If the final element fails to resolve to a resource, name resolution fails.

When a client registers a resource with an e-speak core, the default name-frame for that resource, is root name-frame of the client's protection domain.

If two clients on the same host bind two different resources in their root frames under the same relative path (e.g /a/resource) they will have different absolute ESNames even though the host part is the same:

```
es://host/client1PDRootFrame/a/resource and
es://host/client2PDRootFrame/a/resource
```

If a client terminates and its protection domain is not persistent, there will be a recursive deletion of all names within the protection domain's root name-frame. This means any URLs handed out rooted in this name-frame will be invalid. To overcome this, a resource needs to be bound in a name-frame which is persistent. To stop the deletion of a non-persistent protection domain causing a deletion of persistent resources, the current implementation prohibits a persistent resource to be bound within a non-persistent Protection Domain.

Core name-frame and core root name-frame

Every e-speak Core has a Core Name-Frame with the following ESName.

```
es://<hostport>/core
```

The names of various core managed resources are bound within this name-frame, including vocabularies, contracts and the metaresource. The following names are currently used.

```
/Core/MetaResource
/Core/ResourceFactory
/Core/SystemMonitor
/Core/Finder
/Core/CoreManagementService
/Core/DefaultVocabulary
/Core/BaseDistributorVocabulary
/Core/CoreDistributor
/Core/ConnectionManager
/Core/RemoteResourceManager
/Core/AccountManager
/Core/BaseAccountVocabulary
```

Every e-speak Core has a root name-frame which is denoted:

```
es://<hostport>/
```

or, alternatively, assuming the <hostport> part is already known to the resolver:

```
es:/
```

The following names are bound in the e-speak Core root name-frame:

```
/Core
/ContractContract
/VocabularyContract
```

Canonical ESName

This is the ESName stored in the URL field in the Resource's ResourceSpecification (see Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies"). This ESName is guaranteed always to be valid as long as the Resource is registered. It does not depend on any binding maintained in a Client's name-frame. Canonical ESNames have the following form:

```
es://<hostport>/proc/resource/<type_string>/<unique_id>
```

The <hostport> field is of the form host name or IP address followed by a port number separated by a ":" as specified in [RFC 2396].

The following are the permissible values of <type_string>, they denote the Resource Type (see Chapter 3, "Resource Data, Searches & Vocabularies")

```
"Inbox"
"MetaResource"
"ProtectionDomain"
("ResourceFactory")
("ConnectionManager")
("RemoteResourceManager")
"Contract"
("CoreDistributor")
"ExternalResource"
"ExternalResourceContract"
("ImporterExporter")
("MappingObject")
"NameFrame"
"RepositoryView"
("SecureBoot")
"SystemMonitor"
("AccountManager")
```

```

"Account "
"Vocabulary"
("CoreManagementService")
"Finder"

```

The field <unique_id> is the Stringified form of a number (in the current implementation this is the repository handle).

The terms bracketed are permissible values of <type_string>, but will normally be bound in the Core Name-Frame described above (es://<hostport>/core). If so, they will not occur under es://<hostport>/proc/resource.

Queries and fragments

Queries and fragments are also allowed in ESNames. A query is the data that follows the "?" in an ESName of the form:

```
es://<host>/<relative path> ? uric*
```

A fragment is the data that follows the "#" in an ESName of the form:

```
es://<host>/<relative path> # uric*
```

The character set uric is defined in [RFC 2396] which also specifies constraints on the data in queries and fragments.

Queries and fragments are not used in name resolution and are never interpreted by the e-speak core. They are delivered to the resource handler as part of the message.

ESName class definition

```

class ESName{
String hostPart;
String[] pathPart;
}

```

The above class defines the hostPart consists of the portion of the ESname from "es://" to the first "/". In an ESName the path separator is "/". This separates elements of the path. Each element of pathPart consists of an element in the path, without any "/" character.

ESName BNF

Here is the BNF for ESNames. Please refer to [RFC 2396] for any element not defined directly.

```

ESName = [ absoluteESname | relativeESname ] [ "#" fragment ]
absoluteESname = es ":" hier_part
relativeESname = ( net_path | abs_path | rel_path ) [ "?" query ]

hier_part = ( net_path | abs_path ) [ "?" query ]

net_path = "://" hostport [ abs_path ]
abs_path = "/" path_segments
rel_path = rel_segment [ abs_path ]

rel_segment = 1*( unreserved | escaped | ";" | "@" | "&" | "="
| "+" | "$" | "," )

hostport = host [ ":" port ]
host = hostname | IPv4address
hostname = *( domainlabel "." ) toplabel [ "." ]
domainlabel = alphanum | alphanum *( alphanum | "-" ) alphanum
toplabel = alpha | alpha *( alphanum | "-" ) alphanum
IPv4address = 1*digit "." 1*digit "." 1*digit "." 1*digit
port = *digit

path_segments = segment *( "/" segment )
segment = *pchar *( ";" param )
param = *pchar
pchar = unreserved | escaped | ":" | "@" | "&" | "=" | "+" | "$"
| ","
query = *uric
fragment = *uric

```

PDU Marshalling format

A PDU is transmitted as a 32 bit length (in network byte order), followed by the buffer containing the PDU itself.

All data inside a PDU is marshalled in network byte order.

- `int` is a 32 bit integer
- `long` is a 64 bit integer.
- `short` is a 16 bit integer
- `char` is a 16 bit character
- `boolean` is marshalled as a single byte (0x01) for true (0x00) for false.
- `String` is marshalled as a 16 bit length followed by each character in the `String` as 16 bits per character
- `byte[]` is marshalled as a 32-bit length followed by the bytes.
- `ADR` are marshalled by converting them to ASCII canonical s-expressions defined in "SPKI BNF Formats" (Chapter 5, "Access Control") and then marshalled as a byte array using `marshalBytes`.

E-speak Serialization Format

The basic types recognized are `byte`, `short`, `int`, `long`, `float`, `double`, and `string`. The four integral types `byte`, `short`, `int`, and `long` are 1, 2, 4, and 8 bytes long respectively, and are always sent most significant byte first. The `float` and `double` types are sent just as in Java. The `string` type is intended to contain text rather than arbitrary binary data, and the text must be a valid UTF-8 encoded string as per [RFC 2279]. It is hoped that "string" will not be confused with `java.lang.String`.

We also recognize arrays of types. The type `foo[]` is sent as a length followed by that many instances of type `foo`. If the length is -1, then a `NULL` is returned. If the length is 0, an empty array is returned. Otherwise an array with that many elements is returned.

A map is sent in the same syntactic way as an array, but there is an implicit Key/value association between pairs of elements; all the evenly indexed elements (0, 2, etc.) are Keys, and all the odd indexed elements are values. Some maps may allow multiple occurrences of the same Key.

The length field is encoded in a single byte if the value of the length is -1..62 inclusive; the encoding is 129 more than the length. Thus, -1 is sent as the byte value 128, and a length of 3 is sent as the byte value 132. Lengths from $63..2^{31}-1$ are sent as a 4 byte integer. Lengths below -1 or greater than $2^{31}-1$ are illegal at the present time.

All elements are sent as a signal byte that indicates the type of the object that follows, followed by the data for that object.

Signal bytes are entirely single bytes. They are encoded by literal ASCII characters (e.g., A), literal ASCII characters but with the high byte set (char)('J'+128)).

Here is the Backus-Naur Form (BNF) for "Ob" an object serialized in the e-speak format, using the signal bytes defined currently.

```
Ob = 'E', <RSD >|
    'D', <ResourceDescription >|
    'S', <ResourceSpecification >|
    '[', <ESUID >|
    'c', <SearchPredicate >|
    'C', <SearchRecipe >|
    ']', <VocabularyDeclaration >|
    '!', <Preference >|
    '~', <FilterSpec >|
    'T', <AttributeProperty >|
    'A', <AttributePropertySet >|
    'a', <Attribute >|
    'B', <AttributeSet >|
    'V', <Value >|
    'Y', <ValueType >|
    'F', <ESName >|
    ')', <ESString >|
    'q', <AttributePredicate >|
    '<', <NamedObject >|
    '=', <ProfileAttributeSet >|
    '>', <UserProfile >|
    'N', <NameSearchPolicy >|
    '.', <FinderResults >|
    '/', <FinderContext >|
```



```

'Q', <CoreEvent >|
'e', <Event >|
't', <EventAttributeSet >|
'Z', <ESRuntimeException>|
'z', <ESEException>|
(char)('z'+128), <ESArray >|
(char)('s'+128), <ESSet >|
(char)('I'+128), <Integer >|
(char)('J'+128), <Long >|
(char)('B'+128), <Boolean >|
(char)('y'+128), <Byte >|
(char)('C'+128), <Character >|
(char)('W'+128), <Short >|
(char)('F'+128), <Float >|
(char)('D'+128), <Double >|
(char)('S'+128), <String >|
(char)('Z'+128), <boolean[] >|
(char)('b'+128), <byte[] >|
(char)('c'+128), <char[] >|
(char)('w'+128), <short[] >|
(char)('i'+128), <int[] >|
(char)('j'+128), <long[] >|
(char)('f'+128), <float[] >|
(char)('d'+128), <double[] >|
(char)('v'+128), <Object[] >|
(char)('H'+128), <ESMap >|
'I', <PayloadForRRM >|
':', <CMArg >|
'h', <RepositoryHandle >|
'r', <Contract >|
'W', <RepositoryView >|
'v', <Vocabulary >|
'm', <MappingObject >|
's', <NameFrame >|
'o', <Binding >|
'?', <ProtectionDomain >|
'%', <Inbox >|
'@', <ExternalResource >|
'^', <SystemMonitor >|
'+', <ResourceFactory >|
'y', <Finder >|
'n', <ConnectionManager >|
'd', <RemoteResourceManager >|
'-', <CoreManagementService >|
'~', <AccountManager >

```

The components for each of the remaining non primitive type are defined in the relevant sections of this specification (to do: need to pull these definitions in to complete the BNF).

In the following BNF, the meta-symbol => means "is sent as." The convention is as follows:

```
String    => string
Integer   => int
Long      => long
Boolean   => byte
Null      =>
ByteArray => byte[]
ObjectArray => Ob[]
ESMap     => map
ESArray   => Ob[]
ESSet     => Ob[]
ESList    => Ob[]
```

ESMap, ESArray, ESSet and ESList in the current implementation are marshalled using Java serialization.

References

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NOTE: For all RFC's, access www.ietf.org

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Chapter 7 Exceptions

E-speak defines a set of *exceptions* to inform Clients when an error occurs in the system. Two classes of exceptions are defined: *run-time exceptions* and *recoverable exceptions*.

Run-Time Exceptions

Run-time exceptions are thrown when programming errors occur. A program catching such exceptions may terminate. `ESRuntimeException` has the following subclassed exceptions:

- `CorePanicException` is thrown when the Core is unable to process the request. Although the Core attempts to notify all Clients of its inability to continue operating, it also replies with this exception for as long as it can. The Core can continue to accept new messages as the problem may be limited to the execution of a single message.
- `ServicePanicException` is thrown when a service is unable to process the request. This can be a terminal error for the service, in which case the service exits. Or it can simply mean that the request being processed caused an internal error that was not recoverable, and the service accepts new requests.
- `RepositoryFullException` is thrown when the request attempted to add additional information to the Core's Repository, but the Repository was full. This exception can be recovered from if the Client is able to delete one or more Resources from the Repository. It is a run-time exception because almost every message can possibly throw this exception, and the Client has no guaranteed recourse (because some other application can consume the Repository space freed up by this Client).

- `OutOfOrderRequestException` is thrown when the state of the system is inconsistent with the request.
- `ConnectionFailedException` is thrown when the Connection Manager fails to establish a connection, details are contained in the exception state.
- `InvalidParameterException` is thrown by any other programming errors. This exception has three subclasses:
 - `NullParameterException` is thrown where a null parameter was supplied but is not allowed. This error is often caused by passing an uninitialized object.
 - `InvalidValueException` is thrown when a parameter is outside the allowed range.
 - `InvalidTypeException` tells the programmer that the name specified is bound to the wrong type of Resource.

Recoverable Exceptions

Recoverable exceptions occur due to a problem with the state of the system. For example, when the Client sends a message to request access to a Resource, the message may be undeliverable, perhaps because the Handler's Inbox is full. Recovery for this case can be as simple as resending the message.

The base exception is `ESEException`. This exception is subclassed into three major categories: `ESLibException`, `ESInvocationException` and `ESServiceException`.

`ESLibException` is the base class for client library exceptions. It should not be thrown itself but rather a subclass exception. Currently one subclass is defined.

- `CoreNotFoundException` indicates that a core could not be found to connect to. Either change the specification of the core or insure the core is running to correct this exception.

`ESInvocationException` is a base class for all the exceptions that can be thrown by the Core back to the Client occurring during the processing of the request. Exceptions thrown by most handlers are included here to reduce the number of explicit classes of exceptions that must be caught. This exception is further subclassed into:

`NamingException` results from a wide variety of problems. Regardless of the cause, this exception, or any of its subclasses, is thrown only for the primary Resource of the message header. Five subclasses are defined:

- `NameNotFoundException` is thrown when the name resolution process failed to find a given name. The Client can recover by changing `ESName`.
- `EmptyMappingException` is thrown when a Mapping Object is associated with the name, but that Mapping Object has no usable accessors. This condition arises when the accessor has no elements, the elements refer to unregistered Resources, or the Resources did not pass the visibility tests. The Client can recover by changing `ESName` or trying again with a different set of Keys.
- `UnresolvedBindingException` is thrown when all the accessors of the Mapping Object are search requests. The Client can recover by requesting a lookup using the search request.
- `MultipleResolvedBindingException` is thrown when the Mapping Object has more than one explicit binding.
- `LoopDetectedException` is currently unused.

`StaleEntryException` is thrown if the Resource no longer exists. The Core removes any stale handles from the Mapping Object before returning the exception. A retry does not result in this exception unless another referenced Resource has been unregistered.

`PermissionDeniedException` is thrown by any Resource Handler when the client is not authorized to access the Resource. The Client can recover by retrying with a different set of certificates. One subclass is defined

- `SessionRequiredException` is thrown when a client attempts to send it a message without first setting up a session. The service has security enabled and is performing access control checks. A secure session is needed so that the access control check can be made. This would normally be handled by the client

library and is transparent to the application programmer. The client recovers from this exception by exchanging SLS messages with the service to establish a session.

`QuotaExhaustedException` is thrown when the Client attempts to define more Resources than it is allowed as defined by the quota assigned. The Client can delete other Resources (thus freeing up quota) and reattempt the request.

`MethodNotImplementedException` is thrown when the Client attempts to invoke a method on a Resource that is not implemented even though the method is consistent with the type of the Resource. This is typically used to "stub-out" routines when a service is under development.

`RecoverableCoreException` is thrown when there is a problem while processing the request. There are two associated subclass exceptions:

- `RequestNotDeliveredException` is thrown when the Core never started processing the message. This exception can be thrown by the Client library if it implements time-outs or in by the Core if the corresponding queue is full. It may be possible to recover from this exception by resending the message.
- `PartialStateUpdateException` is thrown when the Core cannot finish processing the message. The Client may need to find out what state was changed before attempting recovery, for example, by examining the state of the metadata.

`TimedOutException` is thrown when a message being written to or received from a channel has not successfully completed within the caller defined time period.

`UndeliverableRequestException` is thrown when the message cannot be delivered to the Resource Handler. In the current implementation, this is not thrown with security enabled, the security subsystem silently ignores such messages (in case they are a denial of service attack) and the Client has to wait for a `TimeoutException`. There are two subclass exceptions of `UndeliverableRequestException`:

- `RecoverableDeliveryException` is due to temporary conditions such as a full Mailbox. Recovery can be as simple as retrying.

- `UnrecoverableDeliveryException` is due to a condition that is unlikely to change quickly. The Client can recover by selecting a binding that points to a different Resource Handler.

`ESServiceException` is a base class exception for all service-defined exceptions.

- `ESNameFrameException` is the super class of all name frame exceptions. This allows the client to catch this exception and handle all the name frame related exceptions in one catch block.
 - `NameCollisionException` is thrown when the name specified in an add, copy, or similar operation is already defined in the Name Frame.
 - `LookupFailedException` is thrown when no Resources are found that match a Search Recipe.
 - `InvalidNameException` is thrown when a string designating a name is not found in the Name Frame.
- `ESRemoteException` is thrown if the Remote Resource Manager operation failed for any reason, details are in the exception state.

Exception State

Each exception has the following state.

```
class ESEException {
    int errno;
    Object[] info;
}
```

The field `errno` indicates the type of the exception as shown below.

```
NONE= 0
ESRuntimeExceptions (1-99 reserved)
INVALID_PARAMETER= 1
NULL_PARAMETER= 2
INVALID_VALUE= 3
INVALID_TYPE= 4
OUT_OF_ORDER_REQUEST= 5
```


CORE_PANIC= 6
SERVICE_PANIC= 7
REPOSITORY_FULL= 8
EExceptions (100-999 reserved)
INVOCATION= 100
NAMING= 101
NAME_NOT_FOUND= 102
EMPTY_MAPPING= 103
UNRESOLVED_BINDING= 104
MULTIPLE_RESOLVED_BINDING= 105
PERMISSION_DENIED= 106
QUOTA_EXHAUSTED= 107
STALE_ENTRY_ACCESS= 108
RECOVERABLE_CORE= 109
PARTIAL_STATE_UPDATE= 110
REQUEST_NOT_DELIVERED= 111
UNDELIVERABLE_REQUEST= 112
UNRECOVERABLE_DELIVERY= 113
RECOVERABLE_DELIVERY= 114
TIMED_OUT= 115
METHOD_NOT_IMPLEMENTED= 116
LOOP_DETECTED= 117
SESSION_REQUIRED= 118
CONNECTIONFAILED= 119

E-speak defined service exceptions

SERVICE= 200

Name frame service exceptions

NAMEFRAME= 201
INVALID_NAME= 202
NAME_COLLISION= 203
LOOKUP_FAILED= 204

Import/Export service exceptions

REMOTE= 210

Client Library defined exceptions

ESLIB = 950
CORE_NOT_FOUND= 951

Exception numbers 1000+ are reserved for application use

Exception hierarchy

Here is the exception hierarchy. Indentation indicates position in the hierarchy.

```

ESRuntimeException
  ServicePanicException
  OutofOrderRequestException
  CorePanicException
  ConnectionFailedException
  RepositoryFullException
  ConnectionFailedException
  InvalidParameterException
    InvalidTypeException
    InvalidValueException
    NullParameterException
ESEException
  ESLibException
    CoreNotFoundException
  ESServiceException
    ESRemoteException
    ESNameFrameException
    NameCollisionException
    InvalidNameException
    LookupFailedException
  ESInvocationException
    StaleEntryAccessException
    PermissionDeniedException
    SessionRequiredException
    QuotaExhaustedException
    MethodNotImplementedException
    RecoverableCoreException
    PartialStateUpdateException
    RequestNotDeliveredException
    NamingException
    MultipleResolvedBindingException
    UnresolvedBindingException
    NameNotFoundException
    LoopDetectedException
    EmptyMappingException
    TimedOutException
    UndeliverableRequestException
    RecoverableDeliveryException
    UnrecoverableDeliveryException

```


Chapter 8 Core Generated Events & Event Distributor Vocabularies

The e-speak event service is described in the E-speak Programmer's Guide. The Core itself is an example of an Event Publisher. It sends Events to an external Client called the *Core Distributor* to signal state changes such as a change in a Resource's attributes. The Core Distributor can then distribute these Events to interested Clients that have appropriate authority.

Events

An e-speak Event is a set of named attributes, where each attribute is a name-value pair. An Event also contains a reference to an e-speak Vocabulary. The Vocabulary enumerates the names of allowed attributes and their types. Specifying a Vocabulary in an Event makes the Event content self-describing. A recipient of a self-describing Event does not need to know anything about the Event's content *a priori*; it can query the Vocabulary to determine the Event's attributes and their types and then extract the values of the attributes it is interested in. Event generators can choose to leave the vocabulary field null, in which case Event attributes must be agreed upon *a priori*, the default meaning being the e-speak Base Vocabulary.

An Event is defined as follows:

```
class Event
{
    String eventType;
    EventAttributeSet eventAttrs;
    EventAttributeSet controlAttrs;
    Object payload;
}
```

Every event has a string that describes the event type and two AttributeSet (sets of name-value pairs). The first AttributeSet is the attributes that describe the event. The second AttributeSet are control attributes that intermediating entities (such as distributors) can insert into the event. Matching (filtering) can only be performed on the event attributes, not on the control attributes. A string is valid for eventType, the meaning of the string is application dependent.

EventAttributeSet contains an AttributeSet (xref to chapter on resourceDescriptions, section on Resource Description defines AttributeSet):

```
class EventAttributeSet extends AttributeSet
{
    AttributeSet attrs;
    String format;
}
```

The string format indicates the format of each Attribute in the AttributeSet attrs. "VOCAB" means that the attributes have to be valid in the vocabulary references in the AttributeSet attrs. "SIMPLE" means the attributes are simple (name, value) pairs and no valid vocabulary is specified in attrs.

Core Generated Events

The Core is a Publisher of Events. All Events published by the Core go to a single service called the *Core Distributor Service*. This service is the Resource Handler for several Distributor Resources, each dealing with a Core-generated Event of a different type. These are:

- Changes to the state of the Repository
- Changes to the state of Core-managed Resources

These types are used to maintain the coherence of metadata and the Resource state shared by value. Both are described in the *Base Event Vocabulary*.

The string in the eventType field for events generated by the e-speak Core consists of a prefix indicating the component that generated the event, followed by further information (such as the name of the method being invoked).

The eventAttrs field consists of a set of name, string-value pairs. Two common examples are:

- name "Name", value is the stringified version of the ESUID of the Resource responsible for generating the event
- name "FailureDetail", value is a string indicating the nature of the failure

The format string of the EventAttributeSet eventAttrs is "SIMPLE".

The payload field is null for events generated by the e-speak Core.

The following is the list of prefix strings used by the current implementation.

```
"core.mutate.NameFrameInterface."
"core.mutate.MailBoxInterface."
"core.mutate.ProtectionDomainInterface."
"core.mutate.RepositoryViewInterface."
"core.mutate.VocabularyInterface."
"core.mutate.VocabularyToolBoxInterface."
"core.mutate.ResourceFactoryInterface."
"core.mutate.ResourceManipulationInterface."
"core.mutate.ImporterExporterInterface."
"core.mutate.SecureBoot."
"core.failure."
"core.failure.exception."
"notifySync"
"notify"
"publish"
"subscribe"
"unpublish"
"unsubscribe"
"net.espeak.services.events.intf.ESListenerIntf"
"net.espeak.services.events.intf.DistributorIntf"
"net.espeak.jesi.event.coredist.ESCoreDistributorIntf"
"net.espeak.infra.cci.events.Event"
"service.create"
"service.delete"
"service.mutate"
"service.access"
"service.pause"
"service.resume"
"service.panic"
"service.genericInfo"
"management.service.create"
"management.service.coldreset"
```



```
"management.service.warmreset"  
"management.service.stop"  
"management.service.start"  
"management.service.shutdown"  
"management.service.remove"  
"management.service.error"  
"management.service.info"  
"management.service.illegalstate"  
"management.servicemanager.newservice"  
"management.servicemanager.deleteservice"  
"management.servicemanager.servicechanged"  
"resource.change_state"  
"resource.invalid_state"  
"resource.invalid_state_transition"  
"resource.statistics"  
"resource.proxy_created"  
"coremanager.info"  
"coremanager.warning"  
"coremanager.serious"
```

Publication of Core-generated Events

The e-speak core sends events to the core distributor as a Protocol Data Unit containing a MessageForResource (xref to ESPDU section in communications chapter). The payload field of the MessageForResource is the event. The payloadType of MessageForResource is set to EVENT.

The e-speak Core does not subscribe to the Core Distributor (as an ordinary Client would).

Distributor Vocabulary

A vocabulary is defined in which Distributors can be registered.

Table 11 Distributor vocabulary

Attribute Name	Value Type	Comment	Meaning
Name	String	Default value "BaseDistributorVocabulary"	
Type	String		
ESGroup	String		
ContractNames	String		
ServiceName	String		Name assigned to Distributor
ServiceType	String		Type of distributor
EventTypes	String	Multivalued	Event types handled
Persistent	Boolean	always false	True if Distributor state survives Core restart
Buffered	Boolean	always false	True if Distributor is able to accept events faster than it can forward them
Secured	Boolean	always false	True if event state is tamper proof
QOSLevel	Integer	always 0	Quality of service level assigned by Distributor
Multiplexed	String	Multivalued	Type of aggregation and summarization

The Service Name, Service Type, and Event Types are strings that are assumed to have meaning to Publishers and Subscribers who have discovered the Distributor. For example, the Core Distributor could be described with a Service Name of "Core", a Service Type of "Core", and Event Types of "Repository" and "Metadata".

The Persistent, Buffered, Secure, and QOSLevel attributes must be set as shown because the current Distributor implementation does not support these features. The Multiplexed attribute can be set by Distributors to describe how they combine events. For example, a Distributor can aggregate billing events from a particular customer and publish an aggregate event to the subscribers. The values assigned are assumed to have meaning to the Publishers and Subscribers of the events.

Events in a Distributed Environment (Informational)

Events are messages that trigger special actions by the recipients. In particular, when a Client receives an Event, the callback registered for this Event is invoked. It would be inappropriate for the Remote Resource Handler to invoke the callback. In fact, the Remote Resource Handler has no idea what to do with the Event. As currently implemented, no special action is needed. The result is delivery of the Event to the Client with no special action on the part of the Remote Resource Handler.

The state of Resources exported by value and the metadata of all exported Resources is not synchronized by default. Clients wishing to synchronize exported or imported Resources register for the Core-generated metadata and Resource Events. They also subscribe to the Resource Event if the Core-managed Resource is being exported by value.

Care is needed to avoid cycles. Consider an exported Resource that has its metadata changed on the importing side. Assume that a Client on each Logical Machine has subscribed to metadata Events for this Resource with Core Distributors from both Logical Machines. When one Client makes a change, they both get the Event.

Even if the Client making the change doesn't respond to the change Event, the other Client must make the change on its Logical Machine. This change can generate an Event that reaches the first Client. Not having any knowledge of the source of the Event, the Client makes the change again. These two Clients continue repeating the same change forever except for the fact that the Core generates a Resource or metadata Event only if the state is actually changed. Hence, the second change on each side does not generate an Event, and the cycle is broken.

Other cycles can occur. Two Clients that make changes to the metadata while the Events are propagating can generate a cycle that is not broken so simply. The problem is that they are both changing the same item without synchronizing. Such conditions are almost certainly programming errors. No action taken by any e-speakcomponent can be guaranteed to break such cycles. Only the Clients have sufficient information to detect the problem.

Chapter 9 Management

Two concepts underpin the manageability of e-speak Resources and Clients.

- **Managed State:** a defined service state embodying the life cycle of a service.
- **Managed Variable Table:** sets of values that can be affected by a manager for the purposes of configuration and control.

Managed Life Cycle

The full state transition diagram is as follows.




Figure 16 Managed Service Lifecycle

State Descriptions

Initializing

The internal dynamic state of the service is being constructed, for example: a policy manager is being queried for configuration information and resources are being discovered via search recipes or yellow pages servers. When the service finishes this work it moves asynchronously into the ready or error states.

Ready

The service is in a ready to run situation, this state is also equivalent to a stopped or paused state.

Running

The service is running and responding to methods invoked on its operational interfaces. If an error occurs which implies that the service cannot continue to run it should move into the error state.

Error

The service has some problem and is awaiting management action on what to do next.

Closed

The service has removed/deleted much of its internal state and awaits either a coldReset or remove transitions.

Inputs

An input is the trigger that causes a state transition to occur. In any given state there is a defined set of permissible inputs that are available, i.e. only those that are depicted in the diagram as leaving the current state and connecting with the next state. To attempt to perform any other transition is illegal. Note that many inputs can have the same name (e.g. error) yet there is no ambiguity as long as the originating state is different.

Clients can provide any input with impunity. However a management agent can request only provide external inputs. For example the manager might reasonably request that a client perform a warm reset, but not to become ready, the client alone can provide this input i.e. when it's internal initialization process has completed.

The available inputs are as follows.

- start: move into the running state. Start to handle invocations on operational interfaces.
- stop: move into the ready state. Stop handling invocations on operational interfaces.
- ready: move into the ready state having finished initialization.

- error: move into the error state, this transition is valid from any state.
- shutdown: clean up any internal state required and move into the closed state. This transition should not cause the deregistering of resources from the repository.
- coldReset: cause a from complete reinitialization of the service and move into the initializing state. The only exemption is that resources that are already registered should not be reregistered.
- warmReset: cause a partial reinitialization of the service i.e. retaining some of the existing service state move into the initializing state.
- remove: cause the service to remove itself from existence. Any non-persistent resources should be deregistered from the repository.

Managed Variable Tables

A managed variable table is at it's simplest a table of name/string value pairs that exist within the client but to which a manager has some level of access. Thus a management agent can control those aspects of a services behavior that is affected by those variables to which it has access.

There is a degree of configurability associated with managed variables and their variables that permit something more sophisticated than the simple get and set operations one would expect to find.

Each table itself has a name to distinguish it from other tables. As we shall see later, the managed service model itself provides for two such tables.

There is a restriction on variable table usage: each name in a variable table must be unique within that table. It is not possible to implement lists by having many entries with the same name.

Configuration Parameter Table

The configuration parameter table is an instance of a managed variable table with a reserved name that identifies it as such. The table holds generic configuration data for the client.

Resource Table

The resource table is another instance of a managed variable table, identical in behavior to the configuration parameter table except that the names in the client's table refer to other services with which the client has some relationship. For example, if a particular client makes use of a mail service then this relationship can be made visible to a management agent through the resource table. Thus a management agent might reconfigure the client to use an alternative but equivalent service. While there might seem no obvious need to separate out this particular aspect of configuration, doing so makes it possible for a management agent to discover the topology and integrity of a network of connected services without the need for service specific interpretation of the variable table (all entries in the resource table are resources).

The name used for an entry in a resource table can be any symbolic name the client chooses, while the value must be the valid e-speak ESName of the actual service.

Managed Service Interface

All e-speak Resources that are manageable implement the ManagedService interface. This applies whether the Resources are external to the e-speak Core, or Core-managed.

```
interface ManagedServiceIntf{
    String getName()
    throws ESInvocationException;

    String getDescription()
    throws ESInvocationException;

    String getOwner()
```



```
throws ESInvocationException;

String getUptime()
throws ESInvocationException;

String getVersion()
throws ESInvocationException;

String getErrorCondition()
throws ESInvocationException;

String getStaticInfo()
throws ESInvocationException;

void coldReset()
throws IllegalStateTransition, ESInvocationException;

void warmReset()
throws IllegalStateTransition, ESInvocationException;

void start()
throws IllegalStateTransition, ESInvocationException;

void stop()
throws IllegalStateTransition, ESInvocationException;

void shutdown()
throws IllegalStateTransition, ESInvocationException;

void remove()
throws IllegalStateTransition, ESInvocationException;

int getState()
throws ESInvocationException;

VariableEntry[] getVariableEntries()
throws ESInvocationException;

String[] getVariableNames()
throws ESInvocationException;

VariableEntry getVariableEntry(String name)
throws ESInvocationException, NoSuchVariableName;

void setVariable(String name, String value)
throws ESInvocationException;
```

```
ResourceEntry[] getResourceEntries()
throws ESInvocationException;

String[] getResourceNames()
throws ESInvocationException;

ResourceEntry getResourceEntry(String name)
throws NoSuchVariableName, ESInvocationException;

void setResource(String name, ESName resource)
throws ESInvocationException;
}
```

The method `getName` return String containing the service name. This name should be used when registering the service resource in the service vocabulary.

The method `getDescription` returns a human readable description of the service for display on a management console.

The method `getOwner` returns a string indicating the owner of the service.

The method `getUptime` gets the time for which the service has been running. The format of the string is "years.days.hours.minutes.seconds".

The method `getVersion` returns a string indicating the version of the service.

The method `getErrorCondition` returns a string indicating the error condition. This returns null if the service is not in an error state.

The method `getStaticInfo` returns an XML document of the following form.

```
<staticInfo>
<name>the name of the resource </name>
<owner> the name of the owning service </owner>
<description> the description here </description>
<version> the version string </version>
<uptime> the uptime string </uptime>
</staticInfo>
```

The `coldReset` transition function cause the service to move into the initializing state and completely reinitialize. The exception `IllegalStateTransitionException` is thrown if the state is not in the ready, error or closed states.

The warmReset transition function cause the service to move into the initializing state and partially reinitialize. The exception `IllegalStateTransitionException` is thrown if the state is not in the ready or error states.

The start transition function cause the service to move into the running state and service client requests. The `IllegalStateTransitionException` exception is thrown if the state is not in the ready state.

The stop transition function cause the service to move into the ready state and stop serving client requests. The exception `IllegalStateTransitionException` is thrown if the state is not in the running state

The shutdown transition function clean up any internal state required and move into the closed state. This transition should not cause the deregistering of resources from the repository. The exception `IllegalStateTransitionException` is thrown, if the state is already in the closed state.

The remove transition function causes the service to remove itself from existence. Any non-persistent resources should be deregistered. The exception `IllegalStateTransitionException` is thrown if the state is not in the closed state.

The method `getState` return the current state: an integer value from 0 to 4.

The value returned is interpreted as follows.

- Initializing(0) - the service is constructing its internal data structures and finding other services which is needs to function.
- Ready(1) - the service is fully constructed and ready to run.
- Running(2) - the service is running and handling methods on its operational interfaces.
- Closed(3) - the service has deleted much of its internal state and closed any open connections to files or other services.
- Error(4) - The service has encountered an error preventing the service from continuing to operate.

The Variable Table

Each manageable Resource maintains a table of name value pairs, which contains whatever information that Resource wishes to expose to the management agent. The table entries can be either read only or read write.

```
class VariableEntry {  
    String name;  
    String value;  
    int updateType;  
}
```

The method `getVariableEntries` returns the table as an array of `VariableEntry`'s. Each `VariableEntry` object contains the name, the value & update information.

The method `getVariableNames` returns an array of strings - one element in the array for each variable.

The method `getVariableEntry` returns the entry in the table for variable identified in the parameter name.

The method `setVariable` sets the variable identified by the parameter name to the string in the value parameter.

The Resource Table

The managed Resource maintains a table of name-Resource pairs. This table contains all the Resources that the element depends on i.e. uses. The table entries can be either read only or read write.

```
class ResourceEntry {  
    String name;  
    ESName resource;  
    int updateType;  
}
```

The method `getResourceEntries` returns the table as an array of `ResourceEntry`. Each entry contains a string that name for the resource, the `ESName` of the resource (URL) and the update information.

The method `getResourceNames` returns an array of strings, one element for each entry in the resource table.

The method `setResource` sets the Resource identified by the `name` parameter to the ESName supplied in the `resource` parameter.

Chapter 10 Repository (Informational)

The Repository is not part of the e-speak architecture because Clients have no direct interaction with it. However, understanding the operation of the Repository helps in understanding other parts of the architecture. Also, the behavior of the system depends on how the Repository is configured. This chapter describes the reference implementation, the Core-Repository interfaces for including Repositories of different internal structures, and various scalability issues.

Repository Overview

The Repository holds the data needed by the Core. This data includes the Resource metadata as well as the internal state of Core-managed Resources. The Repository is also read by the Lookup Service when a Client requests a lookup. These two operations have different design points. Access to metadata and Core-managed Resources is done frequently and needs to be low latency. Lookup requests are akin to database queries; they are less latency sensitive but must be completed relatively quickly.

Repository Structure

To support the conflicting goals of flexible query lookup on a large persistent set and rapid access to a smaller, transient subset, the reference implementation of the Repository described here is divided into two components: the *Repository Database* and the *Repository Access Table*.

The Repository Database provides persistent storage and efficient lookup request processing. This component is left parameterized in the Core-Repository interface. All that is needed is an appropriate database interface. This design allows different implementations of the Repository to select the most appropriate database based on relevant business and technical considerations.

A very broad range of persistent repository implementation is allowed. This Repository Database interface gives another architectural degree of freedom. For instance, in the case of a battery-backed RAM device or in situations where persistence is simply not a requirement, a pure RAM-based Repository Database implementation is feasible. Thus, the Repository Database need not have a large footprint.

The second component, the Repository Access Table, is fully resident in memory in the reference implementation. This access table is rebuilt from data in the Repository Database as part of a system restart. The access table supports a fast associative lookup of information based on Repository Handles. It can be a cache of the Repository data, or it might be large enough to hold all the data needed for Resource access.

Information Flow

Every e-speak installation comes with an in-memory Repository that does not support persistence. To add the feature of scalability, a *glue* layer must be provided to convert Core requests to the Repository into meaningful requests to the selected implementation. This glue layer must implement the information flow methods described in this section. In addition, the glue layer can also include interfaces specific to the selected Repository implementation, such as setting controls.

The Repository Database has two interfaces used by the Core. The Core-Repository interfaces have methods to:

- Register and unregister Resources
- Access the metadata corresponding to a given Repository Handle
- Modify the metadata corresponding to a given Repository Handle

- Look up Resources that match a Search Recipe

The Client can access these methods only indirectly by invoking methods in the Contract, Name Frame, and MetaResource. The following illustrate the methods that need to be supported in these interfaces. The exact signatures and functions vary from implementation to implementation. In the current implementation these interfaces can be found in `net.espeak.infra.core.repository.Repository`

```
public RepositoryHandle registerDescription(
    String          name,
    ResourceDescription d,
    ResourceSpecification s)
    throws InvalidSpecificationException;

public void unregisterDescription(
    RepositoryHandle handle)
    throws StaleHandleException;

public ResourceDescription accessDescription (
    RepositoryHandle handle)
    throws StaleHandleException;

public ResourceSpecification accessSpec (
    RepositoryHandle handle)
    throws StaleHandleException;

public RepositoryHandle mutateDescription (
    RepositoryHandle handle,
    ResourceDescription d,
    ResourceSpecification s)
    throws StaleHandleException;
```

The second interface is presented to the Core by the Repository to invoke the Lookup Service for a Repository lookup request. This interface is invoked when the Client does a lookup in a Name Frame:

```
public RepositoryHandle[] find (SearchRecipe recipe)
    throws InvalidSearchRequestException;
```

The Repository can access permanent storage, but the protocol used for such access is not part of thee-speak architecture.

Increasing Scalability

Because a Resource can be used only if it has been registered in the local Repository, it is important to consider the eventuality of a full Repository. Two kinds of e-speak Repositories are based on deployment needs: a *thin Repository* and a *fat Repository*.

A thin Repository does not have enough disk space to grow with the number of Repository entries. Its purpose is to support Repository Handle-based access, with latency on the order of microseconds. This support is provided on a smaller, transient, subset of Repository entries, which corresponds to "in-use" Resources. A thin Repository is very sensitive to stale data; it must enforce strong policies to:

- Dispose of stale entries, and
- Prevent marginally accessed entries from accumulating.

A thin Repository can have no persistent storage of its own. Thus, because the number of Repository entries that can be stored in a thin Repository is small, an *in-memory* Repository implementation is appropriate.

A fat Repository has a lot of disk space and can act as a server to a thin Repository. Clearly, such a Repository can be highly available. The primary purpose of such a Repository is to support Resource lookup requests with "reasonable" latency (on the order of milliseconds). A fat Repository is not very sensitive to stale data. Because the number of Repository entries that can be stored in a fat Repository is very large, Repository implementation based on a database is appropriate.

A thin Repository can use a fat Repository to fulfill its scalability needs, and a fat Repository can simultaneously serve many thin Repositories. However, many devices cannot need such support because their transient state can hold all the information necessary.

The communication between a fat Repository that provides services to a thin Repository is not part of the e-speak architecture. However, because the security of the system depends on the integrity of this communication, the link must be protected. It is the security of the communication link that makes the Repository part of the Core, irrespective of the physical machine that holds the Repository.

The keyIndexType field: Efficient Repository Lookup

In DBMS, indexes are the primary means of reducing the volume of data that must be fetched and processed in response to a query. If there were no indexes used for resource description attributes in an e-speak repository, every resource defined against a particular vocabulary needs to be examined to see if it matches the constraints specified in the search recipe. This would cause very slow performance on lookups when large numbers of resources are registered in the e-speak Core. So there needs to be a way of specifying which attributes properties within a Vocabulary are the 'key' attributes so that some indexing scheme can be added.

It is not reasonable to index each and every attribute in a resource description. The more indexes that you have, the more overhead in registering descriptions and also the memory requirement becomes more for in-memory repository. It does not make sense to index attributes that are not going to be frequently used in constraints. Therefore, there needs to be a way of specifying which attribute properties within a vocabulary are the 'key' attributes so that some indexing scheme can be implemented on these 'key' attribute properties.

This is the purpose of the keyIndexType field in AttributeProperty (xref to core managed resource Vocabulary section). Valid values of keyIndexType are: NO_INDEX, HASH_INDEX and TREE_INDEX. If the value is HASH_INDEX or TREE_INDEX the attribute is used as an index by the DBMS.

Chapter 11 Localization

A key factor in global acceptance of a software package is its ability to be customized to the location running the software. It is very frustrating for a user to have to read messages in a language other than their own native language or interpret numbers using a foreign format. Imagine if you had to understand an error message written in German, or recognized that the string "06/01/99" really means January 6th and not June 1st.

This chapter describes how to support localizing e-speak for native language and locale-dependent number & date formats. This design is implemented in the current release of e-speak. However, currently all entities have the same underlying data catalog to get their localized strings.

Current Implementation

The current code has hard-coded strings for all display messages and exception details. It also hard-codes the format of number and date/time representations.

For example:

- `net.espeak.infra.core.startup.StartESCore` prints a message when the core is initialized using `System.out.print(" Starting ES Core Server with Rendezvous of \"+ popURL + "\". ");` and `System.out.println("started.");`.
- `Value.getString()` simply calls the `toString` method of the data type object represented by the `Value` class.

Requirements

String Messages

There are three requirements for string messages:

- A framework implementation which supports the use of localized string messages.
- A English implementation of all string messages within the core, cci and client packages, using the framework created above.
- Additional language implementations as required by our customers.

Framework

- Any time the message text is moved away from the code that produces the message, confusion and incorrect messaging is likely. It is important, therefore, that the framework minimized the confusion and makes it difficult to issue the incorrect message. A hierarchical structure must be supported for the specification of the message to be issued.
- Messages are rarely static, i.e., they often contain concatenations of variable values in the middle of the message. The framework must support the substitution of variable values in the body of the message.
- The framework must support the specification of the location and language of the user. If support for the requested location and language are not implemented, the framework should provide the closest match to the requested location and language available.
- A likely scenario includes the core running in one locale and the client running in a different locale. The framework must support a core issuing a message in the client's locale language.
- During development phases, the framework should throw exceptions if the invocation of the messaging methods are coded incorrectly (e.g., a message id that is not valid), but in the release the framework should make a best attempt to format the message for the user.

- The framework must be initialized during the startup of the e-speak processes.

English implementation

- 1 The current code base must be examined for each string message that is produced. Unless there is a good reason for keeping the message definition local (e.g., a debug message), the text of the message should be placed in the English string implementation file and the reference changed to retrieve the message text.
- 2 This English implementation becomes the base implementation and is shown to the user as the default language if their specified language is not implemented.

Additional language implementations

- After a good English implementation has been developed additional language implementations can be created translating the message text from English to the new language.
- After an additional language is created, changes to existing messages must also be changed in each of the additional languages. This is a development process issue that is addressed further here.
- If a new message is created in the base implementation (English), the new message does not need to be implemented in all other languages, however, if this is the case the user sees the English version of the message.

Number & Date Formats

The requirements for non-string formats is broken into two categories:

- Vocabulary attributes
- Value class string representations

Vocabulary Attributes

Three new data types should be supported which provide for locale-defined formats. They are:

- **Decimal:** This data type provides for a decimal representation of a number in a user-defined pattern. The pattern can be derived from the locale-defined format or customized by the user. For example: Decimal number = new Decimal("###,###.##");
- **Currency:** This data type provides a specialized Decimal format that includes the currency symbol and format defined by the user's locale.
- **Per:** This data type provides a specialized Decimal format for percentages using the symbols and format defined by the user's locale.

Value class string representations

The Value class getString method should return a string representation that is customized by the user's locale formats. Specifically:

Timestamp	Date
Time	Decimal
Currency	Percent
Numeric data type (Long, Double, Float, etc.)	

High-level Design

The implementation for the Number and Date formats are left to the Vocabulary team. This document only addresses the String Message requirements. Shown below is the class diagram for the classes implementing localization.

ESString
messageID:String
info:Object[]
ESString()
ESString(String)
ESString(String, Object)
ESString(String, int)
ESString(String, Object, Object)
ESString(String, Object[])
toString():String
receiveObject(MessageInputStream):Object
sendObject(MessageOutputStream):void

ESStrings
table:ESMap
contents:Object[][]
getKeys():Enumeration
handleGetObject(String):Object

ESText
myResources:ResourceBundle
myCustomResources:ESList
throwExceptions:boolean
initialize(String):void
throwExceptions():boolean
setThrowExceptions(boolean):void
getLocaleString(Object):String
getMessage(String):String
getMessage(String, Object):String
getMessage(String, Object, Object):String
getMessage(String, Object[]):String
findMessage(String):String
isDigit(String):boolean

ESText, ESStrings & ESString classes

Three new classes are defined. ESText is the retrieval class and ESStrings is the language dependent implementation class. ESString is a logical extension to String which performs the localization at the last possible moment (client in most cases).

The unitize() method needs to be called by each process that uses the ESText facility. If this method is not called, the first invocation of getMessage defaults to the e-speak base class. The unitize method uses the java.util.ResourceBundle class to discover the language defined strings. ESText supports multiple base classes. After it is unitized, it can be called multiple times with different base class name parameters. When ESText looks up a message, it searches all the supplied base classes to resolve the message ID.

The throwExceptions and setThrowException methods return and specify if exceptions are thrown for detected problems (see below).

Additional getMessage prototypes can be created with multiple params if the need arises.

The base implementation for ESStrings looks like the following:

```
public class ESStrings extends ListResourceBundle
{
    public Object[] [] getContents() {
        return contents;
    }
    static final Object[] [] contents = {
        {"net.espeak.startup.Hello", "template for ID1"},
        {"net.espeak.eslib.ESFolder.dup", "template for ID2"}
    };
}
```

Each additional language looks like the following:

```
public class ESStrings_de extends ListResourceBundle
{
    public Object[] [] getContents() {
        return contents;
    }
    static final Object[] [] contents = {
        {"net.espeak.startup.Hello",
        "German override for ID1"},
        {"net.espeak.eslib.ESFolder.dup",
        "German override for ID2"}
    };
}
```

Class names are searched in the following order:

- 1 baseclass + "_" + language + "_" + country + "_" + variant
- 2 baseclass + "_" + language + "_" + country
- 3 baseclass + "_" + language
- 4 baseclass

ResourceBundle automatically defers to this search order for any message ID that is not found in the specific language implementation or if the specific language implementation is missing.

The optional param values are substituted in the message text by the following rules:

- For each occurrence of the string "%n", the string is replaced by the object[n].toString() value. Note that this is a zero-based index.
- If "n" is out of bounds for the supplied params, the string "n/a" should be substituted. Note: during development, this situation threw an exception.
- If a param is not referenced by the message, the param should be ignored. Note: during development this situation is thrown an exception.
- Multiple references to the same param should be valid (e.g., "%0 blah %0").
- If the included object is a localizable object (Timestamp, Date, Time or Number) the locale-defined formatting rules are applied to this object.
- To code a percent sign in the message, code two percent signs (%%).
- To include all passed parameters, code "%all" in the message template. This is replaced by [arg0, arg1, ...].

The last class is ESString. This class logically extends the java.lang.String class for localization. It accepts a message ID and optional data objects in the same way as ESText does. The toString method localizes the message when it is called rather than when it is constructed.

Usage example

Below is an example of how the StartESCore message can be coded. The ESStrings.java class contains the following:

```
public class ESStrings extends ListResourceBundle
{
    public Object[][] getContents() {
        return contents;
    }
    static final Object[][] contents = {
        {"es.core.startup.Hello1",
        "Starting ES Core Server with " +
        "Rendezvous of \"%0\"..."},
        {"es.core.startup.Hello2", " started."}
    };
}
```

The StartESCore.java class contains the following:

```
System.out.print(ESText.getMessage(  
    "es.core.startup.Hello1", popURL));  
System.out.println(ESText.getMessage(  
    "es.core.startup.Hello2"));
```

The ESString class is used as follows:

```
throw new StaleEntryAccessException(  
    new ESString("es.core.startup.Hello2"));
```

Additional design considerations

ID specifications

To simplify the ID generation and reduce the chances of duplications, the IDs should follow the following convention:

- Use the dot format to specify the hierarchy. For example, message IDs for the StartESCore class should be "es.core.startup.StartESCore.*".
- The last node should be a short description string denoting the message. For example, the startup message issued today by StartESCore would have the ID of "es.core.starStartESCore.Hello".
- Messages are defined in the ESStrings class in sorted ID order.

Core generated exceptions

Because it is possible that the core is running in a different locale from the client, any message text produced in the core that is destined for a client should be specified in the client language. To do this, modify the exception classes to pass the additional objects instead of the text. The exception.getMessage code on the client side uses the ESText class to map the exception number to a message ID and performs the substitutions in the client's language.

Client usage

Client applications can use these classes as well. They need only call ESText.initialize() with the base class name for their ESStrings equivalent.

ESString Wire Format

```
class ESString{  
    String messageID;  
    Object[] info;  
}
```

The message ID specifies the text of the message in either the service-defined message catalog or the e-speak defined catalog. The message ID is used to retrieve a message template from the catalog (ESStrings). The optional Objects are substituted into the message based upon the syntax of the message template.

Message templates can contain the "%" (percent sign) symbol followed by a number. The number the index info object. The percent sign (and the number following it) are substituted with the toString value of the associated object.

An example entry from the current e-speak message catalog (net.espeak.util.ESStrings)

```
MessageID: "net.espeak.exception.4"  
Message template: "Parameter '%0' invalid type, expected '%1'"
```


[illegible][illegible]

003021 : 00000000



Glossary

This chapter needs check to make sure we are not using terms no longer needed. Terms to do with security (keys and locks) need to be removed. New terms need to be added: certificate, key, PKI, ACI, Principal, URL, ESPDU..... probably others.

Term	Meaning
Advertising Service	A service for looking up resources not registered in the local Repository. It returns zero or more Connection Objects.
Arbitration policy	A specification within the search request accessor for naming that provides the logic to resolve multiple matches found for a name search.
Attribute Vocabulary	See Vocabulary .
Base Vocabulary	A Vocabulary provided at system start-up.
Builder	An entity identified by a Remote Resource Handler that is used to construct the internal state of a Resource imported by value.
Certificate	A data structure assigning a Tag or name to a Subject. Certificates are signed using cryptographic techniques so they cannot be tampered with.

Term	Meaning
Certificate Issuer (CI))	A service issuing certificates to Subjects.
Client	Any active entity (e.g., a process, thread, service provider) that uses the e-speak infrastructure to process a request for a Resource.
Client library	The interface specification that defines the interface for e-speak programmers and system developers that will build e-speak-enabled applications.
Connection Manager	A Logical Machine's component that does the initial connection with another Logical Machine.
Contract	See Resource Contract .
Core	The active entity of a Logical Machine that mediates access to Resources registered in the local Repository.
Core Event Distributor	A Core-managed Resource whose purpose is to collect information on e-speak Events and make such information available to management tools within the infrastructures.
Core-managed Resource	A Resource with an internal state managed by the Core.
Distributor Service	A service that forwards published Events to subscribers.
Event	A message that results in the recipient invoking a registered callback.

Term	Meaning
Event filter	A subscription specification expressed as a set of attributes in a particular Vocabulary that must match those in the Event state in order for a Client to receive notification on publication of an Event.
Event state	A reference within an Event to its expressed set of attributes in a particular Vocabulary. These attributes must match the Event filter in order for the subscriber to receive notification of the Event.
Explicit Binding	An accessor that contains a Repository Handle.
Import Name Frame	A container that holds a name for each imported Resource.
Inbox	A Core-managed Resource used to hold request messages from the Core to a Client.
Issuer	An entity issuing a certificate. The Issuer is denoted in a certificate by its Public Key
Logical Machine	A Core and its Repository.
Lookup request	Resources with attributes matching the lookup request will be bound to a name in the Client's name space.
Lookup Service	The component that performs lookup requests used to find Resources that match attribute-value pairs in the Resource Description of Resources registered in the Repository.
Mailbox	Either an Outbox or an Inbox.

Term	Meaning
Mapping Object	An object binding an ESName to Resources or a Search Recipe.
Message	Means of Client-Core communication.
Metadata	Data that is not part of the Resource's implementation, but is used to describe and protect the Resource.
Name Frame	A Core-managed Resource that associates a string with a Mapping Object.
Name Search Policy	A name conflict resolution tool used by the Core to find the appropriate strings when looking up names in a Name Frame.
Outbox	The location where the Client places a message to request access to a Resource.
Pass-by value	A metadata field, which, when set to true, includes the state of the Resource in the Export Form.
Principal	The entity holding the Private Key corresponding to a given Public Key
Private Key	This is secret data. An entity demonstrates knowledge of this secret data by cryptographic techniques to authenticate itself. Private Keys must be kept secret
Private Security Environment (PSE)	A cryptographically secure store for Private Keys.



Term	Meaning
Protection Domain	The environment associated with a particular Outbox from which Resources can be accessed.
Publish	A request sent to the Distributor Service to publish Events.
Public Key	Non-secret data that is associated with a given Private Key by cryptographic techniques
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)	A set of services and protocols that support the use of public and private key pairs by applications for security.
Repository	A passive entity in the Core that stores Resource metadata and the internal state of Core-managed Resources.
Repository entry	The metadata of a Resource as stored in the Repository and made available to the Core when a Client's requests to access Resources are processed.
Repository Handle	An index into the Repository associated with the metadata of a Resource.
Repository View	A Resource that can be used to limit the search for particular Resources in a large Resource Repository, much as a database view restricts a search within a database.
Resource Contract	A Resource denoting an agreement between the Client and the Resource Handler for use of a particular Resource. The agreement includes a provision for the Client to use an API known to the Resource Handler when making the request for the Resource.

Term	Meaning
Resource	The fundamental abstraction in e-speak. Consists of state and metadata.
Resource Description	The data specified for the Attribute field of the metadata as represented by the Client to the Core. See also Resource Specification.
Resource Factory	An entity that can build the internal state of a Resource requested by a Client.
Resource Handler	A Client responsible for responding to requests for access to one or more Resources.
Resource Specific Data	A metadata field of a Resource. Carries information about the Resource. Can be public or private to the Resource Handler.
Resource Specification	Consists of all metadata fields, except the Attributes field, as represented by the Client to the Core.
Session Layer Security Protocol (SLS)	The low level message protocol used by all e-speak Cores and Clients for remote communication.
Service Identity (ServiceID)	A field in the metadata that identifies a service or Resource
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI)	A specific variant of PKI developed within the Internet Engineering Task Force and used by e-speak.
State	Data a Resource needs to implement its abstraction.

[illegible]